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CHAP'rER! 7 
REDUNDANCY; AN OCCUPATIONAL HAZARD. 
"The British working class had • • • come through a·· period of rapid ind-
ustrial mergers and rationalisation progra~mes involving large numbers 
of redundancies and closures, to reach the onset of a post-war record 
high in unemployment • • • 
To a generation of workers raised in the expectation of "full employment" 
••• the situation must have seemed unusually grim ••• This situation 
provided two major possibilities for a strong workforce facing redtmdancy: 
an atmosphere of fear • • • or of anger. The reality in many cases was 
a mixture of both ••• ". 
Introduction. 
This chapter sets out to examine the employment 'climate' in which worker 
occupations first appeared. It looks at· the (relatively) unique situat-
ion of the late 1960s/ early 1970s; marked by a record of unemployment 
unparalleled since the Depression o~- the 1930s, and by the rapid ~eyel­
opment of company mergers and (so-called) rationalisations which made a 
large contribution to the situation in the form of large-scale redundancies 
and closures. 
It is argued that the economic situa.tion changed so rapidly 
and so dramatically as to contribute to the feeling·of a need for drastic 
action among militant workers facing redundancy. Unlike previous post-
war periods of "high"- unemployment this later period was unique in that 
hardly any areas or regions of the country could be considered to have 
1 
"lor1" unemployment rates • For the worker facing redundancy at the onset 
of the 1970s there was very little scope for imagining that a .. move to 
the South" could help resolve the problem. Nor was there much scope for 
believing that economic recovery was just over the horizon; that a period 
of unemployment would just be short-term. The media, the trade unions, 
the Government and all other political parties were united in pressing 
home the point that Britain was part of a "world recession" with no 
1. See chapter J. 
1 immediate sign of recovery • 
;,. ..... 
~: 
In such a situation, it can be argued. th~ proviston of redund-
ancy payments (and allied sums) are of limited value. Such payments 
were meant to alleviate~''' hardship faced in redundancy situations, make. 
labour more "flexible", and - debatably - help to buy off industrial 
militancy. These schemes have worked Up to a :point2 but usually where the •. · 
recipient feels fairly certain of experiencing only short-term unemploy- . 
ment. . In the pioneering occupa. tions the · prosw;ct ;.()f_ long,.:.t~rnt hnemvhl-~ 
'l!B:t was added to a feeling of anger at the unjustness o:f the situation., 
The White Hea·t of the Technological Revolution. 
Wf1en the Labour Government was returned to office in 1966 the economy was 
in a critical state. Among the measures a~ounced to deal withthe prqb ... 
lem was a gover:nment programme aimed at modernising and expanding certain 
of Britain's industries~ In many industrie?.i a la.rge numbei~ of ente:r:-:pri.")es. 
were badly in need of modernisation and were falling behind many of their 
overseas competitors: (this was crucially the case with the shipbuilding 
-.,. __ ·· industry)., ·Anothe:r:· maj'or.. threat to Bri,tish ind.ustry lay in the fact. tha:t;, · 
many foreign multi-natioP..al companies had a. compe-t-itive advantage in their 
economic size~ As Newens (1970) explains it, 
"T'nere are considerable advantages to be achieved by the economies of 
scale which are possible. 'Ihe larger production runs may involve the. 
closure of inferior plant and fuller utilization of the best equiplllent 
but such operations provide savings in overa.ll capital and labour costs · · 
provided that the market· can be found. · 
In the marketing process, there are very considerable advant-
ages in large-scale operations. The cost of exporting is always much 
higher per unit of output for the small firm. The cost of establishing 
nationally or interna.tioP4lly known brand names can. only be recouped if 
sales are on a massive scale"• (J). · · 
-· ......... 
··~ 
·-._ 
-----------------------------------------------------------------
1. This phrasa "r;orld recession11 always erroneously implies all nations 
including most of the socialist states which are experiencing rapid 
growth rates. 
2. Cf. D .'.-iedderburn, 1965. 
;. p. 2." 
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This was the case, for example, of companies in the electrical engineering 
"!!; 
industry. At this time three fairly large companies dominated the British 
industry but were too small to stay in competition in an increasingly 
competitive world market1• 
To improve the productivity, efficiency, and competitiveness of 
British industry the Government introdtced a 'Prices and Incomes• policy 
which placed heavy emphasis on productivity bargaining; introduced a 
"Selective Employment Tax" to force the service industries to shed labour 
and thus direct it towards manufacturing; and set up an "Industrial 
Re-organisation Corporation" (IRC). 
The IHC was established with the task of,' 
"promoting industrial efficiency and profita~ility and assisting the 
economy of the United Kingdom • • • " (2). / 
The Corporation had one-hundred-and-fifty million pounds available to . 
achieve its task through rationalisations and mergers. 
Over the next few years both productivity deals and mergers went 
on at a tremendous pace. In the first full year of the IRC (1967) the 
value of mergers stood at seven-hundred-and-eighty-one million pounds; 
over the period 1954-58 it had only averaged around one-hundred million 
per year. For 1968 the figure was around two-and-a-third-thousand million. 
By 1972 the value for the year climbed to a record two-and-a-half-thousand 
millions. For the entire period 1964-72 over eight thousand companies · · 
were involved in mergersJ. Productivity deals which had only covered a 
1. G.Chadwick, 1970, p.l78. 
2. The IRC ACT, quoted in G.Doughty, 1970, p.57 
J. Cf. Labour Research, Vol. LVIII, No.5, Hay 1969 ... Mergers: Faster and 
Bigger"; Labour Research, Vol.62, No.J, March 1973. "Nonopolies and 
Mergers"; 0.Newens, 1970 
. ~- . 
r f 3612 ·~· I : 
half million worke:rs prior to .1966 covered a total of e:ight~and~~~half 
"": ... -
million by 1969. 
Redundancies were also going on at a tremendous :pace. On the 
one hand, workers were being .,shaken outn of industry due to the Select-
ive Employment Tax, rationalisation schemes designed to reduce so-called. 
inefficient sections of work, and. through mergers which in severa.i cases 
meant the . closuxe of certain sections doing duplicate aDD/or le~~ . efficien~ ·,· 
. ·,_;.,._. 
work. On the other hand, productivity ba.rga,jning wa.s reducing the margin 
. . 
of spare capacity within certain industries and thus,.reducing the ·~limber 
of workers required. In short, many of those made redundant faced a. · 
situation.. where replacement jobs weJ."e incr~aa.ingly dwindlinel o. .· ... -
.·In the first full yea:r .. of the 'Redundan~~·Payments Act•:,·::i966' .. 
payments were made to 137,000 workerse This rose to a quarter-of-a-
.... 
,.·· ·million in the year ending September 19692.. Certainly several mergers·.· .. 
achieved one of t~· aiDs of increasingly profitabilit;. for certain com:pa.nies3, . . , 
it is highly debatable, however, that such mergers are a success stor:r in· 
ancies have occm--:red in many merged firms ana~ :tn B, number of cases . thes& 
companieS. have not the achieved financial success to compensate for this .. ·. 
One study of mergers has shown that of 69 acquisitions by twenty major cor-
. ·. ·.. . .···.···.•······. 4' . 
· pora.tions a. third could be classified as failures within seven yea.rs •. 
1. See table '5~ This shows a sharp and rapid ga.p between unemployed and 
vacancies from 1966 to 1971. 
2. These are only those receiving such payments~ As those with under 2 
years continuous employment at a particular company are not e±igible 
for such payments they are not recorded aJll.Ong the redundancies. Thus,_ 
the figures are underestimates. 
3. "Nergers are extremely profitable to the shareholders of the taken-.over 
company, and astute directc;>rs cat1 wring more out of the bidding firm 
by opposing the bid". labour Research, op cit, Hay 1969. 
4. J.Kitching, 1967- quoted in Newens, 1970, p.27. 
•:,_ 
J 2.. 
l 
l' j 
~' 1V · •· · ·~ •' • ' 'e 
* ~ 
0 p 
c+ 
::r' (I)· 
t:J 
ro 
~ 
t-j g- .. 
(1) 
~ 
0 
H.l 
t;t.~ 
•• 
.. 
Unemployed and vacancies: Greet Britain 
Three-month movln~r :wer:tgel sc:uon:~.l!y adjusted 
THOUSANDS 
1000 .. I 
i· I I I 1.:: ! 
i 
I ' l I I I j I ., I I --.-· I I I I ·' 
900 
I 
8001 ;.· I 
. I I I l I l 
Wholly unemployed excluding schoolleavers and f!dutt stu~en"tS I 1--·1-· 
I l I 
Unfilled vacancies, adults 
I 
.......................... o 
·~ -
~ 
L-=:1 
:c:: 
~ 
0 
E 
C: 
~ .. 
i?-3 
s 
i=l 
0 
!;] 
b 
Ro 
.a 
!-' 
0 
'rj 
ro 
~ 
1oo1 · 1 r 1 I l I 1··.· I J-n---t--t-t-1',-l--
sooa I I l I l I 1 I I' 1'--+-~~-~ 
~ ~ >· !:_j;!' !Z . ~.h c:: ' ' ~ -, __ _ 
tJj . ., 
~ 
~ 
N 
(D 
c+ 
c+ 
ro 
1 . I : .. 
I I ; <: 
I 
: > 
.. 
I 0 
5oo1 -1 I 1 -- · ·- ·---- -- __ ____, ~ 
~ I o . H 1-' l?'.l 
'-0 ' u: ~ ' 
. , . I > ....,., ., . <: 
.. 400 . --- ~---- ------- -----···--·-:- > 
< I H ~ I ~ • . tJj 
t-' --- ~ 
z 
0 
• >' 
... I 
• : l ; 
~ i ·. 
VI 
.. 
,..l· I·· ~-
.. . ~ / ----~-.-- ·~ : .... .. __ /_ .... .,~~.;~-~-.. -.-·-- --- ----~ .. ;___ ___ .. _,_. ··: 
• I .. t• •' t, t '• ,... '"•tt • \..1\ ............ • •• I .l., ... .. ..... .... ••••••• •• ~. t 
1956 1957 .1~~~ 
~ ·~ .• \.,. I •• , ••• • .•• :' 
OJ \. ~:.· :l ."',. \ f· ., ~. .l 
·t... ... .,.,....... ,:1 ••• •• 
..... ~. ...... . ~. , •• ••••• . • t "··· ,•'' .. j.... . ' ...... ·j .,,.·:;, .... /· 
1 i '. • • 0 • • • • • ·: • -· •• '. • ~ 
1001 . •• .. .. .. b) ·-
1959 .1960 1961 1962 19~3 1964. 19pg 19?9 .1967 196~3' 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 . ,_, .~i;:ii:f;. 
... ~:. 
'· 
An estimate of the situation particularly regarding the United Kingdom 
puts the success rate at bearly one in nine1• ,. 
In early 1968 'The Economist• was predicting that around one-and-
a-half million workers would be effected by rationalisation and reorgan-
isation schemes over the period 1968-69 and warned tha·li, 
"rationalisation means men out of jobs\• (2). 
Indeed it did. Courtaulds took over Lancashire Spinners with a resulting 
loss in four-and-a-half thousand jobs. Tube Investment took over Coventry 
Tool and Guage in the same period involving the closing down of·a factory 
which had been opened new less than a year previous. In January 1969 
the British Leyland Motor Company was born of a merger and began by making 
no less than two-and-half percent of its wor~orce redundant, and the 
... / . 
giant merger of GEC-EE- C~,:. led to the lay off of several thousands in its 
first year as a new company (1968:69). ''~ ' ..... 
' · · : · : ·. Jlithir1 ·the public se.ctor the trend was towards contraction. Tens 
of thousands were made redundant in the mining,. railways and steel industry. 
In mining the number of colliery closures was running at one per week in 
1969. Between 1956 and 1970 the labour force fell from 697,400 down to 
295,650 as the number of pits dwindled from 840 to just 2993• Railway 
industry employment was halved over the period 1959-74 and the mileage of 
railway track was reduced to its lowest point since the 186os4• In steel 
1. Quoted by S.Newens, 1970, p.27. 
2. Ibid, p.59 
J. M.McGahey, 1971. 
4. c.I.s. Report, No.l4, p.J2. 
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50,000 jobs were lost over 1967-721• 
"Partly through the activities of Government agencies like the I.R.C., 
but partly also through the harsh facts of Britain's ••• economic 
situation, redundancy is sweeping the nation" (2). 
What the 'Sunday Times' failed to say 'Was that the Government's handling 
of the economic situation was further exasperating the crisis and adding 
to the growing unemployment. 
Unemployment and Government Policy. 
Unemployment had rarely exceeded a yearly figure of a quarter-of-a-million 
in any post-war year up to 19583, but that year it reached four-hundred ~ 
thousand. The next year it climbed a further forty-four thousand but 
... /__. . 
then fell away to below the third-of-a-million mark by 1961. It reached 
a new high of a half-million in 1963 but again fell away to the third~of 
-a-million mark by 1966. When the Labour Government retained office that 
year unemployment had only once exceeded the half million mark throughout 
most of the 1950 and 1960s. From that point on the figure was to never 
fall below the h~lf·'million mark ( with the lone exception of 1969). 
Nineteen-sixty-six was a significant yeara it ma:rked "a turning 
point in Britain's post-war economic historyn4• This was the year in ~rhich, 
"the Labour Government abandoned its committment to full employment, 
responded to capitalist pressure • • • (and) took drastic steps to 
restore business "confidence" in the pound and in the orthodoxy of its. 
policies" (5). 
1. 'An Expanding Future for steel', produced by TASS section of the AUEW, 
-undated. 
2. Quoted in S.Newens, 1970, p.59 
J. The figures refer to Great Britain. 
LJ.. B.Rowthorne, 1973. 
5. Ibid. 
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From this point the Government began to concentrate on combating inflation 
and at the expense of employment policies. Not only was the question of 
maintaining employment relegated to a secondary position but it was to be 
increasingly used as a means of creating deflation. The situation has 
been adequately summed up by Barratt-Brown (1972), 
"Today the task of the State ••• of kintaining aggregate demand at 
home • • • is made the more difficult by the absence of captive markets 
overseas to be pre-empted. 
Today the transnational corporations which alone can finance 
the large-scale plants of modern industry are engaged in mopping up the 
markets of their technologically less advanced competitors in each 
other's countries of origin ••• 
The Governments of the advanced capitalist societies find it 
more difficult to control their foreign payments as giant corporations 
switch their funds, both long term and short term, across the national 
exchanges. The Government's armoury of weapons for managing aggregate 
demand and employment without inflation or foreign payments imbalances 
proves to be inadequate. __ 
The deliberate creation of unemployment has to be added to the 
armoury; and· {ull employment becomes a secondary aim to national econ-
omic competitiveness". 
From late 1968 to July 1971 successive governments carried out intensive 
deflationary policies~ This was done through the cutting down of public 
sector investments and through deflationary monetary and credit policies. 
Within the period there was a major fall in the capital expenditure of 
the nationalised industries to such an extent that the first post-war 
fall in overall public sector investment was recorded. Money supply was 
severely restricted, credit was made more difficult, and long term 
interest rates were raised to ten percent and above. This had the effect 
of pushing the annual interest payments of the nationalised industries 
and local authorities up by six-hundred million pounds over 1967-70. One 
of the major results was a substantial cut in construction work1• 
1. Barratt-Brown, 1972. 
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·These policies began to be felt in the winter of 1971-72 when, by ~oven~ 
"'!.; 
ber the unemployment rate was just short of the one..:million mark1; the. 
highest point since 1939. By January the figure had actually gone. over 
the million mark. That month the Prime Minister, in direct contrast to 
the facts, was to state that, 
'\ 
"We stand now on the threshold of a period of growth and prosperity 
unparalleled since the war". 
It was only the unemployment level, however, that was unparalleled and it 
was to remain so~ Although the rate fell back slowly over the next months 
it was never to fall below seven-hundred thousand and has since risen to 
even greater levels after 1973;. reaching one-and-a-half millions and 
rarely falling below a new "floor" of one-million. 
There is little doubt that in terms of the rate of unemployment 
(and within that, the number of redundancies) confronting workers from· 
the late 1960s onwaids that it was an unprecedented situation. A situation 
which was inclined to impress upon certain workers the need for desperate 
responses. It was in fact the period when unemployment had first reached 
its highest post~war-peak that worker occupations first begaJ,l to appear.-
The Pioneering Occupations: Some Case Studies. 
In each of the early occupations the workforce involved faced a situation 
of redundancy against a background of high local an~ national unemplo~­
ment. In some cases the redundancies threatened the community as well . 
as the particular workforce. 
The GEC-EE Company: Prior to i967 three companies dominated the 
electrical engineering industry - GEC, AEI, and EE1• In January 1967 
1. The General Electric Company; Associated Electrical Industries and 
English Electric. 
.. 
..... ·.·.·· . . :·. 
···,· .. ·· 
·. , .. · 
the Department of Economic A:ffa.irs (DEA) recommended the need for a. .ra.t-
. J 
ionalisa.tion of the heavy electrical industry1 " Thi~ was wssed o;er to . ~ I . 
the new IRC in ~~rch with the brief of attempting to effect a merger of 
the industry's main companies. Before the end of the year the GEC and 
AEI companies were merged and shortly afterwards English Electric took 
over Elliott Automation (with fifteen 'million pounds backing from. the IRC). 
\ 
In 1968 GEC-AEI was encouraged to merge withEE.. The Government 
- tru::ough the IRC ~ not only developed the merger but refus~ to :refer it 
... to the Monopolies Commission for reference. The Government, 
. . 
"having carefully analysed the dif'fere:nt sectors of ind.u..stry in which the 
two companies operate (were) satisfied that conditions of effective com-
petition would continue over mast of the U~K .. ma,rke.t" (2} .. 
In addition it •. wa.s noted that, 
·."there would be som:e instances where the deg-.cee of concentration woul.d 
be high • • • in these cases the new group would be selling princi:pa,l;Ly 
to na. tionalised corporations which are in the pos:i tion of monopoly buy-· 
· ers and which, having been consulted, have :raised. no objections to the 
·merger" (J). · 
The new company came into being towards the end of 1968.and with around 
a quarter-of-million .workers it was· easily the la..rgest em:pl<:;ye:;.:- in the 
private sector. Interna.tionally9 in terms of. to~ sal.es 9 the new company 
quickly became the tenth largest electrical engineering combine in the 
worldo By the end of its first year its pre ... tax proftts stood at fo1.'1:y-
nine million pounds and w• to reach seventy ... seven million for the yea;x: 
of 1972. 
1. The DEA had assessed that the ordering programme of the Central Elec-
tricity Generating Board - a key customer - would tail off by the end 
of the 196Ga, leaving a serious overcapacity in the indU.Stry.. ;~.;. · · . 
2. CIS Report, No.12, The General Electric Company Ltd, 1973, pp.l2-i)><. 
J. Ibid. 
--
·.; .. ,.· 
{ 
.
. ·~o.·m.: 
'J .. · ·7 ~ ... j 
Much of the new company's increased profitability was due to the efforts · 
and philosophy of the Hanaging Director, Arnold Wein?tockl..( When he took 
over the running of the com:pa.ny the 'Sunday Times' was to note that, 
"When Arnold Weinstock entered G.E.C. his prime task was to weed out waste. 
Getting to grips with this has involved making every manager in the· group 
acutely conscious of fractions of a :penny, and personal responsibility 
for profit- ha..."i been raised to virtually unparalleled :peaks11 (2) ~ 
\ 
A key problem for the workforce lay in the interpretation and rigidity of ,. 
"waste" and ":profitability".. Arnold Weinstock's conc~pt was geared to ··.• . 
relative profitability to the extent that factories {or sectionS) coUld 
. . ·:. 
. . . . . . . ·· ... .·.:._.·:. 
, be closed do·ri'n if they were not earning the right ma.rgi.:J.~ of profits . and · ·· 
if the capital could be more profitably re-emp~oyed elsewhere). 'DuS,.w~ · 
. .. . . "' . :. . .· '. :, . :· . . . . . '· .. . ;'X . .• . . ·, .·· .. 
~eJII.erit·,~~~me!,:·t~t,_th~:;~w.~rK cq~-~ · ,9-Q~e;F~P~J Qb,.~:ply . el§~Wh~re. :/:>.,;)' ·:: _ .. • 
'\ \, r' -~·~·..,.. • 
::'J;o;-a:IJ~~:via.t~ the obvious objections of the trade unions invoi-· 
ved the company. promised to confer with them, and appropriate governm.entr . 
de~ments, about matters tha.t would seriously affect the ~orkf'orce ·or 
h~ve a. bearing on governmental policy for regional. a.idl.J. •. The reality, 
""' ... :; .. · 
~~ssive redundancies~; one of the first items on the age~ 
of the new company 41 and in Fe bruaJ:'Y 1969 the 1Economist' wrote, 
.... 
·'..--; 
... ~ ' 
1. 'deinstock •s philosophy amounted to, "if it dosen1t pa.y, it ~~nttr· ~ta.yJ!:;:~:~,~ . 
2. Quoted in CIS report, No-.12,. p.l). 
). G.Chadwick~ 1970, p.179. One of Weinstock's measurements of efficiency 
was based on the ratio of profit to workers employed. In 1969 this 
4. 
was £21) for every employee but by 1972 had reached £424 (or ~8 per 
week for e'rery employee). · · .. _ . 
... ... ~ 
..____ . 
Before the merger GEC promised to create four thousand new jobs in · ~-~, 
scotland, the North East and South Wales ani received a government 
Development Grants Scheme award of £400,000. In addition it received 
£5 for each person that it trained. .for 1968 alone GEC received £1.7 
million in various forms of govern~ent aid. 
Cf. CIS Report, No.l2. 
' . . 
~·~':"':••:•">" ~, ... -· .. ,, '< ,,, .... ,.,.,..,.,,,_'"~'N'C-·'''•'-"~·•-·"""'F.'>·<--"·•>·m•"' "''"""' "" "' "'" """'<"'""'"' • •" , . .,, . ., 
r • 
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"Already there are rumblings around Whitehall about Arnold Weinstock not 
'playing the game' the way the Government wants. As the Industrial Re-
organisation Corporation was instrumental in the aggrandisement of GEC, 
some MPs feel that Mr.Weinstock should show a proper degree of grate-
fulness" (1). 
Redundanciesa Following the merger of GEC-AEI there were large-
scale redundancies at nine of the company's factories in 1968; with the 
loss of eleven thousand jobs. One of the first to go was AEI Process 
Control, (Harlow) with the loss of four hundred jobs, despite the fact 
that the company's joint managing director had given assurances that there 
t b . dund. • 2 were o e no maJor re anc~es • This was followed with eight hundred 
further redundancies at the Temple Fields factory in Harlow. By 1972 
GEC employment was down (by twelve hundred) to just two-hundred-and-fifty. 
At the time of the second Harlow redundancies the closure of AEI tele-
communications (Woolwich) was announced; over five thousand jobs were to 
go. Seven other·:(actories were closed in the next few months. 
The sto~y·was the same with the new merger withEE. In February 
1969 two-thousand-seven-hundred jobs were declared redundant at the 
company's factories at Rugby, Newton-le-\fillows, Witton and Liverpool, and 
in ~1ay further redundancies were announced for Stafford, Birmingham, Cross 
Heath, Kidsgrove and at Watson and Sons3• In August six-thousand more 
jobs were under threat at Manchester, Ashton-under-Lyne, Chesham, Whetstone, 
Accrington, Staffo:r:d, Bradfo:r:d, Trafford Park, and the three Liverpoo~ 
factories of Netherton, Napiers and East Lanes Road. 
From the first merger in 1967 more than sixty-four thousand jobs 
1. Edition of February 8th, 1969. 
2. The previous November the question had been raised in the Commons by 
Labour MPs Norman Atkinson (Tottenham) and Stan Newens (Harlow) and 
as a response to the debate assurances had been given by the company. 
). In this round of redundancies 1,255 jobs were to be lost in addition 
to the 2,000 announced in February. 
.. 
were axed by 1972 and almost half of these were due to direct redundancy: 
/ . 
·. I . ,. : . 
the workforce was reduced down to a total. of around :·one-hundred-and-eighty 
1 thousand,. 
The Liverpool Factories: By the time closure and redun~cy 
was announce~ for ~he Liverpool factories a whole series of redundancies 
\ 
had occurred in the company. Already nineteen factories had been affected 
and over fifteen thousand jobs axed. In addition ten other factories 
were announced due for three thousand redundancies the same month as the • 
announcement about the Liverpool factories. Thus, for the Liverpool 
workers ·t.heir redundancies had come at the end. of a ·long line of redund.- ·. 
ancies and was part of a company policy of further, large-scale,. redund-
ancies. 
Further, the Liverpool workers had. the uneasy knowledge that 
little fight, a.nd .. little co-o:cdinated effort, ha.d. been put up within the 
company. Where it had it had been defeated and despite fairly strong 
trad._e union situations2• 
The redundancies could ha-rdly have been a.t a. worse time., Une:m:-
ployment was at one of its highest post-war points for t1'i& country as a .... 
wbole3; it was over half-a-million for the thi:cd successive year. Locaily4 
unemployment was slightly higher than the national average; with more 
than seventy-five thousand out of work. Against this background the . 
Liverpool workers sought to take dramatic action to stem~ the GEC tide of 
redundancy and closure. It is more than a little ironic that of the 
1. see table 6 which lists the company's redundancies over 1968:.72;,.,:·:.:-. 
2. The Harlow workforce Has 100% unionised and the \~oolwich workforce 
were both strongly organiGed ~ld had a militant local tradition to draw on. 
3. That is, Great Britain. 
-: . .. -· 
l}. 11Locally .. refers to the Department of E:nployment category "£iorth West Region". 
5. A planned work-in, however, was called off, see chapter 4. 
TABLE 6 
REDUNDANCIES IN THE GEC-AEI/GEC-EE COMPANY, 1968-72. 
1968 Feb Woolwich 5500' Thermal Control Div. 
Sydenham 400 ~ E. Kilbride & Motherwell 
Blackheath } 200 Marconi Elliott Computer Harlow Systems Ltd., 
Harlow. 400; Borehamwood 50 
May Witton (B'haml 1650: Nov Accrington Bushings Unit 
Wythenshaw 300 GEC Transformers Ltd .• 
Aldridge 80 Wythenshawe 750 
Coventry 1650 
Willesden 1200 
1971 April Witham 300 
1969 Feb Rugby 140 to Harlow 269 
Newton·le-Willows 1200 Nov Stafford 238 
Witton 1200 Hersh am 241 
Liverpool 200 Glenrothes 150 
May Stafford 300 Rochester 520 
Birmingham 570 Slough 280 
Cross. Heath 150 Willesden 210 Amersham 200 Kidsgrove 135 Wins ford 90 Watson & Sons 100 Hammersmith 65 
Aug Manchester 50 Lincoln 50 
Ashton Under Lyne 140 Liverpool 350 
Chesham 40 Trafford Park 775 
Whetstone 230 Whitton 80 
Walthamstow 810 Bridgend 270 
Netherton 1400 Kidsgrove 230 
Accrington 285 Rugby 200 
Stafford 305 Basildon 80 
Bradford 50 Walthamstow 290" 
Liverpool 305 Bradford 70 
Manchester 810 ... 
Napier 1400 1972 Jan Chelmsford 605 
· Trafford Park 200 Coventry 150 
Wembley 500 
1970 (The Sunday Times 4.7 .71 Stafford . 492 
estimates a further 8000 Greenwich & Lewisham 100 
redundancies in 1970) Harsham 450 
April Witton Moulded Plastics Wembley 500 
Ltd. 60' Stafford 550 
May GEC Power Eng. Ltd., March Swinton 620 
· Reactor Equip. Div., Maryport 40 
Whetstone . 60 Lewisham 60 
July GEC Semiconductors Ltd. Newton-Ia-Willows 160 
Marconi Elliott Microelec. April Accrington 325 Witham 65 to Rugby 100 Trafford Park Research Aug Kidsgrove 555 Lab. 55 Lincoln 380 
Oct GEC Elec. Components Ltd. Manchester (Barton) 60 
*Table taken from the C.I.S. Anti-Report on the G.E.C. Company, :p.24. 
I 
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occupations which did occur.within the company, since 1972, not one 
.... .-
concerned redundancy. One concerned an equal pay is13ue and the rest was 
over pay and conditions. 
Revolt on the Clyde: The UCS Work-in: In the 1890s the British 
shipbuilding industry produced eighty percent of the world 1 s steam ship,,. 
tonnage. A large percentage of this was carried out at yards on the 
Tyne, Tees and Wear of North East England and on Scotland's Clyde, 
Despite the continued importance of these yards, however, insecurity of 
employment was a feattire of the work for the shipyard workers: there was 
always a large element of casual employment and the nature of the work 
process provided an avenue for the employers to dismiss workers as their 
particular element of work was completed. 
Like other heavy industries, shipbuilding has suffered badly 
in times of economic recession. In the early 1920s/ early 1930s unemploy-
ment in the industry was over twenty percent: in 1933 it peaked to sixty-
three percent. 
Af~er the second world~war the industry experienced something 
of a revival. British yards were producing about forty-five percent of 
the world~ shipping tonnage by 1949 and employment levels were at their 
highest point since 1914. From this position enormous ~ofits were made. 
The real problem was that very little re-investment was made in the i~dustry 
at this time, and no real attempt was made to predict future trends in 
world shipping needs. Other countries, the Japanese for example, did 
modernise and as a result began to gain larger shares of the world market. 
By 19 54 the British industry was reduced to twenty-seven percent of that 
market, and two years later down to twenty-one percent. Worse, These were 
reducing shares of an expanding world market in a period of post-war boom 
that was about to tail off.. 
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The industry was moving into another critical situation. This was added 
":' .. -
to this time by the fact that the British industry was underinvested, 
competition was much sharper (more modernised and backed with government 
finance subsidies), and with increasing numbers of British shipowners 
buying from abroad. In the early 1960s a number of yards on the Clyde 
\ .· 
were closed down as Britain's share of the, now much reduced, world market 
fell to eleven percent. 
When the world market revived somewhat in the mid-1960s the 
British yards were unprepared and illfitted to meet the demand - for 
giant tankers a.nd bulk carriers; their share of the market now fell to 
eight percent. 
As the situation deteriorated rap~41y the new Labour Government 
set up the Geddes Committee to look into the industry. The Committee 
recommended, in February 1966, the rationalisation of the industry through 
amalgamation of yards within certain areas, through concentration of 
production, through.high productivity and through a reduction of the 
workforce. A newtShipbuilding Industry Board' wa.s to.eM.ure the success 
of this report. Leading sections of the Scottish Labour and Trade union 
movement argued that if public funds were to be used then it should be 
done to nationalise the industry, but the Labour Government were deaf to 
1 this proposal • 
Upper Clyde Shiubuilders: The UCS was created as a result of· 
the Geddes Committee report. It came into being in February 1968 
consisting of five yards; Fairfields, John Brown, Connell, Stephens and 
1. Despite large-scale government assistance the industry continued into 
decline and by the mid-1970s the Labour Government of the time saw a 
definate need to take it into public ownership. 
1 Yarrow • From the first there were several anomalies. Yarrow maintained 
'!!• 
its own Board of Directors by virtue of the fact that the new UCS only 
·. \ 
owned fifty-one percent of its shares; this section was relatively profit-
able. Fairfields was also to some extent profitable2 • The remaining three 
yards had been near to bankruptcy on the eve of the merger· and, in fact, 
"Without the merger John Browns would have gone bankrupt, and Connells 
and stephens were probably heading for bankruptcy too. That was why 
they were in such a hurry to get into the. merger" (3). 
The UCS, thus, came into being with an inheritance of twelve 
million pounds worth of accumulated losses. The Shipbuilding Industry 
Boa.:rd (SIB) was only to provide it with three-and-a-ha.li' million towards 
paying off this sum plus a fUrther two million for the building of a 
covered yard for Yarrows. All further government assistance had to be 
-----
repeatedly negotiated for and despite the fact that the nature of ship-
building requires a~:relia~. on large sums. of credit and substantial 
liquidity. As Thompson and Hart (1972) have claimed, 
"An adequate provision at the begining would have eliminated the- need for 
continuous applications" (4 ). . · · . 
Instead the UCS was .. to face*' on various occasiomv, .' a capital starvation 
crisis.· On one such occas.sion, in 1970, the government assistance was 
only forthcoming after shipbuilding had been discontinued at the stephens 
yard, with the loss of three-and-a-half thousand boilermakers' jobs. 
1. In terms of ownership. of the UCS the Government's holding was 17i% 
through its 5G% ownership of Fairfields; the total Fairfields holding 
was 35%; John Browns, JC..'%; Yarrow, 2G%, Stephens, lWo and Connells, 5%. 
2. Although the trade unions were. part owners in Fairfields they were not 
permitted any representation on the UCS Board.. . .. _ --
J. Comment from the first Deputy Chairman of UCS. Reproduced in the. 
'Sunday Times•, 24th June 1971. 
4. p.42. I have drawn heavi1:t: on this work for this section and also -
D.Harrison and p.smith,. 19!2; ~.Johnston, 1975; and ~cottish TUC Re~ort 
'Cow~ittee of Enquiry into the Proposed Run-Down of Upper Clyde ~hip-
builders, 1971. · 
.. 
··- ........ . 
Despite a number of difficulties by the begi.m~ of 1971 the UCS had. worked 
~·-
off a backlog of unprofitable orders and was one of :the few; shipyards in 
- - . 
the world to have an order book composed of shi~taken on at current 
prices. The order book of thirty-four ships worth ninety million pounds 
was enough to keep the yards employed for some years. And yet the 
Conservative Government of the time engaged in a remarkable series of 
events. To begin with, they both refused to provide a;ny necessary or". 
give any gua~ntees of any future aid. · This prevented the acceptance 
of potential orders and provoked a situation of panic and alarm among 
various suppliers; a fact. which helped to accelerate the ya.:r;ds' probiems. 
In February of 1971 the profitable Yarrow yard, which had received the 
bulk of SIB financial assistance, was hived off from the UCS. 'lhe ·-
~---· ... 
company was in a crisis situation but still the Government refused 
assistance to what it called "a lame duck". Instead it recommended 'that 
the yards be reorganised with a resulting closure of two yards and an 
overall loss of five-and-a-half thousand jobs. 
UnemploYment a.¢._j.he 9,~qttis!1 R~t Nuch of Scotland's industry 
was based, at the turn of the century, on the heavy industries of coal~ 
railways, and shipbuilding. The Clyde at this point was the world's· 
leadiP~ shipbuilder, and down the water Giasgow was Britain's greatest 
railway locomotive manufacturer. Both industries, ~ong with coal. 
suffered a recession in the 1920s and JOs. A£ter the war shipbu~lding 
and railwa~saw something of a revival but this was shortlived. Ship-
building went into crisis towards the end of the 1950s and railway loco-
motive building was cut back sharply as a result of the 'Beaching Plan' 
-~. 
.... 
-~-
at the start of the 1960s. In both cases the Glasgow area suffered part-
~ .. -
icularly badly. The same was true of mining for Scotland as a wholea 
employment fell from over one-hundred thousand in 1950 to fifty-five 
thousand by 19671• Shipbuilding employment, for the same period, fell 
from seventy-three thousand to fifty thousand. 
Unemployment for the Scottish Region had for some time been at 
least double the national average as the 1970s approached. The 1970s 
began with more than ninety-three thousand Scots looking for work2 ; the 
worst period of unemployment since 1963. Nationally the figure had 
reached a new high point with over six-hundred thousand people registered 
as unemployed. By December national unemployment had fallen slightly by 
seven thousand but was still over the six-hun~red thousand mark, but in 
/ 
scotland it rose to a new peak of just under one-hundred thousand. In 
the new year things deteriorated rapidly; reaching one-hundred-and-twenty 
thousand in April and a national figure of three~uarters-of-a-million?. 
In July the UCS was on the verge of collapse and a request for 
six-million pounds worth of government aid was flatly rejected. 
The Work-ina Towards the end of July the UCS workforce had 
experienced a period of erosion in the shipbuilding industry on a fairly 
large scale. ~~ny jobs had been lost on the Clyde and indeed within the 
UCS itself. Unemplo.yment, both locally and nationally, had risen rapidly 
1. Seventy-five percent of the pits were closed over the period. 
2. 'l'he figure represents 4.3% of the Scottish labour force. 
J. The respective percentage figures are 5.6% and 3.2%. 
to previously unknown ha}.gbts in the post-war period. In July itsel£ 
~.-
Scotland had one-hundred-and-twenty-eight thousand ~employed; six percent 
1 
of the workforce • The figure does not tell the complete story for it 
masks even greater unemployment among shipbuilders and workers in the 
Glasgow area. In the trades most affected by the threatened redundancies 
the unskilled UCS worker faced a situation of one vacancy for. every four-
hundred-and-thirteen unemployed. Of the four most affected trades in 
the yards - joiners, plumbers, electricians and fitters - the ratio was 
one job for every sixty-two unemployed. Platers and sheet iron workers 
faced a one to thirty-eight ratio, and those in the professional, technical 
or executive category faced a one in five ratioo In the Glasgow area as 
a whole over ten-and-half percent were unemployed, of whom forty percent 
___ _, ... .--
had been unemployed for more than six months. In terms of vacancies 
there was only one for every twenty unemployed •. A survey made after the 
work-in had begun revealed that thirty-one percent of UCS workers made 
redundant nine months prior to the work-in were still unemployed2• 
Added to the debit side was the fact that upwards of thirty 
thousand jobs relied on the continued existance of the ucs.3. In the 
words of Thompson and Hart (1972), 
"Add to the breadwinners their families, and some appreciation can be 
gained of shipbuilding's significance on the Clyde" (4). 
1. The national figure had edged up to J.J% 
2. Scottish 1UC Report, op cit, 1971. They found that of their sample 
forty-two percent of the 50-59 year olds had not found jobs • 
.3. Estimate by Tnompson and Hart (1972), p.9. The STUC Report (1971) 
put the estimate at the least at a total loss of 16,000 jobs given a 
reduotion in work to suppliers, etc. They felt that this could cost 
Scotland £.300,000 per week. 
-. 
In short, the Clydesi:de~ conununity faced disaster. It is little wonder 
•.' ~~) .,; 
that the UCS workers saw a need for drastic action. :: 
Unlike the Liverpool workers of GEC the Clyde shipyard workers 
had a situation of strength and experience to draw upon. The fact that 
the local co~~unity itself was under threat helped in the building of a 
-., 
community-wide campaign to save the yaids.. Another important feature lay 
in. the fact that shipyard unity had been tested previously on the question 
of redUndancy and had been strengthened as a result. In late 1965 the 
Fairfields yard had been completely modernised, had orders worth ona•hundred-
and-thirty-one million pounds, and yet was put into official receivership. 
The workers at that time f having watched other yards closing around them, 
were both anxious and ·angry; angry that a h~a~thy ya.:rd. was being closed_-
due, mainly, to a liquidity probleme 'Ihe unions mounted a campaign to 
save their jobH which "exceeded all precedenta in tha mobilisation of 
shipyard workers in the west of Scotla.nd"1 • Every shipya.I:d and engineering 
. • 2 
establishment in Clydeba.nk supported the campa.J.gn • In the face of prob-
able massive strikes throughout the area. the Government. stepped in. and 
provided one-million pounds to keep the yard open .. ·rts next move was.to 
bring together a consortium, made up of private business concerns, govern-
ment finances and trade union support funds, to support the continued · 
existance of the yards3. 'Ihe workers" campaign had won and by the t~e 
of the UCS work-in Fairfields' convenor, Jim.Airlie, was a central figure 
on the new Co-ordinating Committeeo TWo-and-a-half years later, in 
1. Thompson and Hart (1972), p.J6. . .. ~.._ 
2. Ibid. In each of these shipyards and factories meetings were held in 
support of the Fairfields workers. 
). The trade union funds invested gaYe the unions some participation on 
the managing board. 
. > 
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February 1969, fifteen thousand. Clyde workers staged-a one-day strike 
. I ~ . 
against redundancies during the visit of the Technology Ninister, Tony· 
Benn. In June of 1971, in response to a call from the UCS Co-ordinating. 
Conunittee, one-hundred thousand Scottish workers went on a one-day strike 
in solidarity and fifty-thousand of them marched through the streets of 
Glasgow. Against this background, of ~espara.tion on the one hand and 
widespread militancy on the other, the Co-ordinating Committee accepted 
the idea of a "work-in ... 
With unemployment widespread and redundancies a dai;1y 1feature I . 
of life in the area the Co-ordinating Committee considered that a strike 
would simply speed them out of a job; it would allow the officia~ receiver 
to close the gates on theme A new solution would have to be found if a 
. ..--~~· 
fight was to be made and the UCS shopfloor leadership wanted a fight ami 
knew that they could draw on widespread support~,. When the work-in id~~ 
was raised it was quickly seen that it was not put forward simply a.s a 
form of despa.ra.te protest: the process of· shipbuilding, more than any 
otherv lent itself to this kind of action. 1here were various ships. in 
the early stages of being built and difficult to remove from the yaxds 
and there was a substantial supply of materials. When the Co-ordinating 
Committee put the idea to a mass meeting of the workers the idea. was well . 
formulated, it could be explained in some detail an~ defended if necc~ss­
ary, and it was put to the meeting as the focal point of a possible 
fight back. 'rihen the overwhelming majority voted. to accept the plan they 
had a fairly good idea of what was being asked of them. It was twelve 
days after this point, shrewdly, that the Co-ordinating Committee __ had 
.. ·~~ - . 
arranged for the massive one-day .strike of solidarity. The work-in 
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decision had helped in capturing widespread committment for the strike 
~ .... - . 
and the strike in turn helped to steel the morale o~the UCS workforce~ 
With the work-in under way a special meeting of shop stewards 
from throughout the West of Scotland was called for ten days later; it 
was attended by twelve hundred stewards. The meeting was called to 
arrange a follow up strike and demonstration on August 18th. Support 
was boosted when, on August 16th, the Scottish TUC was addressed by UCS 
leader Jimmy Reid and agreed to put their weight behind the strike. On 
the day one quarter of Scotland's entire workforce, two-hundred thousand 
workers, went on strike and eighty thousand joined the march through 
Glasgow in "the greatest demonstration since the days of the Chartists"1• 
The workers occupying their yards must have r~ceived the biggest possible 
confidence booat. possible. 
With the UCS work-in in progress and receiving support from 
throughout Britain and the world the effect was bound to rub off on other 
workers facing their own redundancy problems. This was to be the case 
with the workers of Plessey's Alexandria factorye 
Ice Cold in Alex: The Plessey Companl• Plessey was one of 
those companies to benefit from IRC support in the late 1960s, and by 1969 
was a major employer of labour in the private sector with sixty-five thou-
sand employees. 
The Alexandria works. This works since the second world-war had 
been a Royal Naval Torpedo factory and was employing twelve hundred workers 
in 1970 when its closure was announced. The workers protested and it was 
at this point that the factory was sold to Plessey for six-hundred-and-fifty 
1. Thompson and Hart (1972) p.)J. 
"'· 
'1: 
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thousand poun~ The workers had misgivings about the situation but were 
assured by Plessey that the workforce would increase to two thousand 
within four years. Initially, however, it was only prepared to employ 
five hundred people from January 1971. By April this was up to seven 
hundred, but in May four hundred were declared redundant and in ~eptember 
\ 
the remaining workers were put on the redundancy list. 
The factory was being closed and agreements had already been 
drawn up for the sale and removal of machinery and stock, including a 
dust-free unit worth one-and-a-half million pounds and stock valued at 
half the sum paid for the entire factory1• The company in fact stood to 
make a two-hundred-and-eighty percent profit in a transaction covering ,~ 
less than a year2, and that did not include-the sale or development of 
the factory site .• 
At this point in time unemployment nationally had reached an 
incredible eight-hundred thousand and for the Scottish region over one-
hundred-and-thirty thousand3• In the town of Alexandria one in every 
eight was unemployed. Once again a group of workers faced a desparate 
redundancy situation tinged with anger due to the fact that it was to 
take place in the face of a boost to company profits. Most of the 
Plessey workers had been made redundant before and were anxious to 
put up a fight this time. 
The Plessey workers certainly had no history of militancy. 
1. A.Milligan, Oct. 1971 
2. That does not include any profits made in the course of production •. 
J. Nationally unemployment stood at J.6% and at 6.2% for Scotland. 
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As Eddie McLafferty, the convenor, put it, 
"'!.-
"(We) would not be considered militant in any way (~ually)" (1). 
They were surprised infact to find themselves in the forefront of the 
fight against redundancies, but in that forefront they were. 
It is likely that they reacted both under the impact of the 
general unemployment situation and the'' seeming sense of company gain out 
of the situation, plus the very real impact of the UCS work-in only a 
few miles away and involving the same industry of shipbuilding and marine 
engineering. In any event they occupied their factory. The main aim 
was to prevent the removal of machinery and stock; one of their sore points 
in the whole situation. Unlike UCSthey hadn •t enough material and work 
to embark upon a work-in but they knew that ~ the machinery was removed 
then their jobs would surely be lost. They sat-in, and once they had 
got organised they reviewed their aims and decided to continue~the sit-in 
until they received-assurances concerning future employment prospects. 
Eventually, with support from the UCS and from their shop 
stewards national combine, the occupation secured the jobs of those involved., 
Other occupations were to follow within the company. 
BSA Burn Up: Also in September 1971 another group of workers 
faced large-scale redundancies; those employed at Birmingham Small Arms' 
(BSA) factory at Small Heath. Three thousand jobs were to be lost. 
Unemployment in the region (\~·est Midlands) was abnormally high for one 
usually by-passed in post-war crises. Seventy-six thousand werewithout 
jobs, or three-and-a-half percent in an area experiencing one percent or 
less up to the late 1960s, and not above two percent prior to 197lo 
l. 'The Morning Star', lOth December 1971. 
.. 
The BSA company had been producing large sports motor cycles and although 
I ~~ . 
at that stage it was unrivalled the market was in decline. \Demand had 
rapidly switched to a range of smaller bikes, scooterS and mopeds and 
very largely it was the diversified foreign firms that were taking a 
large share of the British market. The BSA ·company had. avoided divers if-
' ication and by 1971 were paying the price in terms of falling sales and 
a market already dominated by competitors. Large~scale redundancies,:we.re · 
'f. ; '~: 
to be the price paid by the workforce. 
In this case the influence of the UCS occupation was such as to 
influence the response of the :.SSA workers in a somewhat mechanistic 
fashion. The responded to the redundancy threat> by threatening to stage 
"a UCS type work-in". As their campaign de"-.~loped it began to dawn on 
them that such a strategy would have serious· problems; that cycle prod-
uction was very different to shipbuilding. Eventually the work-in idea. 
was dismissed and a ~trike embarked upon. As one leading BSA shop steward. 
was to· express it, 
ncycle production with its rapid flow production and-dependence on a 
mass of small components from supplier firms is not necessarily able 
to conduct a work-in. Infact, many workers came to believe that a.· .. , .. 
work-:in would more quickly work them out of a. job•• (1). 
Indications now were that in addition to the serious nature of 
the unemployment situation the influence of the UCS work-in was widespread$ 
. . 
The BSA workers were despara.te and turned to an action which had proven 
its value in both publicity and in winning a reprieve on redundancies. The 
form of occupation, however, had been wrong •. Whether a sit-in would have 
been more effective is somewhat hypothetical as the strike action did keep 
the works open and helped in the saving of a third of the jobs. · ..... ~ 
1. Q:f:: .• _Mil"J.;s,. 1976a, pp~21.,-22. 
.• 
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The problems of BSA and the British motor cycle industry continued to 
-·r ~ 
grow over the next few years despite a merger with the NVTlcompany. 
Diversification into a range of small bikes remained a problem which was 
not tackled. Eventually all the factories in the merger - at Andover, 
Wolverhampton and at Meriden - came under threat of closure and all of 
them staged occupations. \ 
\ 
Disouiet Flows the Don: The Steel Indust,5£,. In many as:pects 
the industry experienced :problems similar to shipbuilding. In an early 
post-war boom large profits were made but not enough of this was reinvest-
ed in the industry to allow it to compete with foreigh competitors. 
Between 19.50 and 196o the ;profits of the twelve largest U.K. steelcomp= 
anies rose from forty-eight to one-hundred-a~~-sixty-seven million pounds. 
However, instead of building on this profitable base the industry was more 
concerned with paying out large dividends1 ., Meanwhile Britain's sha.:re 
of the world market was falling& by the 1970s the British steel indust-
ry had fallen from third place (in the 1940s) to .:.:id.nth2 •. In terms of 
investment, Bri'!~ain was rapidly- falling well l)ehincl its· competitors •. Over 
the period 196)-67, for example~ investmen-t;. per output ton was much lower 
than~the ··Belgian, Italians,. Dutch, Americans, Canadians and Japanese . 
(investing 100% more) and the French and Germana (with 70% more). 
Investment began to be ploughed into the ~ndustry after nat~on­
alisation in the mid-1960s. With nationalisation, however, came.rational-
isation and a loss of upwards of fifty thousarui jobs by 1972. 
The River Don steel ~larks: T'ne River !Jon works closure announce-
ment came at the apex of BSC 's3 massive redundancy programme. l>lQ~t of the 
............ 
1. CIS Report, No.l4. 
2 • Britain was only producing J~ Of total Horld production. 
J. The British steel Corporation. 
·, 
: .. -. -, .. 
., .. 
'l. 
works was due for closure barring some of the more unprofitf3-ble sections 
I 
which were being hived off to the Firth Brown company. Yet the works 
was the only British centre for the manufacture of heavy forgings and 
castings •. Leading up to the end of 1971 the works began a drastic cut-
back on its intake of apprentices. In mid-October of that year the 
Don closure began, with notices of redundancy being given to ninety 
middle management on the 21st. Shop floor redundancies were to follow 
a week later. In the meantime the company announced that it was to sell 
River Don's (administratively controlled) Openshaw works in I~chester. 
Unemployment and the Sheffield Area: While the Don redUl"..d.a.ncies 
were being announced a number of others were occurring throughout the area. 
Unemployment had been just under two percent1 in the city only a year 
previously but had reached four percent by October 19712• Regional unem-
ployment had also leapt up, from under three percent to almost four-and-
a-quarter percent3. Sheffield had suffered one of the region's greatest 
increases. Twenty-five percent of the town's youth were unemp+oyed at a 
time when the River Don were cutting back on apprentice intake, and 
twenty percent of the University's graduates were still without work. 
In the local steel industry, on which forty-nine thousand Sheffield workers 
relied for their employment, short-time and redundancy·;~re part of the ·, 
general picture. At the begining of October, for example, the Doncaster · 
steel works was put on short-time working. Five days later redundancies 
were announced at BSC's Grimesthorpe section of the River Don works. 
1. The exact figure was 1. 9%. 
·· ...... 
2. In Sheffield alone 11,349 were officially registered as unemployed. 
3. The respective figures stood at 2.8% and 4.2%; rising from .56,000 
registered unemployed to 83,000. 
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Three hundred were to be sacked. By mid-October forty Doncaster steel 
workers were made redundant and two-hundred-and-fifty Sheffield Steel 
workers were put on short-time. TowardS the end of the month further 
steel redundancies were announced, this time at Rotherham where three 
hundred job::; were to go1 and Tinslyet Park where sixty workers were .to be 
made redund.an t. 
How .J:J.:te steel wcs Tempered a The Don workforce were not new to 
industrial action. They had previously taken militant action at the 
works over wa.ge issues a.nd 10unjustifiable punishments"2 • They had also 
been involved ln the political strikes of the period. 
Locft.l1y the town has a. reputation for militant trade unionism 
stretching bu.ok seve:ra.l decades3• ,In the drop forge on October 19th a 
strike began o t' one hundred workers against reductions in manning levels 
from six to fl ve workers per press 4• Rising unemployment was already a 
burning issue among the labour force of Sheffield generally and support 
was steadily bullding for a TUC called regional demonstration against 
unemployment. 
In the local press the major industrial issue was the continuing 
UCS work-in. This became a daily feature and at tim~ would be .discussed 
on more than one page of a paper's edition. 
Very quickly it was decided to repond to the closure threat with, 
what the local 'Morning Telegraph' chose to call, a nucs type work-in". 
1. At the same time Rotherham's remaining 11,000 workers were on a J~y 
week. 
2. Questionnaire reply from E.E.Webster, River Don works.convenor. 
J. Cf. K.Coates and T.Topham (eds), 1970, pp.lOJ-105. 
Lr. Shop stewards found the change in manning levels ••very suspicious • • • 
because the drop forge (was) like·lY to be transferred to Firth Brown". 
Quoted in the Sheffield 'Morning 'I'elegraph', 26th October 1971. 
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A measure of the feeling in the area. about unemployment can be seen in the 
fact that six-thousand people responded to the TUC's march through the 
city of Sheffield on October 2.5th. Addressing the meeting at the end 
of the march shop stewards from the UC3 and the River Don works "were 
given a ~dldly enthusiastic standing ovation"\ Significantly both of 
the two ma.ln ;>peakers, Jack :Peel2 '.a;nd. Hugh scanlon3, spoke out in favour 
of worker occupations as a tactic for combating unemployment. Scanlon 
told the asselllbled crowd that, 
"The days havo gone when we run away from the fight. Work-ins should play 
a bigger rolB tn securing the demands for reflation and more jobs" (lr). 
Already the ta.oU.c was hav1ng an impact on official trade union thinking. 
'l11H lllver Don work in received further suppport when it was. 
announced by the engineering district committee that factories throughout 
the city wou1tl have regular levies to support it. 
Like their predecessors, the River. Don workers came under the 
combined preBalire of job loss fear and anger at a time of unrivalled pol-
itica.l unrest and mou.nting unemployment. The result was yet another 
dramatic fonn of industrial protest. 
In the months that followed four other BSC steel works were 
occupied in pay disputes and one was threathened with occupation if 
redundancies went ahead.5. 
The Tactic Continues: A number of actions against closure 
followed on in this period and became pioneers in their own way. At 
1. 
2. 
). 
4. 
s. 
Th~ Sheffield 'Morning Telegraph' 26th October 1971. 
The then right-wing General secretary of the .Dyers and Bleachers • Union. 
The then President of the AUEW. 
Scanlon in fact 1 reveal? that.~e sees a potential in occupations beyond 
even redundancy J.ssues, J..e., 'J.n securing ••• reinflation". 
This was at a. BSC subsidiary - Redpath Dorman Long - in London. 
Snow Engineering (Sheffield) and at McCormick screen Printing '(Glasgow) · 
occupations followed on in the light of their more famous comrades at 
River Don and UCS. In January of the new year the occu:pa.tion at Allis 
Chalmers marked the first to occur in Wales in the post-war era. Unem-
pi ent was then standing at a post-war record of almost five~and-three 
quarte percent1 with over fifty-five thousand unemployed and almost one 
million un mplo~yed for Great Britain as a wholi. This was quickly 
followed by threatened occupation at Courtaulds' Flintshire factory but 
eventually st·:ika action was taken. '!hat same month there were two occ-
upations and one threatened in Manchester, another in Stockport and one 
in Liverpool. Unemployment for the North West Region now stood at double 
the level it had been over two years previously when the GEC-EE work-in 
had been thrBal.~med3 • Two further redundancy occupations occurred in the 
area. in March, followed by the spate of engineering pay occupations. 
f..is}~£:-·Bendixa The North Western occupations were shown the way 
by the workers of the Liverpool factory of Fisher-Bendix. 
The Site. The factory had been built in 1961 by the.:Sritish 
Motor Corpord.tion with the aid of a. government grant. At its peak it 
was to employed two-and-a-half thousand workers on the production of a 
variety of items4• 
In January 1969 the :SMC company was merged with British Leyland 
and backed by a. twenty-five million pounds loan at seven-and-a.-half 
1. The exact figure was 5.7%. 
2. The national figure stood at 4.1% unemployed. 
'·-·. 
3. OVer 140,000 were unemployed in the region, or 4.9,%. 
4. Products included the Houlton bike, stainless steel and vitrous sinks, 
Bendix washing machines and dryers, and radiators. 
:percent. Shortly after this cut-backs in employment began to occur a.t the 
factory. Fi:rst the famous Moulton bike patent was sold to the Raleigh 
company and shortly afterwards the factory was sold to Parkinson-Cowan. 
In 1971 the .factory was resold to Thorn"' Electrical who acquired the 
entire Pa:rkinson-Cowan company, with its various factories, for a. price 
. only slightly more than Parkinson-Cowan had paid for the Fisher-Bendix 
1 factory alone • 
Thorn, 's main interest from this point appears to have been in 
retaining the ~Jl'Ofitable sections of their new acquisition and selling off 
the rest - inoludlng the Fisher-Bendix factory. In the process Thorn• 
recouped hal±' of what they paid for the entire company in the sale of the 
first three faotories. They then turned to the Fisher-Bendix factory and 
announced thah 1 t was selling off it Bendix washing machine business. The 
work was in fa.ot transferred to Spa.in. In December of 1971 it was announ-
ced that the entire factory was to close. The workforce was instructed 
to dismantle the equipment used for making domestic and storage heaters 
to be transferred to the company's Newcastle and Birmingham subsidiaries. 
~orkers• Reactions The Fisher-Bendix workers underwent a 
rapid process of merger arid rationalisation followed in each case by 
redundancies and closure threats. They were certainly 1angry that a govern-
ment backed merger in 1969 led to cut backs in the workforce, and that 
the patent to the Moulten bike was sold when it was felt that this 
'revolution in bike design' could have ensured the factory the future it 
needed: Raleigh instead went on to benefit. The Fisher-Bendix workers 
1. T.Clarke, 1972; E.Johnstone, 1975· 
- 210 -
were also angry that production of. the Bendix washing machine was shifted 
to Spain in the company's search for greater profitability. 
All this was occurring over a period of deepening Unemployment, 
but also workers' resistance to redundancy. The Fisher-Bendix workers 
had been involved in the campaigning for the GEC-EE work-in in 1969e The 
idea of an occupation had been very much impressed on their thinking. 
Earlier that year they had been involved in a political strike and they 
were involved in the December political strike the following year. Early 
in 1971 they took part in two further political strikes. In terms of 
militancy over issues at the plant they had staged a successful nine week 
strike later in 1971 against redundancies arising out of the transfer of 
Bendix work to Spain. It was during this latter action that the strengths 
and limitations of the strike weapon were sharply demonstrated: jobs were 
saved but by vacating the premises the company had been able to shift 
work out. Shortly following the strike the Fisher-Bendix workers took 
part in an all-Merseyside strike and demonstration against unemployment: 
such was the strength of feeling and concern within the area at that time. 
The last straw came with the instruction to help the company 
dismantle machinery to transfer work elsewhere and facilitate the factory's 
closure. The workers marched into the directors' office and into the 
Board room and ordered management 9ut. Once out the gates were secured. 
A new occupation joined the growing ranks. 
Redundancy and the'Redundancy Payments Act, 1965'. 
With the retUrn of the Labour Government in 1964 the process of a more 
efficient management of capitalism was put under way. ·one of the early 
' .· ·' \ t 3::1.~:\~ 
and key elements of this process was the introduction of the 'Redundancy 
Payments Act• which came into effect in 1965. It had severlll aims. It 
. 
set out to 'provide financial compensation for the social and economic 
costs incu........-:red by the individual as a conseq:uence of his involuntary 
redunda.ncy'1 .. While not denying that levels of genuine compassion lay 
.· 
behind this aint it was hoped that it would have important repercussions; 
in promoting 'greater occupational and geographical mobility' among 
certain ca.tegori~~-of workers, a.ild in achieving •some reduction in (the) 
intensity • • . • (of) U.'lion and workplace opposition' to redundancy2• 
An important stud~of the first five y~ars of the Act's ope~t­
ion claims that in all three aspects the Act has had some measure of 
success. Looking ·at the first two aspects, however, we find that the sue-
cess refers only to a limited , number' of' .criteria.· :' In" te-rm:S: of,.:so·cial 
effects all that is being sald is that it was correct to discriminate in 
payments acco:cding to age and length of service as the older/long service 
workers ~o suffer more personal harship and therefore need greater com-
pensatione (Hardly a selling point for the Act's virtues!)o In rega:td 
to mobility it has to be admitted that a problem lay in the fact that many 
receiving redundancy payments 'were, generally speaking, immobile workers', 
i.e., their age and skills made them less willing to move and less attract-
ive to potential employers. Nonet~eless, it was found that there was 'some 
evidence to show that the redundancy payments made a contribution to' the 
workerS • ability to search for a new job 4 .• 
1. S.R.Parker, C.G.Thomas, N.D.Ellis and W.E.J.McCarthy, 1971, p.7 
....... 
2. Ibid, p.lOa 
J• Ibid. 
4. Ibid, p. 11 
. Possibly the biggest gain from the Act has been its effect on 
worker attitudes to redundancy. Parker et al (1971) found that workers 
were far more likely to accept redundancy if they were entitled to red-
. 1 . 
undancy payments than if they weren •t ' that some employers have been 
"led to treat. the whole affair o£ redundancy more precisely and carefully"2 ; 
and, importantly, as a consequence of changed attitudes, that there had 
"been some decline in the extent of overt conflict over the issue"J. 
. · 'lbeor-etical and Methodolpgical Issuest Attitudes. Parker et al 
(1971) appea,r to accept uncritically the assumptions of the Act concerning 
the causes of redundancy. Principally they accept that redundancy is the 
inevitable consequence of either •economic' causes (e.g. due to a decline 
in the product market) or 'technological/organisational' causes (e.g. 
decisions by management to introduce technological or organisational changes 
within the establishment)~. This is a premise accepted throughout British 
research into theq~stion of redund.a.ncy.5. It is a valid premise but only 
in so fa.r as we bear in mind that it is related to a capitalist mode of 
:Production., Certainly it can. be shown that in var;ious socialist countries 
. (i.e., the East European bloc l3XClud.ing Yugoslavia) unemployment does not 
exist and therefore there is not a. redundancy problem as such?. The 
question is not merely academic for Parker and a number of British resear• 
chers assume that an "acceptance" of redundancy by the British worker ca.n 
1. 
z. 
3· 
4 .. 
.5o 
6. 
p.lO 
p.l) 
.p.l). 
cr. pp.l4-16. . ..... 
cr. D.Wedderburn, 1964 & 196.5; P.L.Cookt 1964; and G.Goodman, 1962. -, ___ . 
G.Goodma.n, 1962, has· attempted to argue that unemployment does exist · 
iri the "communist countries .. but clearly he is not making a. direct 
comparison~ In the communist countries he is refering to workers being 
~under-employed" E!::i maintained in work "until the State machine is 
ready to a,bsorb it elsewhere" •. 
... 
. __ ..,. ___ . ········• ·- ··-· ·-·--·-~··--' ··-·----.. ---·----~··---------. ..... , ___ ,__'""""' . • 1 . 
. ; . 
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to some extent be .equated with an acceptance of the philosophy of redun-
dancy in a capitalist society. 
Thus, at one point Parker et al (1971) claim that, 
"An effective manpower policy which is consistent with the economic object-
ives of the firm requires flexibility in the development of labour, and 
this means that employees may P~ve to be willing to accept both the need 
for redundancies .in those circumstances where they are an inevitable 
consequence of economic or technological change ••• " (l)o 
Later they claim that, the Act!s provisions, 
"have made employees more prepared to accept the need for redundancy" (2). 
TWo points can be made here in reference to subsequent events in the 
early 1970s. Firstly, it would be surprising if some workers were not 
won to an acceptance of the "need" for redundancy. In a society in which 
the capitalist ideology has been predominant for more than two hundred> 
years and where unemployment has been a continuing problem over that per-
iod we should expect to find worker expressions that redundancy is inevit-
able. On the other hand, the stre~th of such "acceptance•• is related to 
a number of factors, including the strength and spread of 'trade union' 
and socialist consciousness. For instance, where socialist ideas are 
strong among a workforce their acceptance of redundancy may only be limited 
to a strategic acceptance of their weak position and not from seeing any 
supposed "need" for the redundancies. Thus, while Parker et al (1971) 
point to the. fact that large numbers of trade union officials in the ASW, 
NUGMW, TGWU and EEPTU unions accept that redundancies are inevitable they 
fail to distinguish between expressions of resignation to the situation 
within capitalism and those of agreement with capitalist philosophy. 
1. p.lO 
2. p.l). 
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The point here is that it is erroneous to attempt to imply that a "decline 
in the extent of overt conflict over" redundancy has been an ideological 
·victory. 
It ma.y well be that the Redundancy Payments Act has contributed 
to a stre~thening of some workers resolve against redundancy. For inst-
ance, as Barker et al (1971) point out, 
"the Act makes it quite explicit that workers do accumulate 'rights' in 
the jobs they hold" (1). . 
If this is the case then we might expect that some workers would feel even 
more outraged at a managerial decision to deprive them of those jobs. 
Certainly the slogan of the UCS work-in - "We demand the right to work" -
· was taken up by a large number of following redundancy occupations~. Of 
12 leading stewards of redundancy occupations interviewed seven used the 
phrase "right to work" to describe to me their reason for taking such 
action. On questions as to whether people should ever be redundant "from 
time to time"3 and on the view that given technological change redundancy 
was inevitable4 only two stewards agreed (and in both cases), while the 
remaining ten strongly disagreed in both cases. 
1. p.l6 
2. Research by H.A.Turner, 1963 has indicated that increasingly strike 
statistics ha~revealed an expression of growing trade union demands 
for greater control (rights) over jobs. 
•In the 20 years of high employment from 1940 the proportion of strikes 
about "wage-questions' other than demands for increases", and (particu-
larly) about "working , arrangements, rules and discipline" rose remark-
ably: from one-third of all stoppages to three quarters • • • One 
could say that these disputes all involve attempts to submit manager-
ial discretion and authority to agreed ••• rules: alternatively,that 
they reflect an implicit pressure for more democracy and individual 
rights in industry'. 
3. The question posed was, "Some people say that you are bound to be out of 
work from time to time. • -~ . •· · ... · · : , · .. <r.; "' 
4. '!he question posed was, "In your opinion would you agree or disagree 
with the statement that redundancy is an inevitable consequence of 
technological change? 
I 
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The major point of interest in the study of Parker et al (1971) 
is the claim that the Act has had some effect in reducing redundancy 
strikes. This is especially interesting in view of the fact that they 
also point out that this was a critical economic period, marked by 
"the lack of economic expansion together with rising unemployment" (1). 
Within this they show, via a survey of two thousand employers, that 
redundancy has increased in frequency in the period since the Act's intro-
duction2P with the greatest incidence in major industries such as Ship-
building and Marine Engineering, Electrical Engineering and Construction 
and in areas already experiencing high QnemploymentJ. The results of 
their study of industrial conflict over redundancy, reproduced in Table 
7below, show that there has been a decline in the level of such strike 
activity in each of the major industrial groupings apart from Textiles & 
Clothing and All Other Industries and Services. The table also reveals 
that this decline occurred despite a general increase in strike_intensity 
over other is·sues. 
Basically this approach is not without its problems. For 
example, the evidence rests on the categories of the Department of Employ-
ment which refers to strikes directly concerning redundancy as the primary 
cause of striking. It leaves out of account strikes which have a number 
of aims including a protest against unemployment or planned redundancies 
but which centre on other issues, i.e., strikes due to all other causes 
1. p.9 
2. Only ~ of surveyed companies had redundancies before the Act, j% had 
experienced pre- and post-Act redundancies, and 2Q% had only experienced 
redundancies after the Act •s introduction: (2%. gave no information and 
72% reported no redundancies for the period in question, i.e., 196)-68). 
J. pp.l6-17. 
- ~~ --~ .,. --,. ~..,.,. ·--· , •• ·~-- ~-,~...,.,... ... _~ .......... ,.~1''.., ... '., ') ''"'l' .......... ~ ..,,....~. ~ ............ ,~~---........................ ~ .. -- ~--~ 
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A COMPARISON OF REDUNDANCY STRIKES WITH STRIKES 
ARISING OUT OF: ALL OTHER CAUSES, 1960 - 69o 
Av.no.of Av.no.of Av.no.of 
working days working days working days 
lost through · lost per annum lost through 
redundancy due to all redundancy 
strikes per causes strikes per .annum~1) annum as a 
percentage of · 
'\ all strikes 
(a) . (b) (a/b) 
MINING AND 1960-65 5,550 432.000 1·28 
QUARRYING 1966-69 725 331,000 0·21 
METALS AND 1960-65 35,288 959,000 3·68 
ENGINEERING 1966-69 23,605 1,207,000 1·95 
SHIPBUILDING AND 1960-65 14,146 7,77,000 5•11 
MARINE ENGINEERING 1966-69 3,981 183,000 2·17 
VEIDCLES 1960-65 52,682 668,000 7·88 
1966-69 21,605 985,000 2·19 
TEXTII,ES AND 196o-65 694 32,000 2·14 
CLOTHING 1966-69 2,095 56,000 3·77 
CONSTRUCI'ION 1960-65 8,182 205,000. 3·99 
1966-69 6,309 215,000 2·93 
TRANSPORT AND 1960-65* 42,262 331,000 12·76 
COMMUNICATION 1966-69 8,574 810,000 1·05 
:ALL OrnER INDUSTRIES 1960-65 2,970 234,000 1·27 
! AND SERVICES 1966-69 7,579 312,000 2·43 
TOTAL INDUSTRIES 1960-65 161,774 3,137,000 5·15 
1966-69 . 74,473 .4.205,000 1·77 
• Includes a very large one-day national stoppage. 
* The table is truten from S.R.Parker, C.G.Thomas, N.D.Ellis and 
W.E.J.McCarthy, 1971, p.lJ. 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
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1. The statistics were specially prepared for the authors by the Department 
of Employment. urn essence, they are a sub-category of the set of 
causes 'Disputes concerning the employment or discharge of workers 
(including redundancy questions)' normally used in the presentation 
of strike statistics ... 
-. 
·- .. __ ..... 
.. ····.sl···-
may well have included redundancy questions. Nonetheless, taking the 
results as a reasonable assessment there is some evidence that this effect 
I 
of the Act is having a continuing effect on some groups of w.orlters. 
The t'rfO case studies of an 'engineering works' Cl.nd a 'brick works' 
referred to in the preceding chapter1 serve to illustrate the effect of the 
Redundancy Payments Act in cutting back on industrial militancy. However 
while this is a real threat to militant trade unionism there is some evidence 
\ 
that in certain industries the trend has changed and that the effects of 
high unemployment have outweighed any considerations of redundancy payments. 
Direct comparison with the stuP,.y:iof Parker et al (1971) has been. 
made difficult by the fact that until 1973 the Department of Employment 
categories of strikes lumped redundancy questions with other employment 
questions: for the Parker study the Department of Employment especially 
isolated redundancy strikes in providing a particUlar service. Table 8 
provides a comparison with Parker for the period l97J-75o It also includes 
a less accurate comparison for the earlier period 1970-72. This period 
lumps redundancy with other employment issues but has been included because 
figures for the combined period l970-75o 
Taking the more reliable period first (1973-75) it can be seen that 
redundancy strike intensity has continued to fall in 'Mining and Quarrying', 
'Vehicles', 'Textiles' & Clothing •, and in 'All other Industries'. But that it 
has increased in 'Metals & Engineering', 'Shipbuilding & Marine', 'Transport & 
CommUnication', and in 'Construction'. OVerall a very slight fall is evidenced. 
The picture might be claimed to be uneven, with most industries claimed 
l. The section entitles, 'The ones that got away'. 
.. 
Industrial 
Category. 
TABLE --8· 
A COMPARISON OF REDUNDANCY STRIKES WITH STRIKES 
ARISING OUT OF ALL OTHER CAUSES, 19ZO - 75. 
Av. no. of working 
days lost through 
redundancy strikes 
:per annum. 
1970-72 
1973-75 
Av. no. of working 
days lost per annum 
due to all causes. 
1970-72 
1973-75 
First 
column 
as% of 
second. 
1970-72 
1973-75 
MINING AND 3,667 3,985,667 0.09 
QUARRYING 167 1,925,000 0.009 i!2ZQ:Z22 _______________ i!~2!Z2--------------l~~222~~~~2 __________ !Q~Q§_2_ 
METALS AND 258,000 2,707,667 9.52 
ENGINEERING 69,667 2,493,333 2.79 
______________________ !!§~~§~~2 ______________ !g~§QQ~5QQ) __________ !§~~--2 
SHIPBUILDING,cAND 1),667 589,333 2.31 
MARINE ENGINEERING 11,667 490,333 2.37 
-----------------------l-Z~~!Z) ________________ !2~2L§~~2----------l!~~Z2-. . 
133,333 2,425,333 5-5 : 
VEHICLES 10,333 1,861,333 0.56 
----------------------l-Z1~§~~2--------------l~~!~~~~~~2----~-----l~~~22_ 
TEXTILES AND 5,000 242,667 2.06 
CLOTHING 3,667 267,333 1.37 
------------------------l~L3J~2----------------l~22~QQQ2_ ________ _!!~222_ 
83,667 1,570,667 5-33 
CONSTRUCTION 22,33.3 . 216,667 10.31 
-----------------------l2~LQQQ2 ______________ ! __ §2~L§2Z2 __________ {2!~ 
TRANSPORT AND 251,000 2,906,333 8.64 
COMMUNICATION 9,667 486,000 1.99 
--------~-------------l1JQL~JJ2--------------l1L§2§L1§Z2 __________ !z~g§2_ 
ALL OTHER INDUSTRIES 131,000 1,709,667 7.67 
AND SERVICES 33,833 1,]62,000 2.17 
----------------------l-§~~~!Z2--------------l1L2~2~§2~2----------l2~~2-
TOTAL INDUSTRIES 
1970-72 
1973-7.5 
1970-7.5) 
879,334 
161,334 
(51.5,083) 
16,137,334 
9,301,999 
(12,719,666) 
Table compiled from Department of Employment Gazette figures. 
5.45 
1.73 
(4.05) 
The figures in the first column for 1970-72 refer to "disputes concerning 
employment or discharge of workers (incl. redundancy questions)". From 
1973 onwards the Department of Employment se~ted this section into 2 
categories - "Redundancy questions" and 11Dismissal and other disciplinary 
measures". Only the latter period - 1973-75 - forms a direct comparison 
with the work of Parker et al(1971) shown in Table 9, but the former 
does allow of some speculation. 
I ... ·,' 
l':34G9 l. 
to be still experiencing a lower strike intensity record compared with the 
' 
pre-Act period but with hall of them increasing in intensity over the 
previous post-Act period, This view rests on a false premise however1 
and a more meaningful reference point is the absolute number of striker 
days averaged in a given period. From this point it can be seen that 
a majority of indUstries have experienced increases in striker da.ys beyond 
\ 
that experienced in the pre-Act period (Metals & Engineering, Textiles & 
Clothing, Construction, and All other industries) or a.t least greater 
than the first post-Act period (Shipbuilding & Marine, Veh~cles and. 
Transport and Communication). In terms of all the industries striker 
days has, for 1973-75, roughly equalled that. of the pre-Act period and 
has thus exceeded that· for 19$5-69. Only in Nining and Quarrying has · 
· the figure continued to fall as against both· ~arlier periods. 
Taking the period 1970-72 and the total. period 1970~75 the 
evidence of trends towards ever greater redundancy strike activity is 
even gre~ter. In all cases (1970-73) absolute striker days is up on the 
preceeding period and in only two of these (Mining and. Qua:O:.ringp anct 
Shipbuilding & Marine) does the figu.:r:e fail to exceed that of the pre ... Act 
period. For the overall period (1970-75) the pattern is exactly the same. 
_ 
1
.::-;" .To this impression we can add the fact that tlie widesp~ad 
nature of workplace occupations evidences a new type of opposition to 
1. There is no good reason to expect redundancy striker days to increase 
proportionately to increases in striker days due to other causes given 
the uncompar~ble increases in both redundancy and in strike activity 
since 1965. Parker et al (1971) provide no good reason for placing 
importance on the ratio of one type of strike to other types. 
., 
.-
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! 
redundancy and, by implication, is a clearer expression of the limitations 
of both the ideological and economic effects of the Redundancy Payments 
Act. Further more Parker et al (1971) have relied on Department of 
Employment data which excludes political strikes. This means that the 
action over the Pentonville Five will not be included in the figure 
although the issue was primarily a question of redundancy and involved 
at least one million striker days. Another problem is that such strikes 
as the national builders' strike in 1972 is included in the category 
of other strike causes and yet the strike had unemployment as one of its 
key issues. In short, unlike any other period before or immediately 
after the introduction of the Redundancy Payments Act the early to mid-
1970s witnessed a sharp increase in activity against redundancy and the 
wider question of unemployment. This took the form of record strikes 
and demonstrations and workplace occupations. If ever the Redundancy 
Payments Act had the effect of dulling industrial militancy this was 
sharply overturned by events of the late 1960s/ early 1970s with its 
political strikes and record unemployment levels. 
Summary. 
Since the mid-1960s the British economy has been in a critical state. 
In an attempt to come to grips with this problem and to improve the 
management of British capitalism.Labour governments ha~introduced a 
series of measures which have directly and indirectly helped to increase 
unemployment. The measures included rationalisations and mergers aided 
by an Industrial Reorganisation Corporation, productivity bargaining 
backed by a Prices and Incomes Act and Board, cut-backs in public spending, 
and the use of unemployment to combat inflation. In the wake of these· 
policies have come massive redundancies but without_ an uptur* in the number 
. of vacancies required to take redundant workers in to new lna-uStries-. Large 
scale unemployment has followed. 
Attempts to .alleviate:'. hardship and curta.i~ industrial militancy 
in the face of redundancy ha\ft: failed in the face of post-war reco:rd 
\ 
unemployment levels. Marches· organised by the TUC General Council have 
. . . . •/ 
attracted millions throughout Britain, strikes against redundancies a.nd. 
closures have soared a."ld a new tactic of worker occupation has appeared 
to challenge redundancy~ -Of thr:( first--eleven··g-ro·ups of workers "to take 
or threaten such action (GEC_-EE workers through to Fisher-Bendix) five 
had been effected by merger and rationalisation programmes and one had 
suffered as a. result of government cut-backs··(:Ssc River Don). In all. 
cases the actions occurred, or were threatenedt at a time of record 
unemployment. In all but one case this was also true·· of local unemploy-
ment and backs up Parker et al 's (1971) finding that redundancies appear 
to have occurred more in. areas of high unemployment .. 
Finally, a common feature in all cases chaJ~enges the vie.rq that, 
the Redundancy Payments Act has led to some improvement in management . 
handling of redundancy situations; in all cases the reverse w~s the case 
and this forms one of the key focuses of the nex.t chapter. 
. ........ 
. ·. __ _. .. _., ... -.-.~=~~~~--~=-,.-·------------.... -~ ......... -, _______ _ 
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OWNERSHIP, CONTROL AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS .• 
"Several features a:ppear to be common to a large number of occupations. 
(Bad) management handling of situations ••• (An) extensive record of 
industrial dis:putes and strikes ••• (and an ownership situation which 
reveals occu:pied) factories (as) ••• among the largest ••• and more 
powerful • • • companies in Bri ta.in••. 
\ 
Introduction. 
This chapter sets out to examine the specific industrial relations ait~c· '" 
uation 1dthin occupied factories and companies. It is argued that these 
are among the worst employers in terms of industrial disputes experienced 
over the period, and that in certain cases the occupation actions might 
not have been embarked upon had the situation been handled differently 
by the . employer •. 
It is argued that the nature of decision. making is a key 
problem and that this has been contributed to, in a large number of 
cases, by the remoteness of that process; a remoteness due, among other 
things, to size and geograpnical diversity of the companies involved. 
Very much in line with D:pa.rtment of Employment findings this chapter 
indicates that the large companies (i.e., employing more than two thousand 
employees) experience a relatively greate;r proportion of industria~ unrest 
I 
- including worker occupations. 
The High and Might¥. 
Compan~ sizet In terms of company size by number of employees a majority 
of occupied companies are among the largest in Britain. As table 9 shows 
seventy-one (53.4%) employ more than two thousand employees. This indicates 
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standard ~ up .501 1,001- 2,001- 5,001- Over TOTAL Industrial · employees to to 10,000 
Classification · . 500 J,O_QO 2,000 5,000 10,000 
order Sector 
III Food, drink and Tobacco I I I I I 1 l 
IV-V Petroleum products,etc and 1 I I I I 2 j chemicals, etc. 
VI-XII He tal manufacturing, engineering 27 6 
.. 
14-' 26 8 10 15:. 
shipbuilding, vehicles 9_
XIII-XV Textiles and Clothing J I I I 1 2 6 
XVII- Timber and furniture 1 I I I I I 1 
' XVIII Paper, printing and publishing :;· I 1 1 1 I 8 
XIX . Other manufacturing 2' I I I // 1 J 
XX and XXII Construction, transport and com- 2 I 2 J 1 2 10 munications, \ 
XXIII Wholesale and retaiJ... distributioi1 I I I I I I 0 
XXIV Insurance, banking, finance and / I l 1 I I 2 business services I '· 
XXVI Miscellaneous services 
·1·' I I I I I -1--
-
Total •• , .... • • • ••• .1:!'2.~- . 6 14- .zo· 17 .· 34- .~JJ ... 
' -- ~----
'· 
*Th:e table is designed for comparison with 'Table l' of the "Bullock Report", 1977, ::p::p.4-6. . .,_ 
p'llblic ~~rat.lals(BSC/ British Rail) and:a.uthorities (Stjt'etford council/ Strathclyde Unive·rsity). >:., 
,are excluded from the table, as is the head office of the AUEW. Three cases 'Hhere number of · · · . •-•. 
.··employees has been unobtainable are also excluded. . . - . ; ' .. 
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~NALYSIS ~y INDU~T~Y AN~ ~U~DE~ OF ·E~P~O~~~~ f-~~~-'~ i~<i;:;:~ (:.J ,., ,. 
Standard 
Industrial 
Classification 
order 
I-III 
IV-V 
VI-XII 
Xlli-XV 
XVI-XIX 
Food, drink and tobacco .:. 
Petroleum products etc, and chemi-
cals etc. •.• ... ... ... 
Metal manufacturing, engineering, 
shipbuilding, vehicles . ... ... 
Textiles and clothing 
Other manufacturing · ... . .;·,. 
XX and :XXll Construction, transport nnd com-
munications ... ... ; .. 
XXlii Wholesale and retail distribution ... 
XXIV Insurance, banking, finance and 
business services ... · • .. .. • 
XXVI Miscellaneous services · ... 
201-
500 
21 ( 3) 
34 (18) 
55 (17) 
11 ( 1} 
32 ( 5) 
32 ( 2) 
43 (10) 
124 (19) 
17 ( 6) 
501-
1,000 
1,001- ,2,001-
2,000 5,000 
5,001-· · ' I Over 
10,000 -~ 10,000 
.: 
Total over .. 
2,000 
Number of enterprises (of which controlled from overseas) 
30 (7)· 
31 (19) 
140 (30) 
44 ( 4) 
78 ( 5) 
44( 3) 
65 ( 4) 
73 ( 6) 
21 ( 6) 
51 c 8) '· 28(4) 20 < 4J .· I:_ 9 < 3)::;; 1.22 < 1) 
. . '·. 
24 (ll) 21 ( 9) .',. 
138 (31). 125 (34) . 
44 ( 2) 37 ( 3): 
. 62 ( 8) 57 ( 7) 
I 
sse 2) 
. 55 ( 7) 
37 (1). 
18 ( 4) 
40 ( 1) 
59< sj 
32 ( 1) 
22 ( 1) 
;::· 
8 ( 3)' 7 (1) <. 36 ( 13) 
45 ( 9) . 48 (10) 218 ( 53) 
. 8 (..:....) :, 10 (-) ; 55 ( 3) 
'.; 
35 ( 1) . 17 ( 3) 109 ( 11) 
16 (-)· . l 11 (-) 
17 ( 1); 22 ( 3) 
, .. 
~:- ~1· 
:: ~ ~: llt· ~ ~ ; 
67 < 1) 
98 ( 9) 
61 ( 1) 
43 ( 1) 
TOTAL 
130 ( 22) 
125 ( 61) 
?51 (131) 
154 ( 10) 
281 ( 29) 
198 ( 8) 
261 ( 30) 
295 ( 27) 
99 ( 17) 
TOTAL ... .... 369 (81) } 526 (84) 1 461 (70) 1 413 (65) lt6s (17) ·1151 (18) 738 (too) 1 2,094 (335) 
-·- ....:~-........ --·-------· -~---"-·~---..:.t-::.:..J~ ... ~.....:.~ ... ...:__:__~-----··---------· 
-. 
c 
::l 
!-'· 
c+ 
CD p. 
;:>::: 
1-'' 
~ p. 
0 
a 
CD 
~ 
CD 
li 
~ 
!-'· 
UJ 
CD 
UJ 
~ 
!-'• 
~ ~ 
0 ~ < CD 
li -I-' 
0 
N 
0 
0 
CD 
a 
~ 
0 
'< CD 
CD 
til 
1-'· 
::s 
~ 
CD 
c: 
::l 
1-'· 
t+ 
CD p. 
;:>::: 
1-'· 
::l 
J1l p., 
0 
~ 
i. ".•·.· ) 
i<·'3~~ i.:') L. 
1 • ~ r 
that approximately 9.6,% of all British based enterprises of thi9 size have 
I 
\ 
experienced an occupation, compared with 4.7~ of those emPloying less 
than two thousand1• 
Financial standing: In total just under sixty percent of all 
occupied private companies2 are among the most financially powerful in 
Bri taina this includes fifteen companies employing less than two thousand 
employeesJ. Of the two thousand and ninety-four enterprises operating in 
Britain4 sixty-eight of the financially 'Top 1000'5 British companies were 
. . . . 
occupied (6.~) which is somewhat higher than the percentage of those from 
the remaining companies; with fifty•four occupied enterprises of one thousand 
and eighty-three companies~, i.e. just under five percent. 
Thus it is the powerful companies (in terms of financial standing 
/.. 
and size of employment) which appear to have experienced the development of 
the occupation tactic more than the small? compa.niesa barely more than 
thirty-five percent of all occupied companies can be counted in this latter 
8 
category. vlhen we consider the number of occupations a single company 
experienced over the period twenty~five of the large companies alone a.ccciun.t 
for over forty-three pe~~nt of all occupations?,L.)·~; term~ of1 financial standing 
I 
1. The percentage figures refer to those totals for number of UK based 
companies provided by the Bullock Report, 1977, p.). 
2. The financial standing of these companies is taken from the 'TIMES 1000' 
editions for the period 1971-75· 
). See tabla 11. 
4. This is the figure refered to in the Bullock Report, 1977, p.). 
5. That is, those listed in the 'TIMES 1000', op cit. 
... ...... 
6. That is, less the top 1,000 and 11 foreign owned multi-nationals referred . ._ 
to in·table 11. 
7. The term 'small' is used in this chapter to refer to those companies 
which neither employ more than 2,000 employees nor are included in the top 
1,000 companies in terms of financial standing. 
8. That is, J~ of the 133 private companies referred to in table 9. 
9. See table 12. 
THE OWNERSHIP AND FINANCIAL STANDING OF OCCUPIED COMPANIES. 
1 2 3 \?I-
-;, 
Number of UK Top 1000 Foreign owned 1-lulti-plant co.s 
employees. British ++ multi-nationals not counted in Comwies not counted in '2 I'- columns 2 & :;3* 
--
Up to .500 
-
3a lb 
.501-
1,000 1 :'2 _,-:' 
1,001- 6c 2d 2,000 ... 
Total::·~' --
·" . J 
7 ~mallCo.,s 7 1 
- - -
.... - .... --
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- --- ------ --- --
--
- - ---- --- ---- ----- --- - ---
- - ~ ~ - ~ ~ ~ ---
2;001-
18c 
.5,000 
- -
.5,001-
llc 3e 10,000 3 
Over 
32f 10,000 '.1 1 
Total 
Large _co.s 61 It 4 
- - - --- --- --- --- --- - ~ - - - ~ - - -- - - - - -- - -
Total all 
Companies 68 11 
.5 
--
+Table compiled from newspaper reports, journal searches, interviews, etc. 
a. Including the 63rd largest US company (by turnover). 
b. Not included is a factory hived off from a multi-plant firm and then 
closed under the new ownership within a year. 
c. In these cases at least one company is known to be US owned: · likely 
the figure is higher. -
d. This includes ·one US and one Japanese owned company. 
e. This includes the 45th and 88th largest US companies. 
f. This group includes no fewer than 7 of the Top 10 British companies, 
and .5 more in the lower half of the Top 20. _ --- ···~ . 
* This category includes those companies owning at least four factorie~·-:~--- ·· 
++ This category is compiled by use of the 'TI~~S 1000' editions for the 
period 1971/72; 72/73; 73/74; and 74/7.5· -
TABLE 12 
COf<lPANIES EXPERIENCING IviORE THAN ONE OCCUPATION 1 12Zl-Z.2· 
2 4 I 1 J . .5 
Number of ITumber of Col.2 as % Total no. Col.4 as % 
UK Co.s with of all Ca.s of occ'pts of all 
Employees 2 or more of same of Col.2 occupations 
occuetions . ca tegor~ .<a) com~nies. in 12vte co.s* 
Up to .500 2 0 • .54% 4 1.98% 
-
.501-
1,000 1 0.19}& 2 0.99% 
1,001-
2,000 2 o.4J% 
.5 2.47% 
Total 
Small Co.s 
.5 0.37 11 .5.4.5% 
----------- ~ ~- -·---------- ~--
______ ... _ 
- - - - -- ~ - - - - - -- ~ - -- ~ - - - - -· - ~ - - - - - -- - --
2,001~ 
.5,000 
.5,00l-
;w,ooo 
pver 
llo,ooo 
fl1op 1000 
~ritish Co.s 
7 1.69}& 
2 1.2Q% 
.. 16 10.20% 
22 
17 -8.42% 
8 ).9&/o 
62 )0.69}6 
87 4).0{% 
77 J8.12% ,_ ____________ .. ___ ..., _________________________ ... ____ .. _____ ~------.-CIII .. __ ......__ .. _.,.. 
Foreign owned 
IJl.ulti-nationals 2 4 
,.._ .. ..,. ______ .. _.., .. _..,.. __________ .. _ .. ____ ~----.., .. -.... --.... --... ~------------... ------........ --... --
pther Co.s (b) 6 .17 8..42% 
•*This column refers to .private companies only, i.e., the lJJ refered to in 
Table ll.These companies experienced a total of 201 occupations. 
. -
a.Figures are taken for comparison from the Bullock Report,l977, p • .5. 
b. This refers to all remaining companies not included in the first.. t~o 
categories. As a comparison the Bullock Report (1977) refers to 1,08J -~. 
such companies if 1,000 Top Companies are excluded along with the 11 
foreign owned multi-nationals(refered to in table lJ) from Bullock's 
total of 2,094 companies. · · 
-~ 
twenty-four-top British and foreign owned companies accounted·for just 
- -,., .... · . 
over forty percent of all occupations in private companies.~ 
Industrial Relations: It could be argued that to some extent 
size is a determinant by that obvious fact alone, i.e., that with_more 
plants and larger numbers of employees the larger firms might be expected 
to have more occupations. However, studies of the industrial disputes 
\ 
situations of companies by size indicates that the greater number of 
employees itself is not directly the answer. It would seem, that greater 
numbers give rise to other problems which more directly bear on the 
industrial relations problems of a particulax company. Certainly large 
numbers of employees, --~p:read across several concerns, create orga.nisat-
ional problems of communication, of bureaucratisation, of ~ecision-making · 
. . . . 1 / . 
·and control and of job satisfaction • But these questions are not purely·· 
a "technological" or. ''structural10 problem; there is sufficient research 
and , argilinen.t·: to show that a key factor in organisational development 
) . 
rests in an understanding of the power structure of an organisation,.·.-,:· 
those in controlp and of the power structn~e and control of society 
genera.lly2• rn short-p many of the problems of large companies rest:· in 
their primary concern to remain . CO!!_lpeti~ive-· and maintain levels of 
I profitability, and in their secondary concern as to the effect of.such 
organisational imper*'tives on worker satisfaction). 
1. Cf. R.Nichels (1949); S.N.Lipset, l1.A.Trow and J.S.Colemen (19_56); 
D.Loc~food .. (l958); R.Blackburn, (1967); G.S.Bain, (1970); J.Child, 
2. 
(1972, 7~);~nd R.Pa.yne'and D.S~FUgh '(19?6). ::_ ".. ,,., ' ·· ' 
. . ··. :.·, . 
·. ::~ 
Cf. G.D.H.Urse11 and A.J.Nills, (197&)~ -~~ ... - :: :;:, . .. :~· 
......... 
. ~ 
I would argue that concern around questions of worker satisfaction 
has, where it has occurred, arisen out of the profit imperative and 
has thus been restricted in practice. Despite fine theoretical 
concern for worker satisfaction the practice of many companies has 
arisen out of different concerns. At the least worker satisfaction 
has truten a secondary place to issues of profitability and managerial 
control. Cf. N.Bogomolova, (197.3); D.Birchall, (1975). 
,_ 
•.) 
·_... 
i . 
·~.- ·------· ·~··-·---~' ------ ---···-·~-------:--·:··. 
In February 1976 the Department of Employment publish~d a survey 
\ 
which revealed that, in terms of'working days lost per l,OOQ employees•, 
establishments employing over one thousand employees have .the far greater 
number of stoppages and days lost1• Their survey in November of that 
year revea~ed that although only an average of just over two percent of 
all manufacturing establishments had any industrial stoppages in 1971-73 
the percentage for the large establishments was as· high as an annual 
. . t t 2 average of almost n~ne een percen • 
employing over t1-ro ·thousand workers made up over fifty-five percent of the 
.total. These companies, however,~experienced sixty-two percent bf the 
occupations which occurred in the pe·~:dod~,; At the least, twenty-four 
•,:.r,•.... ~.:- .•::; '•' . 
'-~.; '·' ... 
occupied companies are known to have experienced seventy-six ~r more 
industrial strikes over these years: of these the large companies comprised 
twenty-one (87~)- and accounted for ninety-six percent of the strikes4 • 
Adding a further dimension, fifty-four occupied companies also experienced 
---- political strikes at their establishmentso Thirty of these (5~) were in 
the large category and accounted for more than sixty percent of the nearly 
two hundred political strikes5. 
1. 
2. 
). 
4. 
_5. 
Reviewed by E.W.igham, The TIMES, 26th Feb., 1976. 
Department of Employment Gazette, Nov.,l976, Vol. LXXXIV, No.ll, 
pp.l219-24. . 
Comparable figures for 1,000 employees as the base line is respectively 
63% of occupied companies ·exj_Jerie~cing 6st'fo of all occupations. 
The figures remain the .s~me. if we: !J.se_l,OOO employees ·.as,.- the base 1tne • 
..... _ 
For a base line of 1,000 employees the respective figures are JJ (61%) 
and 66%. . . 
· It may be argued that political strikes do not indicate bad 
(internal). industrial relations. The high number, hm'lever, does suggest 
a willingness of some worker.s to take such action where in a "good" company 
one might have expected workers to be hesitant about such action. 
·::.:: 
. ·. ~ ·: 
· ..... ' 
- . 
I-Iany of the companies experiencing occupations within this period .··. 
(and '~ver ·the ·1onger~0J.971-75 :period} havf)~ a1feady4h~.,.,a· consi~e:ta.b1J·~oiliit'-> 
. -~ . 
wri~en about their bad industriai relations situations. Companies such 
as GEC1 , with nine occupations, five strikes and over seven political 
strikes to its credit in 1971-73 alone; Ford's2, with at least two. ~ccup-. 
ations and fourteen strikes and political stril~es; British LeylandJ, 
\ 
with no fewer than two occupations and thirty-nine strikes and political 
strikes; Plesse-y 4 , with a total of ten occupations~ strikes and political 
strikes, apd Lucas5, with.thirteen, ~~d so on6• 
Regardless of size those companies experiencing occupations in 
1971-73 were among the very few in the country to experience any industr-
ial unrest at all, and that speaks mUch of their indust;rial relations - • 
.. sitUa.tion. The· Department of Employment survey? showed that of all 
establishments in manufacturing industry less tharL six percent had any 
strikes at all over the three years 1971-7). Manufacturing establishments 
with two or more stoppages in the :period wereceven fewer; only 0.9% had 
1. Cf, CIS Report, No.,l2, 1973; G.Cha.d.rrick, 1970;.Ne-Hens, 1970, and 
chapter 5 of this worke 
.. 
. . .- . . 
2. Cf. CIS Reportp No.20, 1978; H.Beynon, i97J; J.Natliewss 1972; A.Nashrl976• 
\ 
J. Cf. ·CIS Report, No.5, 1974; Turner, Clack and Roberts, 1967; J .Fryer, 
~The Sunday Times•, 7th December, 1975; D.Whitfield~ 0'fhe Morning 
Star·•, 1st September; 19759 K.-Graves, 'The Morning Star', 25th.Aug~ '75· 
4. Cf. P.Foot, •socialist Worker' • 4th Oct.l97.5f A.Milligan, 'The Moriling 
Star'. lOth December 1971, and 29th October 1971. . 
5. Cf. CE ~:port, No.l2, 1975; 'New Scientist', Jrd July 197.5, p:p .. l0-12; 
D.Elliot, 'Peace News', 1.5th August,1975; D. and R.Elliot, 'Voice 
Newspaper•, October 1975. 
6. Cf. 
. ... '- ·__ ..... 
CIS Report, No.lO, 1974 (Courtaulds); A.Sampson, 1973 (ITT); P·:.A.vi.$1 ·-
'The Norning Star', 20th March 1974 (Giltspur InvestmentS); R.Smith .. 
and D.Sawbridge, 1975 (larsons); M.Prlor, 'Tlie Horning S"Ea.r', 4th 
Aprilp 1975 {Imperial Typewriters). 
7. D of E Gazette, op cit, November 1976. 
. ·- .': 
. ·--:.-·._.· 
.·' 
.· .... 
two stoppages, 0.6% had between three and sj..x stoppages, and ;only O.J..% had. -
' 
seven or more stoppages. The figures for the occupied c~m:panies show that 
only a minority ~. twenty-five companies (28%) - experienced no more than. .. -
one industrial dispute, i.e., an occupation. Seven {8;&) had two disputes, 
forty-eight (53%) had three to six dispu~es, and ten_ :"(11%-) had seven or 
more. Thus it is likely that occupied\ companies' establishments were --
among the tiniest of minorities to have had industrial unrest beyond one 
dispute. 
Case Studies.·:< 
Jlle handliiJ5 of redunclancy situations: In many ways the losing of one's 
job is the most traumatic event that can happen in a person°s working life. 
- -. By that token the handling of such a situa.ti9n needs to be done ver,y 
- skillfUlly if anger, fear and dep_ression are to-Pe .avoided or ininiJnisede 
- -
· The Redundancy Payments Act, 1965 aimed to at least defuse some of the-
elements of fear but this ~s been seriously weakened by the advent of 
high unemployment. Beyond this personal element the Act had noped to 
- -
defuse industrial conflict over this issue bu:f;, a. cruciaJ.- LUZOplem has 
_ lain outside of the A.ct 's provisions, namely with management de_cision 
making and subsequent handling of decisions'made. A recent study ha.s 
- l - -
claimed, rather cautiously, that ~~~employers have bee11 led to treat 
the whole affair of redundancy more precisely a.nd carefully" since the 
1 - -
Act's introduction • This may be the case but the ~·some••~ referred to 
did not include companies experiencing occupations. In every case the 
workforce leadership complained of unfair treatment. This fell into 
two major categories; firstly, many of the decisions behind the redunda.n~ 
.... - ... ~ . ..._ ... 
--....._ ___ .......... 
··~ .. 
actual redundancy situation was then handled was not see1i as fair. 
1. Parker et al, op cit, 1971, p.lJ. My emphasis, AJN., 
.,_ 
t . 
---- ···-··· -·- .. ···---
···-·-r·-··········" .· .. -.,_ ... -.---~ ••.....•• ~"··-·•· , .. •· ~- ;· ~ ~: :.: .. L::_.:::~;::::..::;:::J 
;Leads-ate EJ18'ineering: On July 1st 1969 the Leicest~r based 
Stibbe company began operations at their new Leadgate factory in Consett, 
North West Durham. For opening in this "development area" the company 
received thirty thousand pounds in regional employment grants and forty-
four thousands in operational grants over the next three years1 • The 
company was thriving and by 1972 was rated in the 'TIMES Top 1000 British 
Companies'. By June of that year it was employing nearly two-and-a-half 
thousand people; three hundred at the Leadgate factory. Using govern-
ment aided grants new machinery worth three thousand pounds was installed 
at that factory, and-the company.publically announced that its development 
was a success story. One week later, on June JOth, the Leadgate factory 
was closed. 
The workforce responded by staging a sit-in which was a remark-
able event for that part of the country. The factory itself was under 
the leadership of trade unionists to the right of the movement. Fred 
Carlyon, the convener, for example, had once used his influence to get 
a local trade union militant removed from his union and sacked from his 
job. 
"I've made enemies, when as a union man, among my own people. I got a 
Communist's (union) card took off him: I got his job took off him. He 
was causing unneccessary trouble in the works .. (2). 
Carlyon was part of the traditional right-wing trade unionism of Consett 
where anti-communist and anti-militant trade unionism reign. Even the 
local Steel works which, as the tmm 's major employer, was under closure 
threat did not have an 'action committee' though there was a prolification 
of such organisations throughout Britain's Steel industry at this timeJ. 
1. 'The Morning Star', 7th July, 1972. 
2. Interview with Carlyon, October 1976. 
J. Cf. Ursell, 1976. 
! 
.... 
s ."' ,. 
··'::• 
.····- ·. 
·. .: ·.~-. '· . 
,. . '. 
The major organisational exception in the town was the local trades coun-
cil which had only come under left wing leadership weeks ·before •. In fact 1 
. . I . . . . . 
one of their first major actions was to set up an .,Action Committee Against 
Unemployment" to assist the Leadgate workers who \iere now giving some-
thing of a m-ilitant lead to the area's workers. 
The main factors which drove\the Leadgate workers .•over the 
edge' included the fact that no consultations what-so-ever took place 
over the redundancies, no.advanced warning of the closure was given-
the workers were given days' notice and the full-time union official was 
. not even informed, the factory was being clcised after barely meeting the 
minimum operating period after which grants need not be paid back, and 
on top of everything else new machinery was bought only, apparently, to-
be shifted to the c0mpany's Leicester-factory a few days later. 
As Carlyon was to express it, 
11 \~e were all very bitter when the announcement was made. The men were 
called to a meeting in the canteen and told that they were going to 
·lose their jobs; it 'lias the first they knew.•• (1) 
They left that meeting ngasping with shock and indignation .. 2 , 
"But we just couldn •t sit there and cry., We held a meeting and the next 
morning we put a lock on the gate and organised a sit-in& There were 
men at the factory 24 hours a day.. (3). 
The focus of the workers" anger is revealed in the fact that their first 
intention of the sit-in was primarily aimed at preventing the removal of 
the new machinery. They knew that with it went their jobs but they also 
saw it as a symbol of what the company had<done in moving to Corisett. 
Now when asked if he was a militant Carlyon was to reply, 
.·; .... : 
..... ~ ·· .. ··:•• 
1. The Neucastle 'Evening Chronicle'~ 15th December 1972; interview •,ri th ~-
Carlyon, October 1975. 
2. Ibid. 
). Ibid. 
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"The way some people say it, militancy is not a compliment.. if by milit-
ant you mean a person who stands up for his rights, then I~m a militan~'(l). 
\ 
Baynard. Press: The situation at this small, central London, 
printing establishment echoes Ltb&t of Lea.dgate. The establishment was 
.·· .• 
owned by Reed International which 1-ra.s at the time ranked::=.among the top 
twenty companies in Britain. However, they were in the process of going 
\ 
through a series of closures a . immediat'ely prior to the Ba.ynaxd. closure 
they closed down Odha.ms Press, Fleetway Printers, Cornwall Press, Temple 
Press and. Fisher Bookbinders. Three further factories were to be sold 
off, including Baynaxd Press, to property developers. · The three hundred 
workers were given only one week's no·t.ice of closure. In cUldition, their 
shop floor leadership were unconvinced that the company's closure prog-:. . 
~~e-was warranted. 
Unlike Lea.dgatet workers these workers had a 'hi~tory,q:fr&~tive 
• ' '• .. • • • : I •' ' '/ • J' ~ '.. • '·':.:,~~ • • •o • •' • • I 
militancy and had been among the earliest supporters of the Briant 
Colour Printing work-in. They quickly responded to the closure· threat 
- part in anger, part d:rawing from experience - by staging a sit-in. 
Interestingly, as jj;' to underline. their doubts about Company closures, 
after only twenty-four hours the company co~ceed~ and withdrew the 
closure noticeso 
Linpa.c,: This Liverpool factory began under the ownership of 
the Reid-Medway group. As is nsual in these cases the company was sold 
off - to Linpa.c of Featherstone - without any reference to, or consultat-
ion with, the workforce. On the transfer the new company informed the 
workforce that they were going to close down for t~e months in order 
to re-equip and re-employ on a selective basis. 'l'he plan, in fact-, -·ias- ...... 
·,, 
1. The Newcastle 'Evening Chronicle' 0 15th December 1972. 
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to reduce the number employed and mainly by sacking all the': women workers •. 
I . . 
Re-employment was also designed to achieve other aims. ·The management 
informed the workers that they could not ~tee that existing condit-
ions of· employment vrould be maintained. AJ:Jgry, the workers sat-in to 
prevent sackings and win assurances that working conditions would be 
\ 
maintained. 
Da•i!son and Barfos: For the period 1971/72 this company was 
ranked as Britain's 860th largest. Within that same year it was to face. 
two occupations at its factories. The first took place at the Gorton 
(Manchester) works in January 1972 when management attempted to close 
it down. The second occurred just. five months later at the unmilitant 
'Ihetfo:::d (Norfolk) works, and again over red.tinclanci.e_s •. The company, 
without consultation, began by announcing .that there would be thi;rty-i'ive 
redundancies,. The situation was made wore. by the relatively shoi:t notice 
given~. At this point the unions intervened and after discussions the 
company agreed to reduce the redw..dancies to a total of sixteen. The 
agreement was ha.-dly fresh, however, when, without warning, consultation 
· or reason, it was announced that the number of redundancies was to be 
increased to twen·ty-eight. It was at this point that the occ~l:pa.tion 
began .. 
Once again a seemingly urunili tant group of workers, based in 
an unmilitant environment 7 reacted sharply against what they saw as 
unreasonable action. A reflection of the feelings of the workers at how 
they had been treated is further revealed in an incident in which 
... scuffles occurred when a manager - allowed in to inspect the workS :.:.<·..:_ 
···~ ........ -:- ·-- .. 
1. At the same time 100 redundancies were announced at another of the 
company's factories. 
··. ·--
--. 
attempted to tear down a notice declaring that the factory wis under the 
control of supervisory and clerical workers1 • 
. . . 
Extrusion Hachines: The occupation began at this Runcorn (Chesh~ 
ire) factory after the vrorkers had been faced l'lith an ultima.t\~IIFtha.t:.-they 
had to accept a new working agreement. When the workers refused the · 
management responded by ordering them ~o collect their cards because the 
\ ~ . .: .. )',!.,,:,,~:~~:~~~·~if.~:/·'::. 
factory was being closed. This kind of tactic is not too.untypical but 
there are increasing signs-that it is leading to the type of response 
embarked UJ?On by the Extrusion workers. 
Allis Chalmers: This company was rated as the country's 87.3rd 
largest when, in January 1972, it was in the thro~~ of closing down its· 
factory in Mold (Flintshire). No warning of closure was given beyond a 
. . / 
few days"~ notice a.r..d there was no consultation. This was not surpriSi.rlg 
in a factory where industrial. relations practice has been ~ed\ as being 
"poor" prior to the closure announcement2• The workers, however, were 
far from convinced that there was a sound reason for closing their factory 
. so they emba~ked upon a sit-in... As with Baynard P.;ress their case seems 
to have been proven by the fact thatv a.t'ter only seventeen days of' 
occupation, the closure was resci.~. Four years later it• was still o:pen 
employing roughly the same nUIIlber of workers. 
( 
It must surely be question--
ed that if financial reasons alone had forced the company to make the 
closure announcement then no occupation could have forced it to keep it 
open; at least not for such a long period. 
1 .. ''The Horning Star! , }td Nay 1972. .. ~ .... 
... ~.._ ··-. ~ 
··-.. ·, __ • ..::!:'" 
2. Questionnaire return from Hugh Hughes, convenor at Allis Chalmers. 
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The handling of other vrorkplac~ p:r.:,<,?blems: Two clas'Sic cases. 
' 
·Within the bad indust~ial relations' situa:t.ions of ma.ny of the occ:upied 
companies there were some extremely bad cases. While such cases were 
untypical most of the others were not exactly good situations. 
Bainbridge (Manufacturing) Ltd: Here was a case of mismanagement 
in various directions, even to the extent of contravening the law. 
Towards the bo:gj~j~:;> of May 1975 the company collapsed;owing 
thirty thousanA pounds to-various people including the workforce who were 
owed four thousand pounds in wages and holidaymoney. At this point, ' 
fearing the worst, the workers staged a sit-in to ensure that they would 
get the money owed to them. The action was facilitated by the fact that 
there was still considerable salable stock on hand in the factory. At-
this point _the thirty women involved were as yet unorg~ ~nto a union~ 
The action was quickly called off when the manager gave them assurances 
that all would be well with th~ establishment of a new company - 'Two 
Glo'. In short, with a change of ownership and name the same factory 
would continue tradiP.go The nevr company appear.ed. with the former owner. 
David Bainbridge, as the new managing director and with his wife as :Part 
owner. However, within five days of its formation the new company also 
·collapsed, and with it the assurances given to the workforce. Bainbridge 
at this point appealed to the workers to stay on and complete five-
hundred dresses which he claimed would be sold and the money shared with 
them. The workers felt no reason to trust this situation and seized the 
factory, along with the dresses, instead. 
Settled in for a battle the workers now approached a trade_ 
-~·- ... ·"'""~---.. 
-~~ ..... 
union - the NUGHW - for membership and advice. (They were, in fact, advised_-
J -
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to give u:p the occupation and take out writs against the c.om:pany) .. 
I . 
In the meantime the company books had been impounded by Social 
Security officials for non-payment of National Insurance Contributions1• 
The Department of Employment. had been called in by the union to investigate 
the fact that only six of the employees had contracts of employment •.. The 
' 
Inland Revenue was, at the same time,\looking into the ·c~m:pany's tax 
affairs. 'Ihe i'fages Inspectorate was investigating the fact tha.t the 
workers had been normally paid only two-thirds of the minimum rate for 
the industry. The Inspector of Health and Safety had earlier been called 
in and had ordered improvements and. a wiring check, and Health officials 
were to be called ill. to investigate the fact that the factory had ~wo._ ·• 
sub-stand~ toilets2• 
Through all this the managing director had expected his workforce 
to work on for nothing in the hope that they might get back some of the 
money owed to them. 
Coles Cranes {s~derfan~l!, At the other end of the scale {in size 
of· employment bn\ly·~)~_ is the Acrow company under the chairli!.ti.nship of 
U .A.de Vigier. Nr.de Vigier ra.pid.iy. ma.nage,.4 :t!?f· turn a. :peaceful. non-
militant, factory into the battlefield of one of the. North Eas;t's most 
militant and longterm industrial disputes of the post-war erau 
Up until 1972 the Sunderland factory of Coles Cranes was an old 
"family" firm owned by the Steel Group. 
i. 
1-
,, 
t 
I 
I 
·I 
-- I 
I 
"If you wanted a safe and steady job in Sunderland you came to work at Coles" (3). 
1. The Bainbridge concern had :previously been fined :for a. simi~r otfenc~ ... 
2. 'The Northern Echo', JOth r~y 1975. 
). This was the view expressed by ~~tty Wake, the works' convenor, a.t 
an interview in 1975. 
, ;· 
i 
. 
For the man who had led the Coles occupation the company previously had 
' 
' been "progressive and forward looking" and was none of the finest and 
happiest companies in the country"1 • Over the entire p6st-1'1'ar period. 
industrial relations had been 'good", and there had not been more than one 
or two isolated strikes. Much of this was reflected. in the company Labour 
2 turnover; described as "emba.rra.singly low at one percent.. • Many of the 
workers had fifteen to twenty years service with the company. 
Trouble began in early 1972 when the steel Group ca.me under 
pressure from an asset stripping group which was buying up its shaxes. 
In this situation the company turned to the Acrow company to buy.them out. 
Acrow agreed, during the spring, a.tddst assurances to Sir James Steel) that 
the company would continue the existing business and that all rights of . 
the existing steel employees would be fully safeguarded~. 
For the first six months things did continue as normal but in 
November shop stewards were informed, through the local directors, that 
there was to be an immediate reduction in the workforce: tha.t was the 
first ever they hea-rd. of their new employer. To make w.atters worsQ· . 
. the company stated that redundant workers were to be informed o£ tbe 
decision only one hour after their stewards had been informed and that 
they had to be off the site by the end of the week - just four days later: 
ten percent of the workforce was to be affected. Apart from being 
callous in its severity and approach this decision broke all existing 
procedures and agreements and contravened both the Redundancy Payments Act 
1. Interview with Matty Wake, 1975. . .. 
........ 
. ...... 
2. Ibid. 
· ........ 
J. The Steel Group President. 
4. The statement to this effect was printed in one of the newspapers put 
out by the occupation workforce leadership. It is reproduced in Mills, 
{Jun~, 1976n p.J6. 
.·•::-
. ' 
and the Contracts of Employment Act1 • To cap it all the shop stewards 
were informed that the redundancies were total unnegotiable. Then began 
the first of a series of twists and turns in de Vigier's decision making. 
lhe shop stewards went immediately to London to attempt to get the 
redundancies delayed for one week while negotiations to place. De Vigier 
agreed. On their return back to Sunderland, however, they were told by 
2 local management that the original decision was to be upheld • 
Not yet having recovered from this shock the next news to be 
passed to the workforce, through declarations on the factory notice boards, 
was that all existing agreements and procedures were to be scrapped?. The 
new :procedures and agreements were :presented to the shop stewaxds on the 
15th December (1972). These included a :plan to re-time the rates in the 
assembly shop and without any allowance for consultation or trade union 
appeal in the fixing of new rates; 11flexibility of labour" was to be 
introduced; the number of shop stewards was to be reduced by two-thirds; 
the composition and number of the union works committee was to be determ-
ined by the company; the union convenorshi:p was to be reduced to a :part-
time :post, and shop steward business was to be restricted to the last 
hour of any day only. Here was a :plan which intended not only to deal 
with internal company affairs but directly with the affairs of trade 
unions. Not even the Conservative Government's 'Industrial Relations Act• 
had dared to go so far. 
The shop stewards were now told to ratify these changes or be. 
1. Both require that a minimum length of notice of between one and f'our 
weeks be given depending on length of service. , ',t" 
2. De Vigier was to claim later that the problem lay with local management's 
J. 
interpretation of his decisions. 1 
Interviews with Coles Convener, Matty Wake, and the APEX union official 
- John Creaby - and national official (Horace Green) involved in the 
dispute. 
I , . 
. -· __ ,_.,.._ ~-~-~~·- - ___________ ....:.._-....:..~-! 
. •'. 
suspended, and the assembly shop workforce was also thre~tened with sus-
' 
' pension if they failed to accept the new rates~ Both the shop stewards 
and the assembly shop workforce refused and were duly suspended, but the 
assembly shop workers also refused to accept suspension and worke~ on: 
in effect, staging an occupation. The company now threatened to suspe:nd 
any worker supplying materials or assisting these workers. Eventually 
\ . 
some storekeepers and two crane drivers were suspended but they t?o worked 
on. Eventually the situation was cooled down through discussions with 
local management but with the problems merely delayed rather than resolved~ 
Nonetheless the shop stewards had achieved a tactical victory in avoiding 
being provoked into a strike immediately prior to Christmas1 9 
-As the workforce stopped work fo~ the ~ristmas break they_knew 
that a series of management demands awaited their return. Management were 
insisting, through a public notificationv on "the right to employ modern 
work study methods",to 1tfix fair and realistic times in the assembly shop" 
- by which they meant an alteration of the shifts, to do away with demare• 
ation lines and. in:;;titute "flex:i.bilit,y of laboure&!) to do away with stagg-
. ered . holidays, to insti tut.e compulsory overtime working, and to change 
the whole shop steward structure within the factory. 
! 
Some changes had already been made in working conditions. The 
. canteen facilities had been seriously cut back2• 
On the post-christmas return to work a mass meeting was called 
by the unions to press forward four demands. These were, firstly, · 
1. It was the shop stewards' im:presion that the management were~de~~ber­
ately attempting to provoke such a strike, and at that time, in oider·-...-
to break the unions. (Interviews with Wake, Creaby and Green.) -
2. Previously there had been a cho~e of four hot meals, hot pies, or 
sandwicheso The chaise was reduced to one hot meal and no pies or 
sandwiches .. 
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the withdrawal of all notices cancelling existing agreements;;. secondly, 
I 
the restoration of all previous agreements, procedures, etc; thirdly, 
meaningful nego·t.iations on security of employment, and fcn~~l:i:cy. no victim-· 
, I 
isation. The mass meeting went on to agree that failing management 
acceptance of these points an immediate occupation of the factory would 
take place. In the event management refused even to discuss the demands \ ' 
and the occupation began. A bitter three month battle followed. 
This was not the first time that the Acrow company and its chair-
man had been involved in such actions. In 1964 the company had ta.~en over 
Adamson and Hatchett (Cheshire) and proceeded to declare that trade union--
ism at the factory was unneccessary and that "flexibility of labour" had 
to be introduced. A· nine-day dispute resulted but in this case trade 
unionism was seriously eroded within that factory. 
In 1968 the company took over S.H.Heywood (Reddish) and adopted 
the same anti-union policies. This time the workers won a three-week 
strike but in 1971 the factory was closed down only to be re-opened. some 
time later with non .... urrl,cm. labour,., The story was repeated a.. third. time 
at Thomas Storey's, another of the company's ac~uisitions. Here fifty-
five workers, including the union convenor, were declared redundant during 
I 
a period of trade union recruitment within the fact~ry.. A:eter a strike 
the workers were reinstated but four weeks later de Vigier personally 
sacked the convenor1• 
After the occupation of Coles in Sunderland the workers were 
eventually persuaded to look into the company files. Some interesting 
facts were revealed. For instance, it.was shown that de Vigier had ordered 
....... _ ·- · .. 
· ...... 
1. Quoted in newspaper produced by Coles occupation leadership. 
Reproduced in Mills, June,l976, p.J?. 
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local nianagement to make a ten percent cut, in the labour forc'e, and that 
' this order had been received days before a meeting with shoP stewards at 
which it was claimed that there were no plans to introduce redundancies .. 
It was also revealed that, despite rnanagement charges that redu¢ancies 
. . 
were due to low worker output, production problems lay chiefly with the 
difficulties of new cranes, the introduction of flow-line production and 
the transfer of certain workers to other work. In short, behind the 
scene··" management were aware that difficulties had arisen out of IJ'I.anagerial 
. 1 decisions but in public these were blamed on worker output •• 
A tortuous three month battle ensued with management refusiug 
to talk to the shop stewards and then doing so, with points agreed at 
-meetings and then denied, with meetings call~d to discuss certain issues 
and. then something else entirely introduced, until finally agreement· was 
reached (and then den,ed) but rrith a victorious return to work .for the 
:' 
Coles workforce~. 
1. Interview with Wake~ CrE>.aby and. Green., 
2. At first de Vigier refused to meet the workforce and when he changed 
his mind (January 19th) he chose a time and place difficult for the 
shop stewards to meet. He then refused their suggestion for an alter-
native place. In February the local manager (D.Hassall) held talks 
with national union officials. Ha.ssa.ll was said to have full powers 
to settle the dispute and yet said that his decision would be sent on 
by post. No settlement was reached. At the end of that month a. new 
meeting was held between management and shop stewards and agreement 
seemed near on a. return to the status quo and a phased return to worlt. 
The meeting ended after eight hours to resume to a conclusion the foll-
owing day. Instead the stewards were faced with a. management refusal 
to agree anything but a phased return to work. Even here the management 
wanted a longer phased return to work. Meanwhile de Vigier, at a 
meeting in London, agreed to accept the unions' four demands and a mass 
meeting was held to plan a return to work. The following day._l9_cal 
management were denying any acceptance of the four demands. This ··was • .. ---: 
followed by an attack by de Vigier on the three leaders of the occup-·- ·: 
ationa this was in the form of a full-page advert in the local press. 
Writs against these leaders followed. 
After more meetings, which consisted mainly of denia.ls.of pre-
vious agreements, de Vigier finally agreed to the four demands. 
,. 
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; The Acrow company had taken over a company with years of 
"peaceful and harmonious industrial relations .. and had turned it into a 
militant battlefield. They had taken over a company led by men to the 
right within their trade unions1 , and put them to the head of North 
East workers fighting for trade union rights and against redundancy. 
Company attempts to undermine the occuPa.tion failed equally well. When 
a group of Swiss workers broke into the occupied factory and removed a 
large crane for export support came in to Coles workers from workers 
throughout the Acrow group and from dock 1and.railway workersa one result 
was the establishment of an Acrow combine committee. Support even came 
from influential international sources2• 
Ironically, given the situation at_~oles de Vigier may well 
have achieved his aims if he had taken it at a much slower pace. This is 
a point agreed by the convenor, 
"If only he had eroded the rights and conditions bit by bit he might well 
have succeeded, but doing it all in one go just got up the backs of 
everyone" (3). 
Nonetheless, the Acrow company does not appear to have suffered from the-
experience. '!he same year in which the occupation took place the company 
recorded a pre-tax profit of just under six million pounds and by 1975 
it had become the largest manufacturer of equipment used in the construct-
. . d t. 4 J.on J.n us ry • 
1. Wake, for example, when interviewed in 1975 was standing for election 
in the AUEW and his opponent was a candidate of the "Broad Left"~ 
ironically, for this work, his opponent was Norman Temple who led the 
North Road (Darlington) railway struggle over 1962-66. 
2. Charles Levinson, secretary General of the International Confederation 
of General Workers wrote to de Vigier asking him to "desist from thesE/" 
irresponsible practices''. Cf. I>lills, June, 1976, p.J8. 
3. Interview with Waite. 
4. 'The Times', Business News section, 8th September 1975. 
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A brief survey of. other occu:pepon situations. 
Bason: After being taken over by an American company eleven redundancies 
were declared. including all of the factory.•~s shop stewards.. \1orkers 
suggestions of work-sharing and voluntary red~~dancies were rejected and 
it became clear that some element of anti-trade unionism was involved in 
\ 
the sackings.. l\:0. occupation ensued wh:i,ph was forcibly smashed by thirteen 
bailiffs and twenty police officerse 
Balfour Darwin: The company was taken over by the Edgar Allen 
group in I-la.rch 1972 and with assurances that the~e would be no redundancies; 
six months later ninety people at the Sheffield factory were sacked. 
According to management these reduPAancies were in line with "efficient 
working within the revised concept"1 • 'Ihe workforce wanted none of this 
"revised concept" and staged an occup;~.tion. 
F .a .Bloomfield..:.: The occupation of the site worked by this 
company began when the employer withdrew leaving his workforce redundant: 
the cause was blamed on 'financial difficulties' but the workers were left 
with wages owing c 
Bowden Cabless Here t'l-relve workers involved in an overtime ban 
and work-to-rule in connection with a pay dispute were laid off. The 
I· 
workers then occupied the factory. (During the course of the occupation 
the company issued dismissal notices to office staff not involved in the 
occupationo These were withdrawn on the basis that these staff accept 
lay-offs without pay)e 
Br~ant Colour P3:-inti~: The firSt of the BCP occupations 
occurred when the workers were given redundancy notices to take ai'f~~t . 
1. 'The Horning Star' 25th September 1975. 
. ··~·· 
I . 
t 
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from that same day. 
British Le;y:land: 'lhe company had ten years earlier purchased 
their Rants site for a half-a-million pounds and were now, in August 1972, 
planning to sell it to the Eaton Corporation and to English and Continental 
Property for two~and-a-half millions. The new situation was to mean that 
\ 
one-third of the factory's twelve hundred jobs were to be made redundant. 
The shop stewards were convinced that redundancies were not neccessary 
and that they were occurring against a background of company gain. 
When demands for work-sharing were rejected an occupation began, 
Sometime later, at the company's Cowley works, another occupat-
ion occurred when workers involved in an overtime ban over pay were laid-
off. 
B.A.C. During a dispute at the company's \veybridge factory 
in which workers "blacked" certain jobs certain of the workers were· 
suspended. This triggered the occupation. 
Peter Brotherhood: An occupation began at this East Anglia 
factory when the management threatened to withold the pay of twenty 
engineers unless they resumed normal working. 
Bryant: An occupation began at the company's Birmingham (Ringway 
Priory) site and, later, a·t one of its Manchester sites when it became 
clear that a blacklist was being used to prevent the employment of militant 
trade unionists. At the Birmingham site a militant worker was sacked 
when it was discovered that he was on the company 0s blacklist. 
Cammell Laird: After a series of disputes, ending with the lay-
ing off of one hundred boilermakers, an occupation began with the demand 
~--·· 
forla Government enquiry into the "mismanagement of the Birkenhead yards"1 
1. 'The Morning Star', 2nd September 1975. 
' ' ····-·--··• ·-·-·-•••• •-·--~-~---•r" ....,....,,~ ... "_ '''" • ·--•-¥• • r ._,_-r-.,....,~-,.--•••. ._ 
Cateruillar: Draughtsmen at the Birtley factory occupied their 
offices after being suspended, without pay, for attempting to"black" the 
I . . 
work of non-union staff and prevent the incursion of company unioni~m 
into the factory. At that time Caterpillar, along with other companies, 
were attempting to destroy the TASS section of the AUEW through the use 
of a body known as the 'UK APES •1, and through use of the. 'Industrial 
Relations Act'. 
Chesterfield Tube: An occupation occurred following the sus-
~nsion of norkers involved in a work-to-rul~ over pay. · 
Henrx Boot: The company's site at Coney street in York was 
occupied following the sacking of eight workers who had complained about 
safety conditions. 
Crosfield Electroniqs: The company was taken ov¢r ·by De La. 
Rue who claimed that the move would actually increase job security. Six 
months later three hundred workers at the North London factory were made 
redundant, including hall' of the shop stewards' committee. The: company 
refused to discuss the issue with the joint shop stewards' committee or 
even·to allow the convenor on the siteo An occupation ensuedand ended 
when the company took out a writ. 
Cubitt: Similar to the Bryant ca,ses, ail occupation occurred at 
the company's Chelsea site when militant workers were sacked.· 
Cameo: An occupation began following the sacking of ten workers 
for workit'..g-to-rule . in pursuit of a wage claim. 
Educational Audio Visual Inc: S.taf.f .p),lrsu:l.ng negotiation in 
regard to an annual pay agreement were met with management refusal to 
.... ..._ .. 
negotiate and were sacked instead. 
- ··-I 
,~ 
1. H,;Smitl'i'.and D;~sawbricge, '-1975, a.~scuss the use of this body at the 
rirm of C.A. Parsons in Newcastle. 
......... 
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Ferranti: Five of the company's Manchester factories were occ-
upied in response to a lock-out threat during the engineering pay battle 
of spring 1972. 
L.Gardner and Sons: The factory was occupied following the 
suspension of three hundred workers for banning piecework during a pay 
dispute. The remaining workforce haQ been put on a three-day week. 
During the occupation the management refused to negotiate with the union 
and instead introduced "scab" labour into the situationo 
The year earlier during a similar dispute the company refused 
to allow a union meeting on the premises and prevented the workers from 
leaving the factory to hold the meeting outside. 
G.E.C. At the company's Manchester Ruston-Paxman factory an 
occupation began after workers were told that they would not be paid while 
they worked-to-rule. This formed one of the engineering pay battle 
occupations. 
The 'Gravesend and Dartford Reporter's Printers occupied their 
section after being dismissed for refusing to roan the presses during a 
national pay dispute. 
G.K.N. The company's James Nills (Salford) factory was occupied 
during the engineering pay battle when the workers were threatened with 
a lock-out for working to rule. 'J.his action led the occupations in that 
general Manchester area pay battle. 
Gainsborough Cornford: An occupation began here when the union 
convenor came across secret information, not known even to local management, 
that the factory was due for closure. 
. .... 
'' 
' 
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.. ,.· •. _; 
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Hawker-Siddelley: A main cause of "the occupation: at the 
! 
company's Gloster Saro (Gloucester) factory rras stated ~ ~er· towa.J:ds 
the fact that redundancies were carried out without negotiation or 
consultation, and that there was no regard for service. For inst;;Lnce, 
workers with long service, (12 years or more) were included in the sackings .. 
\ 
Hick Ha:r;zreaves and Co: In a now familiar :pattern, an occu:pa.tion 
began at this factory after workers, involved in a pay dispute; where 
informed that they would not be paid while they were working-to-rule. 
Kromberg and Schubert: During a policy of non-cooperation with. 
management over planned redundancies the workers were sacked with only 
fifteen minutes notice. 'Jhey occupied the factorye 
Lovell: As with other leading building firms this one had its 
........ ~ 
Guildfo:z:d Street (London) site occupied after operating a blacklist and 
sacking militant workerse 
Lucas: This company's Wolveihampton factory was occupied duriug 
a pay dispute when the management attempted to sack the workf'orce and 
employ non~·'l.mion labouro 
1-lCAlpine: When workers were locked off the firm's Strand (London) 
site during a dispute over the employment of ."lump labow;" the action t . 
was turned into an occupation. 
Mabbutt and Johnson: During two previous pay disputes the firm 
had sacked twelve workers on one occasion_· and threatened to close the 
factory on the other. Now when faced with yet another pay dispute they 
again employed the tactic of sacking the workers involved but this time 
they were m~t with an occupation. ... ·~. 
Charles HcNeil: The workers here felt compelled to occupy the 
-l .. 
j_ 
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factory when the management attempted to remove machinery durlng their 
strike over pay. 
C.A.Pa~: \'lorkers in the TASS section of AUE\Il occupied the 
company's Kent offices in a battle linked with that at Caterpillar; 
namely, an attempt to prevent the incursion of the UKAPE,. association 
into the works. The occupation was preceeded by the sacking of TASS 
members involved in sanctions against the work of UKAPE. members. 
E.Peart and Coa This was. yet another case of an occupation 
arising out of management threats to t-rorkers working-to-rule during the 
engineering pay battle. 
Aberdare Cab1&2_: Not part of the engineering pay battle these 
engineers nonetheless faced a similar problem. of a work-to-rule being 
countered by a management threat of lock-out. In the event the workers 
raised their hand and played the now widespread occupation card. 
Plessey: An occupation followed management attempts, at the 
Beeston (Nottingham) works, to lay-off the entire workforce during the 
course of a pay dispute. 
Rolls Royce: At the Ansty (Coventry) factory an occupation 
began when the company threatened to lay off the entire manual workforce 
due to a dispute with thirteen internal drivers. The drivers had threat-
ened to withdraw their labour because the company had, without consultat-
ion, upgraded nine workers and "upset" the differential in wages between 
such workers and the internal drivers. 
Seiko: When the company sacked one of the workers the rest of 
the small workforce went on strike and joined a union. · The management 
refused, however, to recognise the union on the grounds that it was not 
:, •, 
f 
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registered according to the Industrial Relations Act. They ~lso refused 
to guarantee that all striking workers would be reinstated.\ At.this 
point the workers regained admission to the works and occupied it. 
Strachans E~ineering: An occupation began immediately after 
the workers were informed that the factory was to be permanently closed 
from that day. Tney were given one-and-a-half hours notice of redundancy. 
\ 
During the course of the occupation it was revealed that the Special 
Branch had been operating inside the factory and that JOhn Grist, the 
firm's chief accountant had been aqting as their 'contact man'. The 
occupation committee went on to call for an inquiry into Special B:r.:a.nch 
t . •t• 1 ac 1v1 1es. In the endp however 9 the workers were forcibly evicted from 
the factory and a security firm was subsequently hired to gua~ the 
premis~s. 
Taylor Woodroli,~ After struggling for t.en•and:.a;;;.ha.i:ft' months to 
\,. 1 
secure trade unionism on the company's Guildfo:rd. Street (London) hospital 
site management re-introduced non-union labour. This led to the occupation. 
. . . . . 
Tillotson Print Co: The fo'I.U' lead.i.ng shop stewards were sacked 
·- . _.. ..• ~ .. ~ 
for calling a work-to-rule over trienty-six redundancies. They then lecl 
their fellow workers into an occupation. 
Tress Engineeripga During the national engineering workers pay 
claim battles of 1972 the workers at 'Iress in No:rthumberland began a 
work-to-rule. The management laid them off in response and the ~orkers 
began the North East's first occupation. 
Viking Engineerine;: Also during the engineering pay battle, 
this time in Nanchester, the workers here staged an occupation when an 
-.. - . 
·- . 
electrician's shop steward was suspended. 
-.. _. . .. 
1. Reported in 'The Sunday Times', Business Section and reproduced in 
'The Horning Star' the following week on 15th April 1975. 
., 
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It would seem that a fairly common problem in occupied factorles has been 
management threats to suspend workers, lay them off, lock them·out or 
' 
sack them. This was the situation at least in sixteen of the cases which 
occurred duri!l.g the period. In each case the threat (or action) immediately 
preceeded the occupation. What appears to have happened is that an already 
difficult situation was escalated and·'led to an escalation of worker action. 
\ -·· .. 
Another widespread problem - occurring in a minimum of thirteen 
1 
cases is that of management attempts to undermine trade union organis-
ation, including the use, in fo.u:r cases, of "blacklisting ... In four 
redundancy cases the workers were angered to extreme action by the extreme 
lack of notice given; in three of these cases notice given was in hours. 
In four other cases the management stepped Up disputes by witholding or . 
threatening t;o' :withhold wages. In a.t least three cases take-overs led to 
redundancy situations which were mishandled even to the extent of following 
on from assurances that the take-over would not lead to redundancies. In 
. a minimum of two· cases the employer's handling of economic affairs brought 
about a crisis si,tuation leaving the workforces without jobs or wages. 
In a further seven cases a variety of situations were so badly handled 
by management as to seriously escalate the situation Qeyond its original 
dispute. 
Added to these forty-nine cases there are the two 'classic' 
cases of Coles and Bainbridge and eight 
th f d t . . . h t J ose re ere o ~n prev~ous c ap ers • 
redundancy cases2along ~ith 
This makes a total of at least 
sixty-four casea of mishandled/ bad industrial relations situations. Thirty 
1. 
2. 
-. ...... 
. ... 
The number refered to includes other cases not detailed in this se.ction~ · 
Of the forty-nine cases,those not detailed include -British Rail Workshop 
(Swindon),. Peter Lind (Liverpool), Nirlees Blackstone (Manchester) L 
Scott (~1anchester) and Timex (Dundee). Non detailed redundancy ca~es • 
include RCA(grford Ness) and ~exton and sons (Fakenham). 
·. i 
· .... ·! 
). Chapters four and five detail events at Fisher-Bendix, Snow, Propytex, 
UCS, Plessey (Alex) and the River Don works (Sheffield) •... ___ ·----.- :·--- -·····--~---_ 
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percent of all occupations to occur within 1971-75. 
The Government Connection. 
To the extent that certain of the occupied companies can be accused of 
mismanagement then the Government of the day must take a certain degree 
of blame (or responsibility) also. That is, in regard to those cases 
where they had a direct interest. 'This was the case with tW..tionalised 
industries such as the occupations at British Rail Workshop (Swindon), and 
at five occupied steel lWrks, including the River Don. The government 
also had a key or controlling interest in the occupied RCA and Gammell 
Laird establishments (where four occupations occurred) and where the 
government had a fifty percent interest; at B.P. (stroud),with a forty-
eight. percent ~nterest in the company; and in the case of the British -
Leyland Company where an eighty-five percent interest was acquired- three 
occupations have since occurred up until the end of 1975 alone. 
Less directly the Government contributed to the occupations 
at Plessey (Alexandria) in the manner of the sale of the factory, and at 
UCS and Sealand Hovercraft where they refused to use public funds to save 
these companies from a liquidity·problem. Thus in seventeen occupations 
involving nine companies the government had some kind of substantial 
interest or influence. 
To say that the government directly played any role in foster-
ing bad industrial relations (or mismanagement of situations which led 
to occupations) would be far too strong. The links are indirect, but 
they are links none the less. 
The Links 1 The situation of Plessey and UCS have already been 
._ .... 
discussed earlier. In the Plessey case the government contribution is '·· 
.· 
; 
less than clear but in the UCS case the Conservative Party, both in 
' 
Opposition and in Government, can be seen as playing an important contr-
ibutory role to the work-in. In a similar way but to a lessor extent the 
same can be said in regard to the Sealand Hovercraft occupation. 
Secl.a.nd: The company, on Board of Trade ad vice, moved to .Hillom 
(Cumberland) in 1970. ' . The move along with company plans were approved by 
the Board of Trade (BOT) and a grant was offered of around one-hundred-and..; 
fifty-nine thou$8,nd poundsi .·.' The financial assistance was an important 
. .. ·' ,, .\ 
factor in encouraging the move. 
From 1970 to the end of 1972 the company experienced two major 
problems .. · On the one hand, the. owners ran out of capital and on the other 
hand government bodies appeared to be both s~ow and unwilling to make 
payments available. In the meantime the government prototype development 
grant scheme had been dropped and over thirty-two thousand pounds of grant 
money had expected to be in this form. as part .of the aid to Sealand~. By 
the end of the year, having only received just under seven-and-a.-half 
thousand pounds of the estimated grant money3, the owners were desperately 
pressing the Department of Trade and I~iustry (DTI) for the realisation 
of the potential grants they felt owed them. The DTI, however, now 
stated that they would only match further granted aid, pound for pound, 
against what th~ owners could come up with. The company was to be forced 
to prove that they could raise private capital4• 
1. Of this sum £127,000 was to be operational grants and the rest in the 
form of prototype development grants. 
. .. ·~. 2. It seems that even as late as the end of 1972 Sealand's owners were ·• 
unaware that this type of grant had been stopped. 
J. Five thousand had been provided for staff training and two thousand 
four hundred pounds for the first prototype. 
4. R.Eglin, 'Slaying the \~hitehall Dragon', 'The Sunday Times', 24th Dec.1972. 
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In the middle of this ~l.tng was the workforcet many of whom 
had been made redundant four years earlier when the Millom +ron.Works 
was closed down. Faced with a situation of closure in a factory with 
orders :providing work for at least nine months the workers staged a 
•work-in' ., Not. unsur:pisingly this began with the full support of the 
management and. staff. Within three we"'eks the factory had been saved 
when a consortium of business interests offered to put one-hundred 
thousand pounds into the company1• Now the DTI came forward with much 
needed capital. 
In very different ways a much greater responsibility lies 
with the government in regard to occupations which occurred at the 
ESC River Don works and at BLMC :plants. 
The River Pon Works: The heart of, the Don works' problem lay 
in the governments attitude to the futuxe of Steel production in Eritainz 
an attitude debated throughout the cc1unt:ry by a multitude of Steel workers, 
' giving rise to a number of 'action committees'. It has been argued that 
part of the price of entry into the European Economic Community (EEC) was 
a serious cut back in steel production to the quotas set by the EEC 
authorities. As a result certain steel works were closed to meet 
l •.j,.• 1 b. .... . ·2 po ~~~ca o JeC~~ves .• Certainly, some of the leading action committee 
activists saw ~he closures in this way and this made resistance to 
closures even more compelling. This was the case at the River D,on works 
where the workers' leaders did not believe that there was a sound economic 
case for closing the works. The fact that it was conceived as a political 
decision helped to exascerbate the situation. 
1. The consortium included Vickers Shipbuilders, James Fisher and Son, 
Ferranti and an anonymous Yorkshire businessman. 
2o c:e. G.D.N.Ursell, 1976. 
. ... 
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British Leyland: While the particulars of each occU.pa.tion 
were·not the direct responsibility of the government the stf'uct'lp:'ing of 
the industrial relations system certainly was. The government,a Labour 
administration at that. acquired the company (to the extent of 85,%) when 
it was going ~~ugh a critical period both in terms of finance and in 
industrial unrest. 
In mid-1975 the government injected seven hundred million pounds · 
into the company and yet resisted the call from various trade unions to 
fully na ti?nalise the company. ~lhile some effort was made to change the 
industrial relations system (with some level of worker participation) 
management were still left to declare massive redundancies1 and to use 
threats of closure in cases where the workers were accused of not co-oper~ 
ating with company policy. In fact, on more than one occasion . the 
government itself threatened to pull out its financial backing if the 
unions did not follow a certain coutae of action. Old, and bad management 
practices, it seems have been allowed to continue such as, for example, 
at the Southall (AEC). factory where an occupation occurred after workers 
involved in a pay dispute were threatened with lock-out. 
Cammell Laird: As has been pointed out earlier, boilermakers in 
1975 felt compelled to occupy the shipyard and call for an inquiry into 
mismanagement and yet all that happened was that an injunction was served 
on fifty of the occupiers, two full-time boilermaker officials ~d everY 
shop steward includedt forbidding them to enter the yards. 
1. 
B.P.: The actual occupation at Stroud can not be laid at the door 
......... 
. ..... 
Worker participation ended at questions of whether redundancies sh()ulcf: 
occur or not. 
... 
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of goverr~ent but their investment in the company does reveal something 
of the extent to which they have been prepared to leave curf:ent _de_cision 
1 
making and industrial relations practice tmchanged • 
Although owning, through the Bank of England, forty-eight 
percent of BP shares and having the right to nominate two Board members 
with powers of veto this right have never been exercised. This policy \ . . ... 
of 'non-interference' was continued when the Labour GOVernment, again . 
through the Bank of England, acquired Burma. Oil's twenty percent share 
in BP. inth a sixty-eight percent interest in the company the government 
pledged not to use its majority shareholding "to interfere in the company's 
commercial affairs"2 .. 
In the same way the government of the day has failed to intervene 
in the industrial affairs of companies in which it has a holdi."l'lg ~xcept 
to back up ma.nagement decisions., 
It will not, of course, be surprising to find that the govern-
ment has acted in the ways it has done. It can of course be argued that 
'. ,,, . \,y-.. . . 
the significance of its role in occupations is minimal. in most cases and 
surely very indirect; '!hat is not the point. What is being identified 
is the role of government (Conservative and Labour) in industrial 
capitalism. They are as indirect a part of the developmen~ of occupations 
as capitalism itself but they are defi~tely less impartial and more 
directly responsible for the political-decision making that they_make .. 
1. 
2. 
That is not to forget that an Industrial Relations Act ua.s introduced 
and later repealed. What is being argued is that the bases of capitalist 
decision making was left in tact. 
·-~- ... : .: .. . ::: ~ ....... 
G.Nuttall, 'The Horning Star', l'(th September 1975. The quote is taken 
from the 1975 Annual Report of BP. 
. . ·--·---------·· ,..:. ___________ _ 
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Finally, it needs to be said that there was some difference 
betHeen the Conservative and the Labour G0verrunents in regacl to the 
question o£ occupations. lihile both lend responsibility in certain cases 
for a brief period of time - late 1974 - the Labour Government did lend 
its support to three occupations to aid them in the establishment of 
worker co-ope-ratives1• However, as is·, discussed later, the period was 
all too brief. The decisions were made against the advice of influen~ial 
-. 
sections of the government-and within the Cabinet and they may have cost 
leftist Minister, Tony Benn, his job at the Il,ldustry Hinistry. After his 
'l 
departure government involvement in the worker co-operative became as 
much a hindrance.· . as a help., 
' . . . \ . ~: 
The Legal Connection. 
Beyond any considerations of management action or government involvement 
one or two cases of local police action have played a direct part in 
encouraging the transformation of a strike into an occupation. This was 
the case at Hawker-Siddelley's Lostock (Bolton) plant, at Walmsley's 
v1igan plant and at. L .. Gard.ner and Sonso In all three cases the :police 
warned that strikers-_'_picket lines were "causing an obstruction' or 
needed to "be drastically reduced .. in number. Fearing arrests the strike.:r;s 
occupied their factories instead. 
In another case, at Cammell Lai:rd 's, police action had an 
indirect but substantial influence. Early in 1975 a strike at the yard~ 
encountered trouble when police attempted to cut back a picket line. 
Violence ensued and eleven pickets were arrested. In the September of 
that year boilermakers occupied their ya:rd and made reference to _,_:~~he __ 
......... : 
result of other forms of action as being partly responsible for their 
1. See chapter 9. 
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particular course of action. 
! 
In a somewhat less direct sense it can be argued that some of 
the Hanchester J}a.Y occupations had been influenced by the trouble over 
picketing at the long running, and violent, Roberts Arundel strike in 
Stockport in l970-71. One of those arrested at that time was Bill Anten 
\ . . 
the convenor of the Hawker-Siddelley factory at Hoodfol:d that rras occupied 
in April of 1972e 
Beyond any possible influence \':9n the decision to occupy in 
the first place legal action has been used in a number of cases to 
attempt to end such actions. This has been so in at least twelve cases, 
but with varying success.. Namely, at Bason; Briant Colour Printing; Coles 
Cranes; Crosfield Electronics; 'The Gravesen~ and Dartford Reporter'; 
Imperial Typewriters; Lovell; Hassey-Ferguson; Propytex, Sha:rston Engineer-
ing ; Scott's Bakery and at Strachan Engineering. 
In five cases writs were issued against the occupation leaders 
but successfully defied, (Briants, Coles Cranes, Lovelf, Propytex and 
. 2 
Sharston ). In the case of ''Jhe Gravesend and. Dartford Report 0 the police 
. were called in but left after they were satisfied that there was no 
damage done. But in the remainang six cases writs were successfully 
1. 
2. 
At Lovell the High Court judge gave permission for a court order to 
be served ~n a trade unionist occupying a crane) by pinning on the 
bottom of the machine and shoutir>.g the contents through a load hailer. 
It was ignored and the occupation and accompanying strike continued 
to a successful conclusion. 
In this case the Chancery Court, at Preston, granted a writ for 
eviction on the grounds that the workers had been sacked and were 
therefore not entitled to be on the premises. (The employer---had,;_ 
in fact sacked_them as a tactical move during a pay dispute). 
In making his decision the judge, Sir Thomas Burgess, stated that, 
"1'his is a small firm and it -rrould be possible to get them out but if 
it were a big factory you might want 2,000 police with tear gas. I 
want to be sure that any order I might make can be enforced". ('The 
Horning Star, 1st April 1972). . 
Ironically, the decision failed in its enforcement with 
strachans being fortified by a mass picket of engineering workers. 
.. .... 
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enforced • 
Summag. 
;. 
'; 
Industrial relations practice has played a vital part in the enactment of 
a substantial ~Jamber of occupations, i.e.t bad management handling of 
situations. So few enterprises experienced industrial stoppages over the 
early 1970s that this throws a light on th_e situation at those places 
which were occupied. Further, the fact that a majority of occupied camp-
anies experienced more than one type of industrial action in_ the period 
puts them among the most industrially 'kt.r.U1t\torn••; , in the country. 
": r' ' 
In at least thirty percent of all occupied enterprises a direct 
linl~ is revealed between bad ma.P4gement handling of a situation and the 
occupation which followed .. : 
\H thin the general picture it Wo.s the large and financially power-
ful companies which experienced a proportionally greater incidence·and 
number of occupations, strikes and political strikes. In short, occup-
ations __ occurred where there was already evidence of a relatively high 
degree of industrial unrest within,. the recent period. 
As might be expected, in a capitalist society government policy 
• backed by force of law - lends itself to th~ ma.i.il.tenance of the existing 
structure of industrial. decision ma..'l<.ing. The actions of both Conservative 
and Labour Governments over the period have not done much to dispell this 
view. Infact, Conservative Government action played a role·:in:.: ·· · .-
encouraging occupations at the UCo and River Don works, and Labour 
Government policy was a contributory factor to the continuing unrest 
---- .. :·.-,~ 
1. At stracl.1ans, scott's bakery, and a second Bason's occupation violence·-.: 
ensued in the eviction of occupiers. At Scott's 1 for example, 60 
security guards with eight dogs broke their way in to evict 17 bakers. 
At Bason's thirty-three bailiffs and police used hammers and crowbars 
to smash their way into a section guarded by five workers. 
-
. .. ------... 
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(including occupations) Hi thin British Leyland.o 
The law has been used on several occassions to attempt to 
evict lfOrkers fro-m OCCUpations and in at least three Cases police inter:p-
retation of the law has played an influential role in rrorke:d preference 
for occupation action as opposed to a strike. 
Finally, the trend of government maintenance of the status quo 
and the legal means at its disposal was reinforced in 1977 with the 
passing into law of the 'Criminal Tresp:ass. ~w '-. ., . Introduced by a 
Labour Government, this new law seriously undermines the legal :position 
of trade unionists considering the use of the occupation tactic1• 
1. Cf. 'Workplace Occupations and the law •, by the Campaign against a. 
criminal ·:.trespa;:sS'- law i: 1"978'.~ 
·._ . .-
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CHAPI'ER 9 
LEADERSHIP AND THE A.U.E.Ws TOifARDS A 
SOCIOLOGY OF MILITANT TRADE UNIONISM. 
"(In) a number of ••• occupations ••• AUEW membership involvement 
and leadership far outweighed that of any other union. That union 
has been involved in more occupations than any other union and in a 
majority .of cases its shop stewards played a leading role. 
(An) explanation lies in the fact that ••• (it) both encour-
ages and reflects shopfloor opiniom·at all levels • • • (and has) a 
membership more strongly organised at shop floor level, with establish-
ed traditions and experience of influence and participation, and being 
better placed to respond to events". 
Introduction. 
This chapter sets out to examine the role of the engineering (AUEW) union 
in the development of the occupation tactic. Attention is drawn to 
this union because it has been found to ha.ve .-played an overwhelming role 
both in a ma.jori ty of occupations and in many of the key events of the 
period from the mid-1960s. 
Given the role of the AUEW the question is then posed as to 
why and how it rras able to fea:t;ure as it did. The answer appears to lie 
in the structure and-decision making process of the union and its trad.-
i tions of militancy. It is further argued tha.t the initiation of the 
I 
early occupations, especially as they arose at shop floor level, required 
a lay leadership not only experienced in industrial action but organisat~ 
ionally capable of acting quickly. In short, an organisation which 
.. 
assists the role of the shop stewa~ in taking quick decisions ~d ~hich 
allows the steward relative ease to act upon them. 
:; ''; .. . l , .. 
Ideally, ~n .terms of 
. . -
British trade unions, the AUEtf fitted this bilL 
.... ""' 
Tffe Engineers in Battle. 
The AUEW and its predecessors- primarily the_AEU and DATA- have dominated 
. -' ';; 
the events of the period described throughout this work. \ . 
Engineering union members and organisations played a key role 
in' the various battles against wage freezes and anti-trade union legis-
lation. Engineering union members formed the backbone of the early 
political strikes and later the organisation officially gave a lead in 
this field': Along with the TGWU the AUEW was a prime target of the 
National Industrial Relations Court. During the arrest of the Pentonville 
Five it was a resolution from the AUEW which led to the TUC General 
Council's general strike threat. At the 1975 TUC Congress it was the 
union's TASS section which seconded the resolution stating TUC policy 
against planned legisla,tion to curb occupation activity. 
Engineering union members also pla:~d a significant role in 
the development of worker occupations (see table 13). Organisationally 
the DATA union was the first, in the post-war era., to be prepared to 
support the use of the occupation tactic; this was in regard to.the one 
planned by GEC-EE workers in 1969. At the UCS the new AUEW leadership 
very quickly made the work-in action official within a weeko This 
. . 
pattern was followed in several other cases. At River Don the AUEW 
District Committee played a key role in the initiation of action there. 
In terms of local leadership the idea of an occupation at the 
GEC-EE factories originated with Frank Johnson, the local AEF District 
secretary2• At the UCS the idea of a work-in came from engineering 
.. 
stewa:rd Sammy Barr and the organisational (Jim Airlie) and propaganda. 
{Jimmy Reid) leadership came from two other AUEW members. Engineering 
1. During the December 8th, 1970, strike DATA and CEU were among a handful '·· 
of unions to give official backing. The AEF at that. time facilitated 
support by its members by allowing them a free hand. · 
2. Johnson was to the right of his union. Cf. G.Chadwick, 1970. 
_, 
'rABLE-l) _-
THE AUEW AND -OCCUPATIONS LEADERSHIP, 1971 - 7.5. 
TFADB No. OF OCr1PA~T0MS 
PTV0LV7D.* 
AUFW (~ng.) (112) 
(TASS) l34 ( 21) 
..... ,.. ~,.. ,.. __ . ____ ----------- ~ ~ 
TG'i!TJ ( ;qiS) 23 ( 21) 
( 2) 
-~ 
- - -- -ASTNS 21 
- - - - - -F.FTPU 18 
- - - -APF.X 14 
-- - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - -
NUGWH 
"TUSHW 
-- ..... -
A.SBSBSW .· 
SOG!\T 
~:TATSf)7:lfJ 
"!GA . · .. 
9 
8 
-------7 
- - - - -- - -5 
- - - - - - -
4 each 
2 each 
--- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
SGA 
-TtJ1)8T'.'! 
T 'TT.'! 
"!U?Li\T 
··-----------
1 each 
~ ... --.--------·-
* The table iniicates \ 
how >;rany i:imes a 
particul§lr uni.on.was 
rcfered. to in regard 
to different nccu-
nations. Informat"" 
ion is tal-:r:n mainly 
from 3 press reports 
- )'l:PlHNCl S'T'AT?/Ti·'l~ 
'T'IVVS - and supp-
lemented by articles, 
in~Prviews nnd quest-
inn n::l.i. re r.. 
It is likely that 
several ~ore uni9ns. 
have been involved 
beynn1 the 27 refer-
. e:d tc here nnd it is 
enually lilr~-,ly that 
tbe renorting of sev-
e~71 uninns has been 
uh!0rstated: in the 
~~~ch0ster ~n~ineering 
c'G0S t~~ n~tion was 
t:11 ~ '':1. hy the regif'll'l:J.l 
:· ~ ·-·-;r ·\ri:l. th -:~.0!'0 ttlJ3.n 
2~ uninns. nn~ethe­
loss in ~e,orting and 
r~cn"din~ Rvents 
those ~laying leading 
rolos ~re far more 
likely to be nic~ed 
nut ~h:::m tho 'f' who are 
nnt. ~·h~ tt~l8 t~us 
:L.s l}'u_,l_y a '>ottr.'r in-
1; c.'J+-ion t~:1t the A1f'-.,,, 
i.-:. :1 l.'l.C"e nn..,·ber of 
'.':'.a .s·c~ s • 
{ 
•'z"M:. _\ l~··I 
. c 
Union shop stewards were also to the fore at Plessey (Alexardria) and 
Snow Engineering. Thus, of the first four pioneering occupations, begin-
ing with the UCS, engineering union shop stewards played leading and 
initiating parts in occupations. 
In the progression of the tactic~ use into pay disputes it 
was AUEW lay and district officials, particularly in the Manch~ster area, 
who played a vital role in the widespread nature of occupations. 
In the development of the tactic into the North East region 
of England again the members of the AUEW were predominant. Shop stewards · 
of that union led the first four of the region's occupations and in total 
played leading roles in eight of the first twelve of such actions~ 
The occupation which led the way w~_s at Tress Engineering where 
not only did the workers draw inspiration from fellow engineers in 
occupation in Manchester, Leeds and Sheffield but l'l'ere also involved in 
the same national AUEW claim. 
At the region's second occupation - Leadgate - Fred Carlyon, 
the convenor, described the role of the AUEW as follows, 
"The AUEW have been involved in events • • • over the period 
in fact still the predominant factor" (1) 
e e o and are 
At Qoles Cranes (Sunderland) twelve unions were involved in the 
::third;; of the region's occupations, but one full-time official of APEX 
has since stated that at the plant the AUEW were the strongest body, both 
in numerical strength and in having "the most able leadership". 
"You had a very astute convenor in Matty TJlake, who was also District Pres-
ident ·of the AUEH and obviously, therefore, very aware of the conflict 
situation ••• in the broader sense. Therefore he was able to grasp 
various things (and) within days of the occupation things came verY.·~~-
quickly together; the thing gelled" (2). -- -·~ 
1. Letter from Carlyon, 2nd September 1975. Reproduced in Mills, June,1976. 
Ny emphasis, AJM .• 
2. Interview with John Creaby. Reproduced in Mills, June, 1976. 
\ 
On the first evening of the Coles occupation the Wear District Committee 
\ 
of the AUEi~ met and gave full backing to it. rli thin a week the occupation 
was made official by the executive committee of the union. During the 
course of events John Tocher, the divisional organiser for the Union's 
North West region, provided valuable assistance in the form of information 
on Acrow's activities in plants within his region~. 
Membership of the AUEW, thus, has been a significant factor in 
2 ' 
development and spread of workplace occupations.. • From a number of stand-
points it can be called a militant trade unione It would be a thesis 
in itself, however, to attempt to explain why it has been so. This chapter 
· ., attempts a compromise in ·suggesti~ the direction in which an under-
, ~ .: . ' 
standing of the problem might go. 
· Militanc;y HYPothesis.: Those factors underlying the actions 
involving the AUEW have been looked at throughout the earlier part of 
this work. Many other unions faced the same set of problems and yet did 
not respond in the same way. A central problem lies in the character and 
1. Tocher also played a key role in the development of occupations in 
the Ha.nchester area in the spring of 1972. 
2. It would be entirely wrong to leave the impression that the AUEW alone 
had members playing leading roles in occupations. Members of the TGWU, 
for example, played leading roles in some of the hardest fought occu-
pations. TGHU shop stewards were to the fore in several early cases; 
River Don (Oct'71), Fisher Bendix (Jan '72), Linpac (Mar '72), BIJ.lC 
(Cowley) April '72, Lovell (May '72), Westinghouse (~my '72),etc. 
They also played substantial roles in 15 other occupations, including 
BLMC-TET (Aug '72), Lucas, Liverpool (oct .'72), Triumph Meriden (oct '73), 
·and Imperial Typewriters (Feb '75). . 
rfuite collar workers have also played important roles. APEX 
was the first union to recognise the UCS and Coles (Sunderland) occu-
pations. ASTMS was the first to advance the tactic beyond reuUndancy 
issues and barring the AUEvl and TGiW has been involved in the greatest··._ 
number of occupations. · ·· 
.-
I 
- • ···•~ --·v·-•-·- •-·r .. ·•- ~··· -··--··----~-•- ~'-•'"• . -•r•••,..•-'"":"'-.-"~~-~··'"- .... '-"'•--· 
organisation of the union itself and it is to these factors\ that the 
chapter is directed. An analysis of the AUEW will possibly\help to pro-
vide an understanding of some of the essential features of union militancy~. 
The main ingrediants of the AUEW 's militancy appears to ·lie in 
three areas of organisational and social-psychological factors: firstly, 
the union has a long and well established system of shop floor organisation; 
secondly, the Union's structure facilitates speedy action and allows the 
predominance of shop floor views in union policy making; and thirdly, the 
Union contains a large number of workers who are confident, capable and 
willing to provide leadership. 
Shop floor organisationc 
The existance of shop floor organisation is a vital prerequisite for 
militant trade unionism2• It is the nature of the labour market and the 
labour contract which have given rise to trade unionism because it is at 
this point that the contradictions of capital/labour relations arise. By 
that token, it is at this point - at the shop floor level - that trade 
unionism is likely to have its greatest need of expression .. 
If ·a trade union has an involved and lengthy process of negot~ 
iation, with equally drawn out procedures for union response and action, 
I 
then its members will be less likely to be able to deal with the very 
basic and immediate problems as they arise. 
1. The term militancy is being attached here both to the actions of 
.AUEW members in specific cases and to the organisation's poliCies and 
response~ relative to other unions, over the period in question. 
·~·· .,._} 
2. '!his thesis agrees with the perspective put forward by V .L.Alle~.~ (1966) 
in regard to the basis of trade unionism and the nature of the lab~~ 
market in this process, and agrees with R.Blackburn (1967) in regard - ·· 
to the role played by the labour contract in engendering unionism and 
industrial conflict. 
·;. 
In such cases a union's capacity to respond to events will be lacking, 
regardless of intent. As Allen (1966) states, "militancy" lefers to 
those union actions which exploit to the full "whatever power or influence 
1 is possessed • • • in a prompt, speedy manner" • Asswning that all 
unioris have t.."le aim of protecting and improving their members' interests 
then the method and speed of achieving this is the crucial element in 
militancy. Added to this a union should also be capable and able to 
speedily reflect the-.:·views of its members on a specific issue in a given 
time. But militancy implies something more, 
"If unions are to maximise their returns they must uninhibitedly play the 
market by demanding what they thiru{ the market will bear and refusing to 
accept terms which are less than thate By doing this they would satisfy 
the .. criteria for militancy" (2). 
Militancy is thus a combination of quick action, reflective of 
member needs and interests as far as is possiblep and a preparedness to 
go to whatever lengths to achieve effective results. Organisationally 
shopfloor representation meets a major part of the first two elements. 
Research into the third element might usefully be directed at leadership 
factors arising out of the unique combination of shopfloor organisation 
and independence which has existed within the AUEW over many decades. 
Shop stewardships: The Big Four Unions: The AUEW, TG\'IU, 
ETPTU and the NUGMW accounted for just over half of the total number of 
British shop stewards in existence in the early 1960s3. 
Within these four unions shop stewardships appear to hav~ had . · 
the greatest increase .in the engineering union4• Along with the electricians.' 
1. p.l9 
2. V .L.Allen (1966) p.24 
). W.E.J.McCarthy, 1966. 
4. Ibid, p.5. 
....... 
'·, 
union it appears to be the best organised (at least) in th4 engineering 
ind~stry1 and has one of the longest records of shop steward recognition 
and militancy of any British trade union2• 
In many respects the AUEW is the best organised at shop floor 
level of any trade union in Bri~ain, has one of the longest histories in 
\ 
this regard, and has consistently been one of the most militant unions. 
However,~ in: :_t'erms? of union militancy those unions with the most shop stewa.:rds 
., ~ . 
. _\ 
can be roughly divided into militant (AUEW, TGWU) and non-militant (EE,JPTU, 
NUGMW) unions3. Thus,· the exist~ce of stewardships alone provides no 
full explanation of militancy. An important key lies in the extent to 
which shop floor organisation has autonomy over plant-level negotiations, 
and the extent to which it is able to influence crucial areas of union 
policy making. 
Union structure and Rules and the Functioni~ of the shop steward: 
Recent studies have thrown considerable light on the fact that the 
engineering union structure provides the most flexible and democratic of 
any British union 4 • __ 
The A.U.E.W: The shop steward in this union has, by far, the 
. - (;~-- . 1.· • 
{' .~. ' ''_,, ' . : ~· (' '"' 
... J .. , 
1 •. ~ .Cf. · A~I.Marsh~ E:o.Evans::and' ~.Ga:tcia~'197L·· ·\nth,, re}3pectively~-
.· 4.3% and 41% of all union members. in the engineering industry these 
, 't: , two .unionst·provided 6.?%/:J+.4tfo,_ of-/all convenors ;::~d &;o/~8~1% ... of · · :.r·~ · 
secretaries of joint shop steward committees. They also' provided ·a:· 
low_membership/steward ·:ratip of 28:1-& 30:1; a high membership,_spread 
across the industry(with members in 67%/93% of·all-..engineering est-
. ' .. ablishments ), ;and:_,a- high percentage of closed shop arrangements. 
2. Cf. J.B.Jefferys, 1945. 
J. Militancy is here related to the policies pursued by the union organ: 
isation at an official level. ·-
4. Cf. R.Martin, 1968;J.D.Edelstein and M.Warner, 1975; I.Boraston, 
H.Clegg and M.Rimmer, 1975. Much of the comparative detail for 
this section is taken from the latter work of Boraston et al. 
greatest range of representational scope within the workpla.ce1• This fact 
arises out of the rules and procedures of the union itself.( Beyo~ this· 
structural factors of organisational size have an added bearing on the 
situation. Within the AUEW steward independence from full-time officials 
appears to grow with size of plant, whereas in the other three unions the 
positive effects of large plant size are to some extent circumvented by 
a lack of confidence among some sections and by the role that full-time 
officers insist on playing2• In workplaces with less than three hundred 
' 
employees full-time officers play a more substantial role in the negotiat-
ion process although relatively less so in the case of the AUEW. ~~y 
small workplace organisations of the AUEW in fact "managed for themselves") 
~. while the largest,in the same AUEW district, "were almost entirely indep-
~ ',. 
) 
endent of the district secretary, calling him in to transact formal bus-
4 iness only" • 
District committees are important bodies within the AUEWa they 
have a large degree of autonomy and are empowered to call strike action. 
f- The body usually covers a relatively small number of members and branches5 
and is thus not too remote from grass roots opinion. In addition it is 
' ·\ 
made up of delegates elected by the branches and with a section, of three 
to six delegates, elected directly by a quarterly meeting of the district's 
shop stewards. vr.here there is a full-time secretary that person is elected 
by ballot of all the district's branches and elected persons have to 
1 •. Cf. Boraston et al, 1975. They contrast the AUEW with the EEPTu, TGWU, 
NUGMW and 10 other unions. 
2. 
). 
4. 
5· 
Ibid. They add that, shop stewards are severely constrained )._n any 
collective bargaining function where "tight" agreements and conditions 
exist - negotiated at higher levels by the full-time officials.. ·~ 
Ibid, p.39. 
Ibid. 
Ibid, Chapter 2 and Edelstein and Warner, 1975, chapter 9. The latter 
point out that the mean number of branches per district in 1960 was 8.7 
but that 30% of the districts were single branch districts. 
.-
r 
:periodically submit themselves for re-election. The over'Wl·~:lming 
composition of these district committees consists of delegales who also 
hold the :position in their workplace of shop steward, senior steward or 
convenor. Meetings of district committees take place weekly or fortnightly, 
depending on the district, thus facilitating a quick consideration of a 
local dispute situation. At Coles Cranes (Sunderland),for example, this 
meant that the occupation could be backed within days of occurring~ 
The highest policy making body of the union is composed entirely 
of lay members who will almost entirely be shop stewards at their place 
of work. This body is called the National Committee and meets annually 
and as and when the situation dictateso 
The decisions of the National Committee are imp~·emented by a 
seven man Executive Committee, presided over by the Union President and 
attended by the General Secretary. All these are full-time posts and are 
subject to periodic re-election. The decisions of the Exe~utive Committee 
can be overruled by a final appeals committee composed of lay members and 
elected by the National Committeee 
While the--system is not without its problern.s the decision making 
process within the AUEW is highly representative of shop floor opinion 
relative to any other British union. 
The T .G. W. U: l·li th the election of Jack Jones as General Secretary 
of the union in late 1960s much more emphasis was put on the role of the 
shop steward and moves were made to set up district committees which 
would be, to some extent, similar to those of the AUEW. At national level 
a Shop steward Delegate Conference was established to enable stew!:l;t'ds to 
......... 
ratify national agreements made by na·tional officers. 
' 
The move towards a more grass roots representational approach appears 
to have ~ an impact on the manifestation of militancy at ~fficial union 
level. Nonetheless a number of features remain which act to curtail 
(or potentially so) grass roots expression through official channels. 
The picture of shop floor representation is a sporadic one. 
In various ways their strength at plant level resembles that of 
the AUEW where strong organisation exists within a large plant, but even 
here the full-time officers are able to exert a greater influence than 
! : either the district secretary or regional office); can \<Ji thin the AUEW. 
"If the stewards usually went their own way in the end, it was only 
after full discussion" (1). 
District committees of the TGIW do apparently have the effect 
of supporting the stewards in the smaller plants and have contributed to 
the building up of shop floor organisation that hasLbeen weak.. And they 
are made up of senior stewards from throughout the district. However, 
in terms of power and autonomy their freedom of action falls, 
"short of those possessed by the Engineers' district committees" (2). 
The meetings are quarterly and full-time officers have a large degree of 
control especially over informationa 
"consequently shop stewa:r::ds and convenors were more dependenton information"(.3) 
At higher levels the Executive Council is one of the few bodies 
with elected members subject to periodic re-election. This body appoints 
the union's full-time.officers. The General Secretaryship is electiv~ on 
1. Boraston et al, 1975, p.jl. 
2. Ibid, p.4). .. ~--
.3· Ibid, pp.)l-)2. 
"·'.; 
-:-.. : 
., 
a ballot of the entire membership, but is not re-elective; \the post is 
l held until the incumbent retires. 
Plant size and union tradition play~ some role in adding to the 
negotiating strength of some sections of the union's shop stewardships. 
This is the case in some large engineering plants, in steel works' branches, 
and on the docks1• \ 
Thus, within the TGWU there are a number of avenues for the 
expression of shop floor needs but these exist alongside several factors 
which can (and do) serve to inhibit such expression. 
The N.U.G.M.\Jrs2· In a number of ways the full-time officer 
predominates in this union~ At the highest policy making level there is 
the Annual Congress consisting of delegates elected within the districts. 
Full-time officers along with full-time branch secretaries can (and do) 
play an influe~ial role at these congressese The Union's governing body 
is the General Council which consists of ten regional secretaries and 
fourteen,il;~y members. The General Council's executive body is the 
National Executive and it consists of five of the regional secretaries and 
five of the lay officers~ Howeverp within the category "layn officer 
1. A study by Boraston et al, 1975 of a situation prior to Jones' election 
.throws some light on the democratisation process opened upo They found · 
a case of a full-time (appointed) branch secretary being previously 
responsible as the sole negotiator for more than one thousand dockers. 
Following a protracted strikep the election of Jack Jones, and a 
recommendation by the Devlin Committee advocating the institution of 
shopfloor organisation, a shop stewards' committee was established • 
. It began to operate with a procedure which gave them wide powers to 
negotiate on rates of pay, hours of work, overtime, piecework and 
manning scales. Boraston et al conclude that this case indicates that, 
"A workplace organisation which is capable of running its own·affairs 
may stay in a subordinate position for years if both union and man:..'·-~ -
agers co-operate to keep it there .. , (p.,54). . "· 
2. I am refering to the situation prior to 1976. By 1975 there were 
calls at the Union's Annual Conference for ~ore power to be given to 
lay officials of the Union. : .. ;: 
.-
full-time branch secretaries (or .. administrators") can be included. Thus· 
the highest policy making bodies consist of a large number ~f full-ti~e 
officials. 
Elections within the NUGMW are a rare thing. The General sec-
retary is elected (through the branches) but then holds the post for life1• 
District officerships are appointed positions (at district level) and 
subject to approval by the Governing Councile National officers must 
stand for election at some point in their life but having done so once they 
need not do so again. · Once elected they are deemed to have been elected 
a union officer for all time and can thus be appointed to any other and 
2 higher officer position barring that of General Secretary •. At branch 
level full-time administrators may be appointed by the Union's leading 
bodies. 
To a large extent the shop stewards • function in the NUGMW is 
not as significant in the negotiating process as stewards in the TGWU 
and AUEW. A sizeable number are not involved in negotiations of any, but 
a minor, kindJ o There is evidence that things are different to some extent 
1. It has not been unknown for the job to continue beyond 11 life", i.e., 
beyond the official retirement ageo In 1946 Charles Dukes was due 
to retire from the post but instead the General Council decided to 
·"retain his services in an advisory capacity for such a period as. 
(they) consider neccessary", (NUGMW Annual Conference Report, 1946). 
Interestingly a sizeable minority opposed this move. The voting 
records 170 for the. move and 92 against. Duke's services were retained. 
2. _The Union's rule 30 (clause 3) allows that if a candidate for office 
has already contested an election in which they had been successful 
no additional contest was neccessary (Cf.NUGMW Annual Conference Report, 
1945, pp.l43-44). The rule was quoted at that time in conne~~~on with 
the "election" of 3 National Officers. Three candidates, having"sat-: 
isfied the rule, were appointed to the posts, including Jack Cooper ~- · 
who later be~ame the General Secretary. 
3. Boraston et al, 1975, chapter 4o 
1 in large plants but even so full-time officials spend more•. time in large 
l 2 plant negotiations than at the smaller ones • 
By and large, shopfloor expression in the NUGN\-1 is handled 
,\ through the official machinery of the Union and despite the exis~:nce of 
shopfloor org~nisation. Formal union decision-making avenues are greatly 
dominated by those employed in a full-time capacity. 
The E.E.P.T.U: This Union was once the most militant in Britain 
but since the early 1960s it has consistently been to the forefront of 
the non- and anti-militant unions. Its historical development in the post-
war era provides a useful contrast in itself. 
Prior to 1961 the leading body of the Union) was the Executive 
Committee (EC) composed of lay members elected, by ballot of members, for 
a period of two years, and the Annual Delegate Conference (ADC) composed 
of lay delegates elected from their respective districts. The relation-
ship between these two bodies is not entirely clear. Allen (1954) has 
stated that, 
"(T)he EC has control of the union but the Annual Delegate Conference 
considers policy", (4). 
)Theoretically this could be interpreted to mean that the EC could choase 
to ignore ADC policy considerations if it so wished. The extent to 
whi~h this did occur is open to debate~ Executive Committee members were 
all subject to .periodic re-election as was the General Secretary5. 
1 •. That is, those employing 500 workers or more. 
2. Brown and Terry (1977)} l.mpubiished: paper. · · · 
The Union at this point was the old ETU - Electrical Trades Union.-···-·~ 
4. p.74. 
·~. 
The General Secretary has to stand for re-election after a 5 year period. 
Defiance of ADC policies could have endangered re-election \frospects~~ 
At area or district level committees existed which operated in 
a similar fashion to AEU district committees albeit without the same .extent 
of influence and aut~nomy. 
Shopfloor organisational activity was assisted by the Union rules 
which ensured that strikes were offic1al without the prior necessity of 
going through a number of long procedurese Further, shopfloor organisat;· 
ion of all kinds was officially encourageda the ETU pioneered industry-
\'Tide organisation and supported a whole number of joint shop stewards 
committees. In 1960 when the organisation of joint shop steward committ-
ees was being frown upon by the TUC General Council, and with industry-
wide committees receiving condemnation, it w~s the ETU leaders who were 
speaking out(at TUC Conference)in favour of such bodies. 
Since the war the Union had grown five .... fold, its shop steward 
organisation had been strengthened and it had a ~litant industrial p~licy 
which, prior to 1961, had increased membership wages by a greater amount 
than that achieved by any other union2• 
The New Leadership and Union Changes. In 1961 leading members 
of the Union were found guilty, by a Court of Law, of operating 'undemo-
cratic' practices·. Within a very short time those men who brought the 
Court action were to close off many of the basic democratic channels 
1. Hughes(l967) appears to have no doubts that the EC did act undemocrat-
. ically. However, he seems to have ignored the existance of the Union's 
Appeals Committee, consisting of rank-and-file members, which had the 
power to overturn EC decisions. 
Hughes makes reference to the ETU ballot-rigging trial~of 
the early 1960s in such a way as to deem the ETU leaders of the time---~ 
guilty of previous undemocratic practice by retrospective association. ·- ---
2. At that time. the Union achieved a then post-war record £2 week, pay rise. 
Cf. A.Hutt (1975), p.2o6. · 
_,,-~-~--·--·- ~--~- --.. ----···· .. 
which had previously existe.d to encourage and allow shopfloor expression. 
Communists were banned from holding office from 1965 onwards;removing the 
eligibility of many cadres to play a full part in their union. Strike 
procedures have been centred in the Union's leadership and certain combine 
and indust~J~ide committees have been frowned upon and even disbanded. 
Area committees have been formally disbanded and replaced with 'industrial 
advisory committees' with very limited powers and distanced from the 
branches. Quarterly meetings of engineering industry shop stewards are . 
now very much under the control of a full-time officer of the Union. 
At the highest level of the Union the Appeals' Committee has 
been ended and the Executive Committee is now .. judge, jury and appeals 
bodyn1• The EC would seem to be the leading body of the Union nowada.ys. 
Several of the powers of the ADC have been curtailed and it now meets 
biennially. The EC now consists of full-time officers and the policy of 
electing national officers has been replaced by EC appointments. The 
diversified organisational and political functions of the President, 
General Secretary and Assistant General Secretary have all been constrained 
into the single post of General Secretary. 
It is not difficult to agree that, 
"(The) administration of the union is far more centralised than that of 
the Engineers" (2). 
One thing that does appear to have continued has been the strong shop 
floor organisation. This does not apply to combines of stewards and even 
where there does exist a strong organisation many shop stewards are 
restricted in their activities by tightly drawn up plant agreements 
between the Union officials and management. ·- ..... 
1. 'Struggle for democracy in electricians-plumbers union', article in 
The Morning Star, 25th Oct.l971. 
2. Boraston et al, 1975, p.Bl. 
-..... 
'._;. 
Union democra.c;y:: Defining union democracy to mean the exte,nt to which a 
formal organisational structure facilitates member ability ~o act and to 
be heard then the AUEW can be claimed to be one of the most democratic 
trade unions in Britain. Ironically much of the theoretical debate around 
the theme of union democracy has been directed elsewhere than a union's 
formal structure1; its rules, constitu~ion, representational bodies and 
its participatory processes6 Yet, it is surely the ability of union 
members to take (relatively) quick action at the point of conflict (norm• 
ally at shop floor level) without hind~~ce:~ and with some encouragement 
' I;J 
from union rules, procedures and officials, that is the nub of union 
democracy., 
Some early debate chose to centre on the question of attendance 
-· 
at union branches as being of prime importance in judging a union's level 
of democracy (cf.J.Goldsteinp 1952; B.C.Roberts, 1956)2• This was an 
Unnecessarily narrow scope of interest and ignored the increasingly 
important growth of a devolution of union affairs to shop floor organis-
ation within a number of unions~ 
Other areas of debate have continued along the pessimistic 
theme of enquiry began by Michels prior to the First World-wd. This 
line of enquiry, already giving up any great hope for membersilip ~-
icipation, directs its attention to the question of union "factionalism", 
(cf. S.M.Lipset, M.A.Trow and J.S.Coleman, 19)6; R.Martin, 1968; J.D. 
Edelstein and N.Harner, 197.5). The problems with this approach have 
been taken up elsewhere (cf. A.Gouldner, 1964; J.Hughes, 1967; G.D.M.Ursell 
and A.J.Mills, 1978)1 it has been accused of being one-sidedly pessimistic 
......... 
1. I do not intend here to go over ground already well argued elsewhere 
- cf. G.D.M.Ursell and A.J.Mills, 1978. 
2. This question has been discussed at length in A.J .lUlls, 1977. 
3· R~Michels, 1Q49· 
- leaving out of account the democratic aspirations and internal action 
of members; of underestimating the influence of human actioh on organis-
ational structures - overemphasising the deterministic :power of struct-
ures on human freedom; and of failing to examine the actual nature of 
factions. 
Thus, for the very wrong reasons, Nartin (1968) reaches the 
conclusion that the AEU is a much more democratic union than the contrast-
ed NUR, and Edelstein and Warner (1975) hold that the AUEW - along with 
the NUH - is far more democratic than a number of contrasted British and 
US trade unions. The exist~nce and relative equity of strength of 
factions is held up, in both studies, to symbolise evidence of union 
democracy. Hughes (1967) has already cautioned that the actual nature 
of existing union factions needs to be examined and that in so doing it 
will become clear that certain factions, if given achance of power, 
could destroy established democratic practices1• 
A more fruitful direction of study then is to look at which 
groups or factions have a commitmenti.to democratic unionism in so far as 
it is concerned to enhance the ability of shop floor~representation to 
influence policy and to take relatively immediate and unfettered action 
at the point of dispute. Historically the evidence, in various cases, 
indicates that the 'left' (or 'broad left') groupings in the trade union 
movement are more committed to this perspective~ This was the case in 
the ETU until the early 1960s where it was the right-wing who reversed 
1. Hughes had in mind the activities of the Communist Party of Qt~Britain • 
2. 
.... .._ 
In terms of British trade union history factions have been made up 
of 'left' groupings and 'right' groupings. The left, in post-war 
times, has often enough had Communist Party leadership and has 
included Labour Party "lefts" and 'non-a\ignad •' militants. By that 
token the right have tended to be anti-communist groupings often made 
up of a Q:atholic faction and including Labour Party right-wingers. 
many of the democratic trends~ Within the NUG~M democratic structures 
have failed to materialise .under continual right-wing leadel.ship and 
in the absence of a significant left opposition. In the TGWU democracy 
was opened up with the election.of Jack Jones as General Secretary. Jones, 
pledged to st:r.engthen:shop:floor opinion and organisation within the union, 
was elected with broad left backing. Prior to 1969 the AEU underwent 
a decade of dimunution of democratic expression under the leadership of 
President Lord Carron2• This was altered by the election of Hugh Scanlon 
and a number of other left shifts in union leadership at lower levels of 
the organisation. 
The importance of union factions, thus, would appear to lie in the 
fact that certain factions can open up a union towards greater democracy 
or prevent its permanent erosion. The strongest left-wing faction within 
any British trade union is that which exists within the AUEW. Barring the 
ETU prior to the early 1960s the AUEW's 'broad left" has held this position 
for two or three decades of the post-war era. This may go some way to 
explain the continuance of democratic structures within that unionJ. 
Union Leadership. 
In terms of the availability of leadership skills there is evidence that 
Engineering Union members contrast favourably with many (if not most) 
othe·r trade unions - including the ETPTU, TGWU and the NUGMW4• Certainly 
1. From the transcript of the 'ballot rigging' trial and in discussion 
with ETU activists of that time it would appear that the ballot rigg-
ing was the fault of individuals and in no way formed part of the left 
faction's strategy for holding onto power. 
2. On numerous occassions Carron is known to have cast the vote of.nis . 
entire union in a direction favoured by him but in conflict to a majority.. 
of his union delegation members. · 
J. R.Martin (1968) makes some attempt at explaining the factors which help 
to maintain union democracy but very few of his categories are valid. 
Relevant categories include 11pattern of membership distribution" and 
"industrial environment... K.Ingham (1974) appears to support the latter. 
4. Boraston et al, 1975. --~)~~~ ... .. _ _ _ ··-· -----·-------------.,.,------------,------,. 
/; '.:~~ ~ t4U2. 
\ --' 
there is an indication that AUEW members played leading roles in a greater 
. \ 
number of worker occupations than any other body of trade unionists: 
this was the situation even in a·nwuber of cases where other unions were 
well organised, e.g., ~qoles Cranes (Sunderland). 
Union contests 1 The evidence is scant but there is an indicat ... 
ion that the- Engineering Union is better able than many to find members 
to fill shop stewardships and branch sec~taryships. A study in 1961 
showed that AEU shop stewards were more subjected to a re-election process 
(88% of those interviewed) a.nd faced more opposition (54% being opposed 
at their first election and 2~ finding opposition at subsequent elections). 
This incidenc~ of opposition was greater than for TGWU and NUGMW stewards1• 
The later study of Marsh at al (1971) indicates that in the 
engineering industry AEF members tend to have a disproportionately greater. 
number of shop stewards than other unions: with forty-one percent of all 
engineering industry trade union membership they have over fifty-seven 
percent o:f' all the industry's shop stewardships. Likewise they have a. 
greatly disproportionate number of membera occupying con!enorshipa (.54.~) 
and joint shop steward chairman/secretaryships (68.1%). 
The recentwork of Bora.ston at al (1975) points out tha.t the 
AUEW appears to have a great deal more experienced shop stewards than 
most of the other unions (in particular the ·~wei ina.th:i NUGMW) studied. 
A possible reason, they sta.te, lies in the fact that these other unions 
have a. far greater number of women2 ·and immigrant workers, cover indust ... 
ries in which trade unionism has been traditionally weak, and cover 
J. .H.A.Clegg, A.J .Killick and R.Ad.a.ms, 1961. \Of. TGWU stewards interviewed 
73% were subject to re-election as against. 7&% of NUGM'I'l stewards. 
Respectively 3Q%and 39% faced opposition at their first election and 27,% 
and 4% at subsequent elections, (p.l64). 
2. Women members of the respective unions constitutued, in the period 
1971-75, 12.88,$ of the AUEW, 15.4LJ% of the TGiiU a.nd J2.28J' of the NUGZ.IW. 
-· --. -·-::-·~-·-
occupations in which the development of stewardships is traditionally l . 
difficult by fact of geography (e.g., in road haulage concerns). 
The .Engineering Union has also had a. very high number of 
candidates for high office (President/General secretary) over its history. 
Comparing t.~e union with contests for similar :posts in twenty-two other 
unions :{in 'com:pai~blEt ~y-eai;.:·between ·1919 and~-1954) there-~weretmo:re,-t· ·_, 
. . . . ' . . . ' -.: . . . . . . . ,· . . : . ".. ' ·. ~ ' 
. . .... <. . - . . 1 .. . ... · ··. 
candidates in the Engineering Union on five occ~ions a.nd they hait the 
second most on the remaining three occa.sslons2• 
Ideological leadership:. In terms of support for industrial action 
. . 
of a political nature over the period 1969-7* AUEW membership provided 
the backbone of the series of strikes which occurred., One reason to 
explain this lies in the fact that there are a. large number of ideolog-
ica.lly left activists among the Union's membership. The Communist Party, 
for instance, has more members of this union than any other (see table lj. ) • 
In this case members are g~nera.lly a.mong the skilled category of AUEW 
membership which suggests that they served an apprenticeship within the 
industry.. This indicates that such members became Communists as a. result 
of some crucial factors within the industry and the union rather than tha.t, 
as CollllllUllists, they were attracted to seek work in the engineering 
industry. 
As Table :14( shows a disp:r::~portiona.te share of Communist Party 
I. # • 
:.: members a.re AUE'd members. This pr~ contributes to the Union' a inilitancy 
... 
but it is just as likely that certain features within the Union am the 
induStry contribute to the creation of ideologically left militants .. 
1. In 1919 the union post was contested by 22 candidates, with the nearest ·· 
rival being 8 candidates in a.n NUl'l election. In 1921 the two unions 
respectively contrasted 32 to 9. Similar gaps were evidenced in the 
other years I.n.l943 the .AEU was second:-. to the NSP in a contrast with 
a further l1 ~on contests. 
2. Details compiled from Edelstein and \varner, 197.5, pp.217 and 273 and 
V.L.Allen, 19~, pp.J03-4. , 
I .... 
COMMUNISTS AliD THADE UNION NEMBERSHIP, 1971-75. 
Percentage Trade 
of C:FGB union. 
membership 
- !8'& - - - _A~ - - - - - -
9% ·.:·· TG"WU 
----------------6% each ASTMS . 
ETPTU 
UCATT 
- - - ~ -- ~. -· ~ - - - -- -
4% each APEX 
NAlGO 
- - - - - - _N[~_ - - - - - -
'flo each ATri 
NUT ____ ... ___________ __ 
2% each NUGMW 
N,UR 
USDAW 
- - - ... - .., - -- - - - - - -
fl. - 2% each NUJ 
SOGAT 
TSSA ~ - - - - - ~ - - - - - -- - -
pnder 1%* · ASBSBSW 
ASLEF 
BISAKTA 
NGA 
NUPE 
NUS 
POEU 
UP\i ~- ... ___ ... ______ _.. .. ..., 
~ 'Ihe unions in this category 
make up a total of 3% of 
CPGB membership. 
Percentage 
of CPGB 
membership 
Industry I 
and 
:profession. 
20% Engineering, Metal, . 
_______ §h!P~U!l~i£g_(~)~ ___ _ 
. cffi Teaching - · 
-------- ... ----~------8% each Building, Transport and 
Rail. 
- - - - ~ - - - - - -- - - - - - - - -
· 6% Clerical . 
------------------~-_5~ ~ - - - - tl~~- - ~ - - - - - - - c ) 4% each Professional and Tecbnical.b 
PUblic employees •. 
.:. ______ ~!n~ ~ :eu!!l!sa~- __ 
3% . :Power 
---~----------------2% each Distributiono 
Social Servicese 
Chemicals. 
- - - - - - - ~ - - - ·- - - - - ~ - --l% Post Office 
------~--~---------~ 
... 
(a) This was the category used by the CPGB 
in 1971. In 1975 on:;Ly the term .. Eng-
ineering" is used. No "Metal" or 
"Shipbuilding" categories appeared at 
this time. 
(b) It is difficult to assess what is incl-
uded unde.:r this category, but in 197.5 
the figure of 22 delegates in this 
category accords exactly with.the 
number of ASTMS delegateso 
** Compiled from CPGB "NATIONAL CONGRESS CREDENTIAL REPORTS" 1971-Z5· 
. . . ' . . . ~ - .... 
The figu:res in the table are rounded up and leave out of account groupings 
of undescribed unions - "other teaching union" (2%), "other clerical" (J.%), 
"other mining" (under 1%) and "other unions•• (3%). · 
Of the rema.itiing CPGB members: approxima.tely 9% were housewives, 
unemployed, retired, self -employed and students. 
The table only provides a rough guide to CPGB members • union 
affiliations but experience indicates that it is likely to be a reasonably 
accurate one - see chapter 8. -·-
One :main reason a:ppeaxs to lie in the widespread existance ·and tradition 
of the Union's shop stewardships - allied to the formal strlcture of 
the Union. As M:J.rtin (1968) puts it, 
"In the AEU .... the shop-stewards system :provides a training ground 
for opposition members as well as an independent power base, whilst the 
Lay District Committees :provide a means for lay members to acquire wide 
experience and. to spread their name". 
To a. greater extent than most unions the Engineering Union has continually 
·• 
provided an. e:A-tensive tra,jnjng ground for lay members that has led, over 
the years, to a. building up of a. sizeable number of experienced people. 
Educational and craft considerationsa A final and vital 
factor in the character of the membership of the Engineering Union seems 
to lie in the fact that an important core of the membership are fully 
skilled. Various studies of union activism have pointed to the fact that 
1 
skilled workers tend to be more active than other workers , and several of 
these have pointed to the fact that leadership within the Engineering 
Union consists of a relatively high number of the better skilled and 
better educated members2 • The study ~1 Clegg et a.l (1961) found tba.t 
Engineering Union officials were generally better educated than those of 
other unions, 
"Part of the expla.na.tion ••• may be that virtually all of them 
are drawn from skilled occupations" (J). • • • 
:In sho_rt.1) skillt::d·.:·w.orke~ tend: t?: be more· activ~ tba,n,, unskil).e~L, 
and semi-skii1ed workers ·a.n:d, more.· than most ·TUC affiliated unions, the 
. ·-'1 .• < 
~AUEW has a. large, core .. of·J~uch worlters .lanp.. is·.: ~t te.r ,,able to· ·pf'ovide·, : .L. : , 
·\ ... . . \ ' . ' . . . "
avenues for encouraging and training them. 
1. Cf. w .Spinrad, 1960; Per line and .Lorenz, 1970; Clegg et a.l, 196l;~~ .. _ .. 
Martin, 1968; Edelstein and Warner, 1975. 
2. Cf. The three latter studies refered to above. 
3· p.49. See table.i5· 
Ty:pe . 
of 
THE EDUCATIONAL ORIGUlS OF TRADE UNION OFFICERS. 
A 
· :fXRe of School Attended. 
Union Elemen~ Technical Grammar Other 
Sldl1ed 82% 3% 12% 3% 
EX-Craft* 71% 24% 5/o 
Single-Ind.ust:x:y 77% &/o &/o 11% 
General 72% 5% 18% 5'fo 
!fh!t~-~o!l¥ ______ 3'lJ( ____ : _____ ~Of! __ .-1:2%~ 
1-!ean Average 74% 4% 1_% 7% 
THE PREVIOUS OCCUPATION OF FULL-TIME UNION OFFICERS. 
B 
Previous occu~tiopal.1evel Type 
·of 
Union. 
Un- Semi- · Supervis. 
skilled skilled skilled clerical & Admin. Other 
Skilled 
Ex-craft* 
Single-Industry 5% 34% 41% ~ 1% 11% 
fie~e;sa.! -··- ______ -~ ___ ~~ ____ 1:t% ___ !8J1 ____ ~- __ -~ 
Mea.n Average 3% 2~ 47% 11% 4% 7fo 
Ta.ble compiled, respectively, from Cleggf Killick and .Adams (1961), p.48 and p.so. 
*This category refers largely to the then AEU. 
summa.ry. 
In the post-war history of British worker occupations the Engineering Union 
holds a, leading place. More than any other union ita activists played a 
leading role. 'Ibis was true both numerically and. historically. Not only 
do AUEW activists appear to have been involved in more occupations than 
other trade unionists but they played key roles in the pioneering .. ac.tions 
---.... 
(concerning redundancy in 1971 and wages in 1972). Regionally it appe~---, ___ .. 
~ha. t AUE1l militants played key roles in introducing the ta_ctic: this wa.s 
true in Scotland, Yorkshire, Wales, the North East, Merseyside, OxfoJ:d-
shire, Cumberland, Derbyshire, Buckingha.mshire, Surrey, Hanlshire, and. 
Kent. 
Reason.s for the leadership qualities and committment to militancy 
within the Union appear to hinge on one or two important factors. A main 
consideration is that the Union structure and procedures allows speed of 
action at shop floor level and allows rank-and~file opinion to influence 
the highest levels of the Union. ··In using these procedures over many 
decades the Union has been able to build up· a. :pool of experienced leader-
ship. Further, the organisational and political climate within the lJn,ion 
' . ,i ::·_ 
: M:; oiz:engthE!P:d:fleadership tendencies., To begin with there h~,continua.lly ... ,, 
existed large numbers of skilled workers concerned to be involved in 
1 Union affairs to a,ome degree • Many have been encouraged to become 
involved because of the fa.ot that the Union has had a. two party factional. 
sy~tem for some years. The factions ha-,.e been roughly equa.l in strength 
and have both had their share of power over the years. On the one side, 
factional activism has been ensured and strengthened by the fact that 
a large number of Communist Party members hold AUEW union cards.. In all 
the AUEW' has provided its members with both avenues and rationale ;Cor 
'· 
becoming active and in the process many ideologically aware activists 
have come out of the process. 
) 1. That is not to say that less~r skilled members are not active ifithin 
.the Union. They do have a tradition¥ prejudice against them however 
in that rarely, if ever, will a less~r skilled member win a position 
of high union office. Still today the skilled tool maker has a greater 
chance of high office than the (dilutee) capstan-lathe opera.t.or. 
. . . ... ..._ .. 
.9JJ,APTER 10 
LEADERSHIP AND THE C.P.G.Ba ~ ROlli OF THE 
COMNUNIST PARTY IN POST-WAR INDUi:iTRIAL CONFLICT. 
"(T)he initiation of both political strikes and workplace occupations 
re~uired an ideologically left-wing leadership and one which was embodied 
in the strength of the trade union movement - shop floor organisation in 
particular. More than any other left-wing organisation the C.P.G.B. 
filled that bill at that time. The CPGB played the key role in almost 
all of the main actions of the period". 
Introduction. 
This chapter seeks to gain an understanding of the role played by 'ideo-
logical' leadership in the development and spread of the worker occupations. 
That is, to examine the importance of the left·-activist trade unionist to 
the development of certain action. It is argued that such leadership 
does seem to have played an important role not only in regard to worker 
occupations but in the development of :political strikes also. In part·· 
icular Communist 1-arty members appear to have played a more substantial 
role in the character of the industrial conflict t~~t developed from the 
late 1960s. 
Given the significance of these political activists the chapter 
seeks to broaden the study to the role of ideological leadership in 
industrial conflict generally - centering on the affairs of the Communist 
P'o.rty. It is argued that this Party has been one of the most influential 
elements in the direction of British trade union policy (and in the 
developments of industrial conflict) in the post-war era. 
Worker Occupations and ~eolo5ical Leadership. 
Prior to the 1970s the major British trade union 1·reapon was the strike. 
strikes undoubtedly provide a challenge to rnana.gerial prerogatives and in . 
some cases 'raise the consciousness' of tllose involved about the nature 
of capitalism. However, the nature of the .. challenge" is to a large 
extent limited by the structural context of the 'E>trike': this, in tll.:l:'n, 
.has limited the scope of ~onsciousness raising". The 'strike' involves 
a withdra.wal of labour designed to win concessions within existing 
productive relationship;;; of ownership and control. '!'hus a major pmct-
ical and ideological stress is on the temnorary prevention of the exercise 
of employer ri~hts over labour to a result in which the payment of 
labour is altered but not the •tJ.~lations of production";L. This stress 
strongly undermines those elements of a strL~e sitllation which throw up 
anti-capitalist ideas. It also helps to facilitate the potentia~ u.5e of 
the 'strike' among large sections of British workers~ The strike weapon, 
nonetheless, does contain a significant level of challerg·e . to capita.l 
rights and. ma.nagerial control to prevent its read.y use even among'those 
with a long held grievance., In situations of hesitance a crucial factor 
in determining that action shall be ~~en is the question of leeAership. 
In earlier chapters it has been shown that those sections of 
workers which became involved in workplace occtlpa:tions were largely drawn 
from ~he rarJ<s of the more 'strike :prone' t::-a.d.:?. U:':'lionis·~s. Even so it is 
still arguablt:· a big step to ha.ve taken a..nd >iill have raq_uired leadership 
qualities of a certain kindo To begin with, the workers involved will need 
to have been convinced that the situation warranted action of a more 
radical nature. The fact that they were convinced relied on the fact that 
those in the posi-tions of lay leader;::;hip had little hesit,J.t~:J.on.,."by virtue 
Qf their political beliefs·"' in challenging existing·property rights ·at· 
whatever.devel· p9ssible ., In short, what is being argued here is tha.:f:,. · 
l. Cf. R .Hym .. m, 197.2.; P. And.•3T•:>on, 1Y67; V .L.Allen, 1966 
---
worker occupations (at least initially) involved a much clearer pe~pect-
ive of challen6e to capital. Nuch more the stress was on cl).a.llenging 
• 
managerial deci3ion rrakir~ (over disposal of labour and of capital) and 
not always clearly to an end result which maintained particular property 
relationships. Indeed many of the leaders of workplace occupations have 
declared that pa_rt of the aims of the action has been to raise a sharper 
challenge to capitalism. Thus, in (;te:rtain i1.ays, the. auvsnt of the 
workplace occupation represents a aua.li tatively new. form of industrial 
' 1 
action - in type, in ideological undertones, and in possible outcomes • 
As such~actions of this type required a type of leadership able to see 
the effectiveness of this form of str~gle,-being somehow committed to 
challenging capitalism, and being prepared to consider more radical out-
comes as end results of industrial actions. As chapter two indicated 
where~ever industrial disputes have developed into much more politically 
challenging forms left activists have usually been a:G the fore of the 
. . t• t• 2 ~n~ ~a ~on • To a considerable extent this has also been true in the 
development of workplace occupations in Britain ... 
upations certainly owed much to the existance of left le~dership as did 
the spread of the tactic into the field of wage negotiations. At Briant 
Colour Printing moat of the lay leadership were of, or to. the left of,the 
Labour Party& 
"Briants' workers were in the rr..ain t,lverwhelmingiy · inclined to Socialism 
in as much as this would mean 'beini supporters of Labour. '£here were, 
ofcou.rse, people who supported the more revolutiona.ry sor:t-5 of socialLm 
a.s opposed to the social reformism" 0). . 
1. 
2. 
J. 
The UCS workers, for instance, could see one possible outcome in the 
form of nationalisat.ion. ·fue i',isher'""Bendix, JcottL;h Express and Triumph 
Heriden >-ror!{ers sought co-operative ownership. 
LEniin; 196la, 19611i; Lo~ovsky,-~972; ··. i'Jarx & Engels 1967 predicted, • 
and indeed encouraged this. ' 
Interview with Bill Freeman. 
t 41f .L 
The convener, Bill Freeman, counted himself'amoung the "revolutionary" left. 
Although comming from a family of Communist Party members Freeman remained 
a member of the Labour Party until close to the end of the second Briant's 
occupation in 1972. Freeman was to state at the time of joining, 
"i~hy have 1 joined the Communist Party? JJo you know what the real question 
ought to be? Why have I taken such a long time about i t?'t 
' 
"I thought I could do more to change policies in the trade union and labour 
movement by not being a Communist Party member. .But I eventually came to 
the conclusion that if you're going to get anywhere you can't do it on a 
false basis - you've got to come right out with what you really believe 
in" (1). 
In addition to Freeman two other leading members of the Joint shop stewards 
organisation join1~d the Communist party and another the Workers Revolution-
ary Party in the course of the second occupation. 
At the u.c.s. there was a much c~earer 'revolutionary' leadership. 
The concept of the 'work-in' was put forward by Communist Sammy Barr who 
was to play a leading role on the Co-ordinating Committee along with Comm-
unists Jimmy Reid and Jim Arlie. Airlie and Reid, ofcourse, played the 
key roles of chief organiser and spokesman of the work-in. Nor can it 
be argued that these were simply CP militants acting outside the knowledge 
and dictates of their pa.rty2• Reid., for instance, was a member of the CP's 
• 
highest body - the Political Committee, and along with Airlie was a member 
of the Party's most important (scottish) district committee3. Of the four 
yards making up the UCS Communist Party members held three of the conven-
orships and convenorship of the Co-ordinating Committee itself. The over-
all strength of the CP within the UC0 is further revealed in the fact that 
l. 'The Horning 3tar', 12th April 197). 
2. 1bere is no evidence that the 'work-in' idea originated at any official 
meeting of the CPGB but considerable evidence th,~t. the issue was discus.sed 
and member activities co-ordinated once the decision had been taken. 
3· Reid was no ordinary member. He was a leading element of the ~P's ocottish 
District Committee and prior to working in shipbuilding he was.,its full 
time secretary. And, befoke that, he spent many years as the ueneral 
Secretary of the CP's youth organisation - the Young Communist League (YCL)• 
the apprentices were under YCL leadership1 and that both a branch of the 
CP existed within the yards as l-Tell as a YCL 11 industrial group"2• In the 
course of the work-in the CP branch doubled its member;;;hip - from fifty to 
a hundred. 
The situation was very much the same at the Itiver Don works in 
Sheffield. Here the importance of the Communist Party needs to be under-
. s·t.ood at two levels - within the Harks itself and within the district 
leadership of the local AUE\i. For some considerable tin1e now the CPGB 
have been a powerful influence within the Sheffield District of the AUEwJ. 
This is reflected in the great proportion of full-time convenors who are 
CPGB members and in membership of the District Committee. There is cert-
ainly evidence that the idea of the River Don "vwrk-on" originated at a 
meeting of the AUEW District Committee4. Inside the works several of the 
leading shop stewards were CPGB members int;:l.uding Cliff Wright, the chairman 
of the joint shop stewards' committee and Tony Hope,the convenor for TASS 
shop stewards. The Don convenor has since described the leadership thus, 
"The leaders of the Don campaign were a mixture of communist and labour 
party members. If there were members of any other parties among the 
leadership I wasn't aware of it", (5). 
Following the Don work-on decision came the sit-in at Snow Engin-
eering and here the convenor described himself as being sympathetic to the 
views of the Communist Party6• 
1. Again these were no ordinary YCLers. Tam Brotherston was a member of 
the YCL's biggest district committee (scotland) and was soon to be its 
secretary and a member of the &xecutive Co~rrittee. So too with Alan 
Ritchie who became a..r1 E.G. membex.·. 
2. This was only one of three such YCL groups in the whole of Britain. lt 
had a membership of about JO at its peak. 
). Clegg et al, op cit, 1961, for example, refer to the power of the GPJ~ 
within the Sheffield AEU. · 
4. 
5· 6. 
Information from the research C(fficer for the CFGB "Steel Committee" and 
.;torning Telegraph I (~effieldj, 7th october, 1971. 
QUestionnaire return, si-c· 
Questionnaire return. 
The Manchester Pay Occupations: In the spread of the tactic into 
! 
I 
other issues (i.e. non-redundancy issues) the CPGB and other .. lefts" played 
an overwhelming role. In early 1972 the AUEW Executive Committee was a 
fine balance of left and right, with the right having the edge. The left's 
main strength rested in the powerful North west Region which returned to 
the E.C. Labou~-left Bob Wright. At divisional level Communist John 
Tocher held the vital post of Secretary of the CSEU (No.29 District), and 
at district level a whol~ series of important posts were held by Communists 
and their sympa.thisers. Communists held the post of district secretary or 
president in Stockport, OlcL.'laiu, Bury, :Na .. '1.chester. Iil.fact, when the 
occupations began to sp~ad, throughout the region the local engineering 
employers • association complained _that the occupations were "Communist 
inspired11 and organised by a "Communist-dominated district committee and 
union officici.J.sn1 • 
In no other At.i'EW region we~ the Communists and their "Broad Left•• 
so well organised and in no other region did a:ny widespread occupations 
:take place., At localp plant, level individual Communists and Syntpa.th-· 
isers played a vital initiating role but undoubtedly the official backing 
and co-ordination helped to widen the tactic's use throughout the region. 
The Regions: Even looking at a regional level it was left activists 
which are to be found pioneering the tactic in their area. Scotland and 
Sheffield have already been detailed. In Liverpool a leadership of left 
Labour a.."lc'i Communists brought the tactic to the area in the form of the 
Fisher-Bendix occupation. The first of the Birmingham ocGupations wa..s 
initiated by t.h13 Co:m.;11unL:;t domina.tt.:;d ".Building ;~ork~r:s' Charter" .-··-ln· Aorfolk. 
1. 'The Norning Jta:r', 29th April, 1972. 
the first occupation (Sexton's) was initiated by someone describing their 
views as being closest to the lnternational Socialism Group, while in 
. ., __ ., ... ·. . . . 
Oxfo:rdshire theground. Nas broken by a combination of CP, Labour lefts and 
SLL1shop ~3tewards with an occupation at British Leyland's CoHley works. 
In the No~cth East of England the region's first occupation occurred at 
'1'1l:'ess El<tgin''K~:ring a.nd would not have done so but for the intervention of 
an active Communist Party member. Although not even a shop steward Communist 
Alex NcFadden was able to give leadership to the situation and encourage 
occupation action rather than a strike. Mclt,adden shortly afterNards became 
a shop stewa:cd, then soon after that deputy convenor, and eventually 
convenor, and district c!ommittee member. This was the only AUE\v occupation 
in that region's engineering pay battle2 • 
Conununist Party and other left militants can be found playing a 
leading role in most o:f the many other occupations to.occur over the period.J. 
The Role of the CPGB in modern post~·-:'la.r industrial actions. 
In order to appreciate the importa:tl·~ role of the Communist Party in the 
development of workplace·occupations it is important to see their overall 
role in the development of the situation of' wh ... i.<l~h t.h~ occ~t.P<~tions were a 
part. The arguement here is at t1-ro levels. It is being claimed that the 
CPGB played an important role in the development of workplace occupations, 
but that is not to say that this was a direct result o:f' any preconceived 
CPGB plan. Nor is it to say, for that reason, that the CPGB alone were 
'I 
.~. 
J. 
This rE,ferG to the ~)ocialh>t l_a.bJur League; later renamed the ~iorkers' 
Revolutionary Party. 
Information on 'l'res.s was gained through per::;on._q,l and. political association 
with HcFadd€m. 
Communist leadership can be found at Bryant site::; (Ha.nchester) 1972, 
Lovell (London) 1972, NcNeil (Glasgow) 1972, NcAlpine (London) 1973, 
Ford (Dagenham) 1973 & '75, Tillotson (Liverpool) 1973, Hawker-
Siddelly (Bolton) 1973, Adwest (Reading) 1973, ;:)cottish Daily Express 1974, 
Rolls noyce (Ansty )1975 1 P:copytex (Hartlepool) .1974, Hawker-3idd·~lly (wood-
foci) 1974, Corah (wales) 19'/5, Ca.Jru;lell Lai~ lLiverpool) 1975, dwnlock 
Ani~ (N~tio_na1)~212• Balfour lJarw~n (0heff~eld) 1975• 
were directly responsible. They would be the first to deny that they alone 
played any initiating role. More importantly it was the CPGB that played 
the crucial role in creating certain militant conditions out of which the 
occupations carne, and nhen such a situation did arise it was the CPGB 
that took the initiative where ever possible in pressing the situation 
ever further. \ 
To a much lesser degree,it Has Communist Party militants that 
gave the lead to the development of shop stewa1~ committees in the late 
19.50s and early 1960s and it was they that led the defence of such bodies 
against attack and criticism from the TUC General Council and certain 
t ad · ff. · 1 1 r e un1on o ~c1a s • 
In a much more significant fashion the Communist Party played 
the key role in opening up the counter offensive against government 
attempts at new, restrictive, trade union l(~gislation. The heart of the 
crunpaigning out of which came the calls for political strikes was a body 
called the Liaision Committee for the Defence of Trade Unions (LCDTU). In 
organisation and political direction this "body lfas essentially a Communist 
Party front. But, not only did the CPGB provide the organisational 
apparatus for the development of political strikes and campaigning work 
of the late 1960s/early '70s it also provid~d leadership in many of the 
linked individual actions of the period. It is not co-incidental that two 
of the arrested Pentonville Five, and Des Warren of the Shrewsbury Three 
were CPGB militants, for example, Detailed accounts could be provided 
for many of the events of the period which indicate -the vital :cole of the 
CFGB and its activists - the;3e would include the organising of f~ngineering 
worker support that culminated in the "Battle of Jaltley Gates" ; the 
significance of Communist leadership in the official and unofficial miners' 
1. See T.U.C. Annual Congress.Rep~rt, 1960.- ~i~cus~i9n on General Co~?il Report on sho~ {loQr organ~sat~on~. It ~s CPGB m1l1tants f~om the ~ru ~hat speak ou~ 1n ravour of extenu~ng shop floor organ1sat~on. 
strikes of the period; and the importance of the Building Workers' Charter 
Group in the calling of an official national builders• strike in 1972. 
How the. CFGB operates in industr,;l. 
The importa.'lce and nature of; th~ ·role .of the CPGB in industrial affairs 
has variously been underemphasised and distorted to a point where it is 
' difficult to believe that they should'be ~~en seriously. Critics seem 
to fall into two basic camps - those who see the Party as a band of 
foreign dominated infiltraters and those who see them as an ineffectual 
bunch of non-revolutionary do-gooders. These points will be taken up 
later. Interestingly its supporters, for good reason, have been loathe 
to defend the Party's role for fear of giving too much away and those who 
have left the CP have a recurring habit of putting a sinister slant on 
activities they were once involved in2• However, a reasonably straight 
account of the affairs of the CPGB does reveal in which way they have 
indeed been able to play a vital influencing role on trade union policy. 
Theory as a ~uide to action: The Party aims bind. members to 
the cause of .. working for the attainment of socialism" - nguided by the 
theory and practice of :t·larxism-Lenini<3m"3• To this ultimate end the Party 
have evolved a strategy detailed in its "British 1\oad to Socialism". 
document. 4 This document envisages the winning of political power 
through a process of "parliamentary and extra-parliamentary struggle". 
l. I am presenting here an ideal type caGe. The theoretical position of 
the Fa.rty naturally varied in application according to members involved 
and waG going through a period of revision toward"' the middle of thh; 
period. LikeHL;e it:> organisational structures were not a.lways as 
perfectly structured. as suggested hej_"e. 
2. As one ~mch ex-member I write of a Party and Party activities which I 
respected but 1-rhich I no longer am convinced exLts. 
J. Taken from CPGB Aims & Constitution, 1969, p.J. 
4. This is to be initially in the form of a Parliamentary majority of 
Labour and Communist M.P.s. 
A central :part of this "extra-parliamentary" struggle refers to activity 
within the indU3trial sphere. In short, industrial struggle waa to form 
the bacl.::.bone of the Party's strategy .for: winning socialism. 
This pe!'spective imposes a number of particular requirements 
on CFGB indU3trial militants. The creation of a "transformed"(Socialist)1 
'\ 
Parliament is to be achieved through stre:r~.gth drawn from a "left trade 
. . ,.2 nd. '"hr h . ' . h t . ll muon movemen-c · a ·.., oug a proce,;;s J..n wn~c- grea concess1.ons wi 
have been achieved at industrial level (the ad:vanc~m~nt of closed shop 
agreements, for example) ani at parliamentary level (the establishment of 
\ 
picketing rights, etc) ; . the. power of the employers wJ;u~iave been eroded by 
this time through having been forced to yield concession after concession3 .. 
The nub of the relationship of parliamentary .-to extra-parliamentary 
struggle is that industrial unrest and. consequent gains will open up a 
situation where the left can gain elector ally and in turn introduce 
legislation to strengthen the industrial struggle. Where legislation of 
this kind is threatened from the right and from Capital itself then 
struggle within industry would be invoked to strengthen the parliamentary 
fight. 
The implications and demands, thus, are that all CPGB members 
must belong to their "appropriate trade union or :profe,;;sional organisation"4 
in vrhich they must .. assist (its) work (and) talce an active part". An 
''active part" must include attempts to viin union member3 and the organisation 
itself to support Communist policy a.11d thb, in turn, can mean Harking 
to eni any bam; and. proscription;:; again;:;t C:orw11unL:rt.s and getting member.:; 
--------~-------------------------------------------------------
l. The 'BritLh :~oad ·ro· Jociali~:;m', 1968 ver;_;ion, p.56. 
2. Ibid, :p.2J. 
3. Ibid, p.22. 
4. Aims & Con3titution, p.9. 
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:Nuch of this is sumi'lled u:p in the statement that, 
"In the 'course of struggle important inroads will be made into the power 
of the monopolists - economic, political and social. The aim must be 
increasingly to isolate the monopolbb and the Torie.:;, to b:ceak right-
Hing domination of the la,bour movement, and. to \fin a left majority in the 
Labour Party" (1). 
In essence, then, the function of a CPGB member id to con:;;tantly strive for 
industrial unrest to a number of ends. Thi:::J means that within industry 
there are a number of committed activists 1'1'hOf.>e E;trength lies in the fact 
that they share a common set of goals in contrast to the majority of 
rrori<:ers (even those with Labour Party cards) with their diverse needs and 
demands. Secondly, again in cont:rast to a majority of workers, strength 
is dralil1 from a willingness both to join uniom; and to stand for office. 
Thus, in many industrial situations Communists are more likely to stand 
for union office and are thus more likely to get elected& once elected, 
where there are other J?a.rty members, they a.re more likely to get their 
policies across in the face of competing and usually unformulated :policies2• 
Organisation in wi.!!!}igg tJle general_ line: The CJ?GB leave none 
of these possibilities to chance. At the top level it has an "Industrial 
.Q~m_J;:t.me'!lt" based at the King street headquarters. This is headed by a 
member of the Party Executive Committee, ~1d oversees all of the work of 
the lower industrial bodies. It both provides org~~isational and political 
direction for the Party's work in industry. Hembars of this department 
did indeed play an active role in the natio~~l seamen's strike of 1966. 
It rras they whC- helped establish and co-ordinate the activities of a. 
left singer g;rou:p in thcl NU::; H~ich both pu:sh:O!O_ the utrike int.J effect J,nd 
k8pt it going; Hhich bro.3J..iened Glrppo:r.-t for it from the docke:r:s artd which 
--------~------
l. P.48. 
2. V.L.Allen, 1954 details quite effectively how the tiniest minority can 
get their vieH point across within trade union organisation. 
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campaigned for a change in NUS le~1ership. 
The next level of organisation is that of the "Industrial 
Committees" made up, extd.. r:,~o-o:r:dinating the activities, of Party members 
within a particular union1 • These bodies hold meetings on a more or less 
regular basis to discuss -vra.ys of eff""''~t:h~ policy and leadership changes. 
' They are made up of delegates elected"from district level industrial 
cornittees. It is not unusua.l for these meetings to be followed by 
a series of similar resolutions to be passed in a number of branches, by 
certain candidates being either supported or nominated by certain branches, 
and by several Party members being elected as delegates to the Union 
national conference2 a Nat~Cllly this means that certain policies end 
certain can:lida·t.es have a fighting chance of being accepted by conference. 
/· 
The chairman of the Industrial Committee generally sits on the Party's 
"National Industrial Advisory Committee" which, in a similar way, co-o:rd-
inates member activity across an industry. Bo·th ·bodies are directly 
responsible to the Industrial Department. 
At the most basic level there is the Party .. industrial branches" 
which are based on a particular workplace, e.g. UCS, River Don, etc. These 
bodies operate within the terms of the Party's industrial/political strategy 
and carry out decisions taken at the higher bodies. This ensures that 
a decision, for example, to oppose a "five percent pay norm .. will find 
the same opposition both within Ford's and within British Leyland at the 
same point of time. 
1. 'I'he name of the i.ndustrial committee help~'- to mask activity in a :particular 
union. Thus, to use a. f'icticious exa.;11ple, >1ork in the National Drug l'Jakers 
Union l-TOuld be hidden under the title "The Chemical Advisory .. committeee 
2. Recently the 'Horning Star' (September 9th 1978) boasted that over 100 
of that year's TUC Congress delegates were CPGB members. 
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Young workers: The Party is also able to influence the develop-
ment of struggle among young workers through the activity of its youth 
organisation, the YCL. The role of the YCL is basically to Hin young 
workers to join the trade unions and once in to play an active role. 
This aspect of its \'fOrk is in the charge of an Executive Committee member 
ofthe YCL who acts as the "!iational Industrial Organiser" aided by a 
"National Industrial Committee". Below this are one or two national 
"indust~ial collectives" consisting of. YCLers from particular unions: these 
operate in a similar fashion to the Party's Industrial Committees. At the 
lowest level there are the "industrial groups .. in which members at the 
same place of work co-operate on effecting YCL industrial policy but who, 
unlike the Party, are attached to branches based on the locale. 
;party Press: The work of all levels is aid.ed by the 'Horning 
star• and the YCL's monthly 'Challenge'. These readily inform members 
and supporters of industrial dispU'tes in progress (and in need of support) 
and industrial issues (to follow). l1embers and supporters are also 
informed of union elections and policies ~~d are made aware of which line 
and which candidates to support. 
Organisational strength: Naturally very little public information 
exists which details the various strengths of Party organisation. What 
can be discovered is that the CPGB (and the YCL) ru:e strongest within 
ttengineering... They also have collectives for printers, miners, draughtsmen, 
technical workers, teachers, students, and academic staff. 
In terms of"facto:r:y branches"the Party .riational Congress Report 
for 19'?1 :Lncticate;;i th.a.t d.eJ.ega.t2~:; hs.d come from one-h'.Ancl.red-and-s:i.xt,y 
such bodies. This fell to arou.."ld onehundred.-and-fifty by 1)175. 
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h . t• 1 Branc organ~sa 1on : Per~onal experience indicates that the existance of 
at least two CPGB members in the same branch can have an important influence 
in the direction of branch policy. A review of 'The Horning ~tar' for the 
period 1171-75 reveals that no fewer than forty union branches supported the 
2 paper in one way or another and ~~at of these at least three existed at 
concerns which were occupied at one time\or anothera fourteen different 
trade unions were involved. A further fifty-one branches (of 18 unions) 
are reported as being associated with the work of the LCDTUJ. In both ca~es 
these figures are only the tip of the iceberg. 
Shop floor organisation: The CPGB has been an influential and 
consistant force in the building of shop floor organisation within British 
industry a 
"The ideas that had informed the shop stewards' movement did not die (after 
1918) for they passed over to the Communist Party, taken to it by those shop 
stewards who were so influential in its formation in 1920" (4). 
Indeed, to this day the classic works on shop steward organisation are still 
those drafted by CPGB militants - such as Willie Gallacher, Arthur NcManus, 
Tom Bell, etc. such was the influence of the Party that during the General 
··' Strike it was they alone that, 
"had the organisational capacity to mobilise rank and file discontents" (5)· 
1. In each section - branch, shop floor, trades council, etc - information 
is limited to personal experience and 'Morning dtar' report~ of the period. 
Thus, an underestimate of CPGB influence is presented in each case. 
2. That is, either through a direct donation or an indirect one in the form 
of a "fraternal" greeting thrqugh the paper's columns, i.e., greetings for 
Nay Day, Christmas or the opedmg of the TUC and Labour Party conferences. 
J, In total at lea:>t 22 different trade union organisationc; are reported. for 
either case - support. for the paper or involvement in the LC.UTU. 
4. T .Lane, 1975, p.11)3. 
5. Ibid, p.l'f+. 
The Party's .influence in shop floor organisation grew to a new level of 
! 
I 
significance in the post-Second World-War period. t~y - if not most - of 
the major references to shop floor organisation in this period have re!ered 
to the CPGB and its militants. For example, in the mid-1950s a Court of 
Inquiry was set up to look into industrial unrest at the Dagenham works of 
the then Briggs Motor Bodies Company. The Court had been set up to inquire 
into the sacking of Johnny HcLoughlin the chairman of shop stewards at the 
plant. McLoughlin and five other stewards had been suspended during a period 
of industrial action against redundancy thr:eats and speed-up. 
In declaring its decision - against McLoughlin - the Court's 
chairman, Lord Cameron expressed concern at the "Communist influence'• within 
the stewards' committee at the plant and was worried that the re-instatement 
of 11cLoughlin "could be interpreted as a gesture of appeasement of the extreme 
elements in the shop stewards' organisation111 • M.cLouglin, himself a CJ?GB 
meii).ber at that time, was described by Cameron as a man who "showed consider-
able capacity for ••• agitation and propagand.a"f ... 
··.·The Communist Party ha.S;:continued to be an important fore~ among · 
.· .···. ,. 
shop floor. :workers at the Dagenham plati.t which P.-as :since come .under the own·· 
•' ·, .. . •' . . . ' . . . 
ership of the Ford company. Beynon (1973), while attempting to argue that 
the CPGB plays a very limited role in industrial relations), gives ample 
evidence of the Party's continued leadership and importance. Pointing out 
that active Ford militants continue to be drawn into the Party's ranks4~ 
1. Q~oted in Beynon, 1973, pp.49-50. 
2. McLoughlin became :di$illusioned with the CPGB over the 'Hungarian Uprising' 
but initially remained 'a member because it had "the largest numb~.J; of people 
who could deal hammer blows at the capitalist system" and 1:'lcic-ause . of~ its 
factory organisation. "The Communist party branch at Briggs was of great>-
value to the workers there ... (D.'!Iidgery, 1976, p.84). 
3. Cf. p._56. 
Lt-. cr. pp. 56 & p.6o. 
Infact, CPGB members have continued to play key roles in the va.rious shop 
. \ 
steward committees throughout Ford's and have been involved in the 
occupations within that company. Still on the question of Ford's CPGB 
m~:mbers and their sym:pathisers made up the majority of those stewards 
sacked from the Dagenham plant in 1962. One of those sacked workers -
Kevin Halpin - went on to found the LCDTU just four years later: a testimony 
to the activism and militancy of CPGB Ford stewards. 
1 
Another ~or discussion in the history of British shop steward 
organisation was that which took place at the T.U.C. Congress of 1960. 
Again the Communists figure large. At the Conference certain types of shop 
floor organisation were frowned upon- "joint shop stewa:rds' committees", 
. . 
1 
"combine committees" and those steward organisations which united stewards 
across an industry or on a "national" basis. In the latter case the 
Communist dominated EeT.U. were'to the fore in their establishment and it 
was the leaders of this union that led the defence of such bodies at that 
T. U. C. Congress. Communist Frank Haxell went on to defend his shop stewards • 
involvement in a number of compa.ny··wide combine committees: 
nThe ramifications of industry, the establishment of large combine~, creates 
conditions in which it is necessary for shop stewards in certain industries 
to meet to discuss common problems and exchange experiences. Without this, 
the interests of the workpeople at workshop level cannot adequately be taken. 
care of, and the absence of machinery of this type enables the employers 
more easily to ex~loit the situation in one factory as against another" (1) 
1. T.U.C. Annual Congress Report, 1960, p.J)O. 
. ........ 
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'!'he year prior to the 'l'UC Congress the CPGB had made a concerted 
effort to establish a "National Shop 8tewards' Conference" and this was refered 
to directly in the lieneral l!ouncil•s conjemnation of such organisations. 'l'his 
body had been called into being by the joint shop steward committees of lt'irth 
Brown ~Sheffield) and Ford \Dagenham). ln both cases the CPGB had members 
playing leading roles and one such member - George Gaborn, Firth .Brown convenor 
- was suspended from union office for one year as part of an Engineering Union 
effort to kill off this new organisation: it succeeded. 
The failure of such efforts did not deter the l!PGB and the 'l'UC 
debate of 1960 is dominated by its members' attempts to get the General Coun• 
1 
cil's Report "refered back" • In the end the criticisms stood but a following 
motion placed on record the TUG's "appreciation of shop stewards" and deplored 
"the misrepresentation of disputes which has magnified them out of all prop-
ortion~· .' 'l'his resolution was seconded by CIJGB member George .lHvin in his 
capacity as General Secretary of the cine technicians• union \ACTAT)2• 
An example of the tenacity of the l!PGB in regard to shop floor 
organisation can be found in the docks industrys 
"The Gommunist Party decided in the 1930s to work through the unions and est-
ablish an industrial power-base by representing the rank-and-file in the 
labour movement ••• t,.they) did not seek to break the authority of the 'l'GWU 
but to swing it to the left by shopfloor pressure. ~anned from office after 
1948, Party members either went underground or were forced to work outside 
the union structure" U). 
"Many of the militants who formed the nucleus of the \unofficial) liaison 
committees in London were Party members ••• "\4). 
l. Communist Scottish 1v1iners · leader, Abe Noffat, was one of those pm>hing 
the reference-backs "If every one of us here • • • had been expelled • 
every tlme ;-re • . , took part in unofficial stoppages 1 very few of us 
would be present at this l!ongress". 'l'UC Annual l!ongre~3s Report, 1960, pp.J49-50. 
2. J!;lvin pointed out that his union had "only six full-time officials but 
between 200 and JOO shop stewards". TUC Annual Congress Report, 1960, p.356. 
J. D.F.Wilson, 1972, p.lJO. 
4. lbid, p.lJl. 
While the banning of Uommunists from office within the TGWU h~ndered the Party's 
' I 
effort to play a part in various areas of union work this was partially 
overcome by the continuance of unofficial port committees. 'l'owards the end 
of the 1960s the situation began to change under the impact of a Party onslaught 
on the prohibitiv~ rule: 
"Early in 1968, the election of stewards in the Royals tgroup of JJocks) saw 
many members of the unofficial committees returned and five, at least, were 
associated with the. uommunist Party - JJash, Rice, ~uck Brucer, Ted Kirby and 
Danny Lyons. 'l'heir fellow stewards refused to see them excluded from office 
and resigned en masse when the JJocks Group Committee tried to enforce the 
union rule. . 
It was a chaotic position since the stewards in other parts of the port had 
lgone along with the proscription) but in Bristol and Liverpool the pros-
cription had been waived in deference to the known preferences of the 
shopfloor. 
'l'he impasse was referred to the 'l'GWU executive, where opinion was divided 
about the relevance of the ban but united in the desire to protect the off-
icials. it was decreed that the ban need not apply so long as Communist , 
stewards did not take office on constitutional union committees. The stewards 
were then established and' the ban was rescinded in 1969 .. ~1). . 
This view stands in marked contrast to that of Beynon.. Uommunist militants 
played a leading part in the establishment of shop floor organisation on the 
JJocks; organisation which among other things helped to get the anti-trade 
union JJefence of the Realm Actv Order 1305 removed. from the ::>tatute ..t:Sook2• 
'!'he long militant record of men like Jack JJash and JJanny Lyons is well known: 
JJash was one of the men singled out by Harold wilson as one of the ~politically 
motivated men~ behind the national ::>eamen •s strike of 1966. \ !t'rom a position 
.•/ 
of continued rank-and-file militant leadership the Communists were able to 
launch an offensive which succeeded in winning the removal of a twenty year 
old ban on (;ommunists holding office within the 'l'GWU 1 At times Beynon 
;:;tppears to recognise .. : t~t th.e .Cl='GB •s recoid is one ·of proven militancy: · 
... ·~- . 
1. D.F.Wilson, 1972, p.198. 
2. Cf. A~Hutt, 1975, chapter 12. 
·.)' 
.. ~ 
11 (In) times of crisis the stewards revert to the old style 'proven' leadership 
of either the Communist Party or the Left Hing of the Labour Party. The 
takeover and 'work-in' at UCS only highlights a general tendency within the 
politics of militant shop floor committees. On Nerseyside the Communist 
Party is the only 'left' group with long-standing membership amongst proven 
mili tants 11 (1). 
By the mid-1960s and the onset of a new economic crisis the CPGB 
was entrenched in a whole number of shop floor organisations which it had 
been to the fore in establishing. So much so vras this the case that the 
Party's role was highlighted in the reports of the official researcher;;, for 
the Royal Commission on rrrades Unions and Employers' Associations. McCarthy 
(1966), for example, pointed out that a large number of shop steward 
organisations were affiliated to the Communist influenced Labour Research 
2 Department and that national committees of shop stewards, 
"were front organisations, for the most part organised by members of the 
Communist Party" (3). 
Following NcCarthy the report of John Hughes (1967) stated that combine committees, 
"serve as targets for extremist groups, but it may also be true in so far as 
communists in the trade unions have been among those taking the initiative 
in developing such committees they are bridging a real ~ap in union structure"(4). 
The povrer of the CPGB, it can be argued, has not been simply in 
contributing to the establishment of shopflooL· o.cganh;ation but also in 
providing it with organisational,goals and a leadership capable of. achieving 
' 
those goals. This can be seen in a number of industries. '£he !Jocks has 
already been exampled. By the late 1960s, with a. number of achievements at 
local level, the CPGB helped to bring into being an unofficial national shop 
stewards' committee of dockers "under the leadership of a militant NASlJ 
Londoner, Becnie ;:;teer"5. In 1972 the L3~'>ue of containe:.ci::sation 
l. Beynon, 1973, p.228. 
2. HcCa:cthy, para 86. He lists some 216 af.r'iliated. ~>hop stmiard committees. 
3. Ibid, p. ')4. 
4. Quoted in lv.E.J .l'lcCarthy (ed), 1972, p.l8J. 
5· D.F.Wi1son, 1972, p.209. 
'·• 
and consequent job losses within the docks :presented the "unofficial committee 
I 
. 1 I 
with a ready-made :platform" : 
"The committee :played a large :part in-keeping the container crisis on the 
boil and it was instrumental in forcing the TGWU to launch itself towards 
a national strike" (2). 
It was over the containerisation issue that Steer and four other unofficial 
leaders were arrested and jailed by orde~ of the National Industrial Relat-
ions Court in 1972. The_ Pentonville Five, as they became known, included 
two CPGB members - ':~'clt'them Bernie Steer; a third, Vic Turner, joined the 
'1-, .•·• ' 
Party a short while later. 
The issue of the Pentonville Five led to widespread unrest and a 
call for a General Strike to a.chieve their release o Here the CPGB :played 
an important role at three different levels. rts militants were to the fore 
on the docks and in the leadership of the national stewards' committee; rank-
and-file militant action was assisted by the existance and agitation of the 
LCDTU; and at TUC General Council level the Broad Left balance within the 
AUEW helped push that union into action which demanded militant response from 
the TUC leadership. 
steel: For some years the very conserva,tive steel workers r union 
(BISAKTA) had succeeded in :preventing the development of any national stewards' 
body within the industry. The CPGB had tried unsuccesfully for lna.ny years 
to establish such an organisation. However, around the turn of the 1970s 
the threatened closure of several steel works'o:pened up new :possibilities. 
At the Shotton works the shop stewards united against closure threats into 
an 'Action Co~~ittee' and they sent out invitations to other stewards within 
---... 
1. D.F .Wilson, 1972, :p.209. ---
2. Ibid. 
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the industry with a view to the establishment of a national body. The CPGB, 
in fact, had no members in leading positions at ~hotton but the Shotton 
initiative was heavily supported with (behind-the-scenes) CPGB backing. Where 
the CPGB were strong a number of local action committees quickly sprung up 
and these formed the strength of the new national body. Vihere the CPGB 
was not strong action. committees were not established (i.e., at the threatened 
Consett works in N.'vf.Durham) or gave little or no support to the national 
organisation (i.e., the action committee of the threatened Hartlepool works) •. 
r1any of the decisions of the national action committee originated 
at the CPI.';B's "Steel i'Jorkers' Advisory Committee". Thh body co-ordinated. 
the activities of its members involved in the Steel workers' ac:tion committees; 
The most successful campaign against closure was mounted by the CPGB dominated 
River Don stewards' committee, and in the shape of the famous "work-on". 
Aerospace:and Telecommunications: In both cases national combinations 
of shop stewards exist across the industries and in both cases the TASS section 
of the .AUEW is the leading body involved. That union section had in 
advance its own national organisation of TASS stewards within the telecorun-
unications industry and has since pioneered interPational contacts. Its 
stewards, for instance, have contact Hith their counter_pa.rts of the French 
(Communist) C.G.T. unions2 • It is difficult to claim that the CPGB alone 
has played the initiating role, through the unions, in the establishment of 
such bodies although many of the published claims are in this d.irectionJ. 
vlhat is clear is that move~ towards the setting up of such organisations 
l. I am indebted to the CFt-:;B steel Advi::;ory res9arch Ho:cker for information 
on that bo~ly's activit:Les. 
2. 'The Norning star 1 , 28th Oct. 1 7 5 repo.rted contacts between these two bodies. 
J. Cf. H .Fl.J .NcCarthy, 1966 and J .Hughes, 1967. 
weresupported by the heavily Communist dominated ETU in the late 1950s/early 
1960s and the equally heavily CPGB dominated TA;:>S in the late }960s/early 
1970s. As has been mentioned in previous ~ections of this work, the national 
organisation of teleco~munications' stewards helped in the support and spread 
of workplace occupations throughout the industry. 
The 'National Aerospace Shop Stewards' Lia~sion Committee' is also 
noted for having CPGB members rTithin its leadership including its· national 
~ h"l . 1 secre~ary, P 1 H1ggs • This body has brought together shop stewards repres-
entative of onehundred-thou~and workers within the industry including those 
from Rolls Royce2 , Hawker·· Sidde~.?, B.A.C •4 , Lucas Aerospace5, Dunlop6 and 
Hestlands - all companies in which workplace occu:p~tions have occurede 
Construction: and Print: \vi thin these industries the CPGB have been 
foremost in creating industrial associations of shop stewards - grouped around 
a broadsheet or 'Charter' • This is the case with the" Building ~~·orkers e Charter" 
and the "Print Workers' Charter"; both heavily dominated in production and 
philosophy by CPGB members. Bill Freeman, the Briant Colour Printing work-in 
leader, has edited the latter since the mid-1970s and Pete Carter has continued 
to occupy the position of leading spokesman of the Building Workers' Charter 
Group?. The Group has been very influential in a number of industrial actions ·-
1. 
') 
~ ... 
). 
4. 
s. 
6. 
?. 
The CPGB have long been associated with shopfloor organisation in the 
aerospace industry. Cf. A.Hutt, 1975, chapter 11. 
Higgs, standing for the post of AUEW National Organiser in late 1975, 
stated that if elected one of his aims would be "the fostering of machinery 
and organisation to bring wider consultation~-; ~-rith the shop floor represent-
atives·on all matters of policy ••• and strengthen the international 
links of trade unionists in the face of the growth of multinational companies" 
(The 'Horning Star ' , 8th Oct. 1Y7 5) • 
The C.:PGB ha:..s a.t lec.u3 t 2 factory bcanche::; Hithin thL company. 
The CPGB ha:; at least lfactory branch Hithin thb company. 
. ..... 
CPGE stewards have some influence at least within the \•leybridge plant steward~' 
committee of this company. 
CPGB stevrards are to the fore in the Lucas Aeror:;pace stewards' committee. 
The CPGB has at least l factory hca.nch within this company. 
Carter is a former Executive Committee member of the YCL anJ has been a 
member of the CP's National Executive Committee since 1975. 
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including a successful campaign within the leading building unions which helped 
to facilitate the calling of a national strike in 1972. It was also involved 
in mofd:, of the building site occupation::; of the period, and - in co·-operation 
with the LCDTU - organised various protest actions against the arrests and. 
l 
court appearances of the "Shrewsbury 'lwenty-li'our" • 
The Communist Party has also been highly succe.:;s:ful in building 
strong organisation within a number of other inciustries - particularly 
engineering. The evidence of support for the LCDTU reveals that the great 
majority of supporting union organisations were drawn from the AUEW and the 
TG\W. 
The connection between CP influenced shopfloor organbation and 
vrorkplace occupations is quite revealing. At least nineteen such organisations 
can be found which played a direct part in a workplace occupation2• 
The LCDTU: A study of the role played. by the LGD'£U shows the 
extent to which the CPGB is successful in bringing its influence to bear on 
a whole number of trade union organisations~ An examination of the report~ 
of those associated with this bod~ reveals the following support: - onehundred 
and-thirtyeight shopfloor organisations of which nineteen had been directly 
involved in workplace occupations and tvro others in threatened actions~ forty-
eight trade union branches drawn from seventeen unions; forty trade;:; councils 
including four that had given significant support to workplace occupations; 
thirty-two district and regional committees - mainly dra"~<rn from the AUE\1 and 
l. This refer<> to a group of building workerb who were a.c.cebted. and chart:!,eci. 
Hith a number of offences, including con::;piracy, arising out of events 
during the 1972 National builciing worker::.;' strike. 
2. Thio3 information a.co~:;e out of variou.s 'Norning ;::;ta.c' reports and interviews 
>-Ii th occupation leaders. The figure is the tip of an iceber5 and refe.cs 
to situation:::; where the organisation h; found. to have given some kina of 
support to the 'Norning Star' and/or has CPGB members in leaaing position::;. 
'j. The information is limited to reports appearing in the 'r1lorning .::>tar' over 
the period and is thus to be taken as an underestimate in each case. 
L}. 'Ihese organisation;s were draHn from at least 10 major industries. 
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the crGHU but also from SOGAT, NUVB, NSM'ti and the NUM; six national bodies 
were also associated with the LCDTU including the TASS and CEU sections of 
the emergent AUEH1 , the National Youth Commit tee of TAt;;~/, ::iOGA'r, ACTT and 
the \nT"lP. 
Trades Council Organisation: The succe::.G of bodies like the LCDTU 
could not have been achieved had the CPGB not been so firmly entrenched within 
important sectors of the trade union movement, including trades councils. 
The importance of such bodies for a party like the CPGB has been summed up 
.thus, 
"The trades council, like the joint shop-stewards' committees in several indust-
ries, ••• (provide) a natural platform for radical and 'militant' criticism 
of official union policy and one from which would-be rivals to established 
leaders would advertize themselve~;. 
For organised oppositionalist factions the joint shop-stewards' 
committees at the work-place and ·the trades councils in the locality could 
be seen as offering the basis of an alternative system ••• to that of the 
national unions, cutting across the latter's structure and particularly 
adapted to mobilize class, rather than sectional, labour sentiment" (4). 
Indeed the CPGB have not been slow to mobile rank-and-file support for certain 
. . 1ssues using trades council and shop-steward committee organisation and, at 
times, even where this conflicted with official union policy. 
The CPGB had considerable influence on trades council affairs prior 
to the issuing of a TUC anti-communist document in 1948 and conseQuent banning 
of CPGB members from standing as trades council delegate:,). The ban set back 
the Party's efforts in this direction for some time. Those trades councils 
1. The General Secretaries of both sections were leading CPGB members. 
2. ThiB body wab heavily dominated by CPGB/YCL members anci the ;secretary was 
a Party member. 
J. The General Secretary of thi::s union ~<ra;5 a long-standing CPGB member. 
1-t-. H .A. Turner, 1962. 
5. The document Na::> called 'Defend Lemocracy' • At the TUC Congress the year 
earlier (1947) at least one communist wa~ elected onto the dx member 'rue 
''l'rad.es Councils Joint Consultative Committee'. 
l~~4!2 ~ 
that ignored the ban were disenfranchised. by the General Council1• 
It is difficult to say just when the ban began to bryak down but 
\ . 
by the mid-1960s CPGB members were once again firmly entrenched in a number 
of trades councils throughout the country. They v1eren 't, however, represented. 
at the annual conference of trades councils. As CPGB influence grew-rapidly 
during the next few years of socio-economic crisis the Party felt that the 
time had come tc ·-press for the removal of 'the ban. This was achieved at the 
1972 TUC Congress by a resolution moved by Eddie Narsden,the communist 
General Secretary of the CEU section of the AUEW, and supported by another 
comnlUnist - Lionel Jacobs - from the ASTNS union2• 
Shortly after the lifting of the ban the Annual Conference of Trades 
Cmmcils was attended by at least fifty card-carrying CPGB members as delegates3·~ 
The General Council Report in the lead up to th~_l97J TUC Congress was moved 
to caution that the lifting of the ban did not extend to any "association of 
trades councils with the Communist Party or any subsidiary organisation of 
that bodyn4• Trades coun~il association with the LCD'rU, however, was a~ead.y 
a fact of life which the General Council appeared constrained to act against. 
It is difficult to assess the extent of influence which tne CPGB ha.s 
within trades councils. Again figures are hard to obtain. Nonetheless, 
experience of one region of the CPGB suggests that their influence is.very 
' 
substantial. Thus, for instance, in the '.W+:ti:'V~East _region~ of' ·th~·-
. I 1 . 1·,. i 1 
country the CPGB had around eight-hund.ced members ih the early to mid 197Us. 
Trades councils numbered eighteen active bodies and no fewer than fifty-four 
1. For exa,mple, they moved against the .tJagenham trades council in 1949 for 
i.Miting 2.. CFG.B .3pea'ker to Bi:dre;:;·:s a. maet.ing. 1n 1Y5,J they cieregb'G9red 
the Hackney, 3tepney and \'iood Green bod.ie:c; for failing to provide- ii proof 
of their ability or willingnes:::> to \Wrk loyaly within Congre;;;s policy". (TUG 
Congre~:s Report, 1950, p.lo6). 
2, Interestingly Jacob5, despite the long ban, had been both preoident and 
vice president at trades council level anci pre:..;ident at trade;s council 
feJ.eratio:J level fo.c 2Cl yea:c, of the ban·~ suppo~eu operation. 
J. Intervie\'l with Bill Kerris;;; one of the t:PGB memberG who attended that t:onfarence. 
4. TUG Annual Cong~e~~ Report, 197J,p.5J. 
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CFGB members were active within seventeen of them. In several cases CFGB 
members held important posts on these bodies. The same was true at the higher 
levels of County Associations of ·rrades Councils and when it came to elect 
an officer from the region to be represented on the national body a CFGB 
member obtained more votes than the other three candidates combined. 
\ 
Hhile it is difficult to generalise from this one regional example 
it is possible that the CFGB's influence on trades councils is stronger 
where infact their Party organisation is stronger. At a low gueas they have 
some influence in around seventy trades councils1 or approximately 15,% of 
those in England and Wales2 • 
District and Regional Trade Union Organisation: The CPGB have been 
particularly successful in gaining some influenpe in those unions with 
district or regional structures which enjoy some degree of autonomy and which 
draw their strength directly from the grass roots level. 'fhis has been the 
case in the AUEW and the NUN. 
The AUEH: In a large majority- of AUEW Distriot Committees there 
can be found at least one member of the CPGB. On a good number of these 
the Party member can be found holding the key post of either Secretary or 
President. For example, one brief surve? revealed that at least twenty-three 
CPGB members were active District Committee member;:; of important AUE1v District 
Committees4 during the period 1971-75. Of these,nine were full-time ~ecret-
aries and a further seven held the post of President. In addition a survey 
1. This figure is aJ:ri.ved at by adding the 17 from the North East Region to the 
L~O refered to as being associated with the LCu.ru plus a fucthec lJ repo.cted 
- over the period 1:171-75 - a::; having in <3ome •·my iOUpported the 'Hontint5 ~)tar'. 
2. ln the period 1971-75 the variou:=-; ·rue Annual .heports reveal an average of 
430 recognised trades councils. 
J. A ~mrvey of 'Mo:r·ning Jtar' reports over the periorl supple.mented by per;:..,onal 
knowledge of various of the activiots involved. 
Lr. These included !'1\anchester, Glasgow, .Birmin6ham (we<3t), 0tockport, Coventry, 
and London (North). 
of AUEI{ District Committees1 reveals some degree of CPGB influence on at least 
' 
twenty-eight; twenty-three of which are in addition to those mentioned above. 
Thus thB CPGB have some significant influence on at least forty AUE:~l District 
bodies. Arguably,- this influence has been more than token. ~~ithin the AUE~I 
the CPGB has, for some time, operated at the centre of an inner-union 'Broad 
Left' faction. This faction works to effect certain :policy decisions and 
changes within the u."YJ.ion and to get various of its cadres elected to a variety 
of lay and full-time union :posts. The 'Broad Left' was particularly success-
full in the late 1960s/early 1970s in getting a large number of its activists 
elected or re-elected to key :posts including that of President and for three 
of the seven ~ecutive :posts. It was also influential in gaining official 
.AUEW support for the :political strikes of March_lst and 18th 1971. It did 
_,-· . 
this at two levels. Firstly through :policy resolutions through union channels 
and by capturing important union :posts and secondly by the fact that a large 
number of district committees committed their support to political strikes 
:prior to these dates. 
Finally, the fact that AUEW .llistrict Committees of the Engineering 
Section are automc.tically composed of a group of J-6 shop stewards elected 
directly onto them has allowed the CPGB a vital extra channel for its activists 
to get onto sucJ:l bodies2 •. · 
. ~~· .... :. 
'·· 
·, ~ .· . .· . 
The NUN: The CPGB have long had a significant· impact on·the affairs 
of the Niners' Union dating back to the Niners' Federation of Gt.Britain. 
The Party strongholds continue to be in Scotland and in ;:>outh ~~ale;;; but by 
the a-pproach of the 1970s the Kent Area of the NUl>l vras firmly U."lCler communist 
l. 
2. 
.. ··~. 
A :::urvey of 'i·lorning ;:>tar' reports detailing tho<:e bodies associated with 
the LCDTU and those supporting the 'Horning dtar' in one form or other. 
In a~dition to the detailed i~fluence, of the CPGB within ~hop st~ward 
comm1 ttees one report has est1mated tnat around one 1n th1rty AUE'd shop 
~.;teward.;:; are cg_rdca.r:r:ying CH.iB activi.,t.~, H.'raylor, 197 
rn a case. kno¥'to myself one UPGB member who had been defeated in an election 
to be returned to the local AUE~I District Committee gained a :place J months 
later by stand~ng as a shop steward: he had been defeated at a branch vote. 
,: . 
,,:-
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leadership and important Barty gains were made in rorkshire and in Nottinghamshire. 
At national level two of the three NUM General ~ecretaries to-date have 
1 been uPGB members : the third, La1-rrence Daly, was an ex-.t'arty member who was 
el~cted with the support of the CPG~ machine within the union. 
The key to CPGB power within the l'llJH lies in the autonomy enjoyed by 
the union 1s Area ~;ommittee structure: this was a result of the heritage of the old 
federalist ivlFGB. with Areas having automatic representation on the union i~ational 
~xecutive Co~nittee the Communists have been assured, for many years, of a 
significant representation. ·.rhe gains made by the .t'arty in r10ttingham and rorkshire 
helped to add to the .t'arty representation on that body. 
Despite claims to the contrary2the CPGB have had an important influence 
on the direction of the Nm1. It is true that throughout the 1960, despite the 
existance of a Communist General secretary, the union's ~;ommunist led left made 
little impact on achieving a united policy to fight pit closures or to tackle : 
other pressing issues:. that is not to say, however, that they did not attempt 
to unify the workforce. One of the keys to unifying the winers, as the left saw 
it, was to achieve the abolition of the piece-work system and replace it with the 
introduction of a national day-wage system. The ~PGB were the main proposers of 
this plan which was launched in their publication 'A Future for the fliners 1 (1965). 
The Party intention was the unification of the miners to struggle against erosions 
in conditions and jobs in the industry. un the face of it this appeared as if 
they were flying in the face of their assumed strategy in other industries where 
1. Arthur Horner and Will .Paynter. lnterestingly, the i"arty ha~> com;istently 
failed to.win the aesidency since the inception of the NUM; all four Presidents 
have been right-wing Labour Party members opposed to the Communist Party. The 
Party's lone succest; in this field v1as quickly eroded: in 1960 they supported 
a fellow traveller, E.Hachen, who won the ballot but died immediately prior· to 
taking up office and in the re-election Communist Abe 1'loffat was defeated by a 
right-wing candidate. 
2. Cf.R.Jenkins, 1960; J.D.Edelstein & M.Harner, 1975. 
supported local level bargaining. Infact, support for this new;line brought the 
\ 
. 1 
Party hostility from some left-wing quarters • Indeed, the new national system 
stood to shift the ground from almost self-regulatory supervision towards a 
marked increase in direct supervision2 •. Nonetheless, 
11The Party recognised that in raising all wage negotiation to the national level 
one of the main factors inhibiting the common action and unity of facemen and the 
lower-paid day-wage men would be removed. · Now the facemen would be in the same 
boat as the outbye workers, both having to win wage increases at the national 
leveL However, it was also recognised that the new wages system for faceworkers 
would sooner or later result in the re-direction of their militancy away from the 
individual face, district or pit level, and towards the sphere of national barg- · 
aining. 
· Inevitably this would result in considerable pressure being brought to 
bear on the NUM leadership, and with increasing rank and file pressure for firm 
action on pay, the role of the Left in the NUM would be considerably strengthened11 (J). 
·Meanwhile events slowly began to take shape .. The NCB, for its own 
strategic reasons4, introduced the National Power_.Loading Agreement in 196.5 and 
made provision for the eventual equalisation of fa.ceworkers' wages throughout the 
country.5a1ongside the progressive elimination of contract work and its replacement 
by a day-wage system. 
In 1968, despite a fierce attempt, the right-wing failed to win the post 
of General SecretaryshiP in the election of that yeara Lawrence Daly defeated 
·-- . >fl:)' . . 
Joe Gormley in a closely fought contest?~ By now the new wage system was begiming 
to· have the desired effect. and pressure was coming to bear on'· the National Executive 
1. 
2. 
J. 
4. 
,5. 
Cf. D.Douglass, 1972. 
I.Rutledge, 1974. 
Ibid. 
Cf. Rutiedge, op cit. The NCB had hoped that the scheme would lead to a 
reduction in the number of industrial disputes which occured throughout the 
coalfields, and that it would keep back the wages of the stronger elements 
within the industry. 
This was finally achieved in 1971. 
Committee to push ahead with a national pay claim. The following year a series of 
unofficial strikes on this issue broke out throughout the Yorkshire coalfield 
and, at times, supported by the Scottish and \'/elsh miners. 
At the 1971 NUN Annual Conference the time rras ripe for the CFGB to 
press ahead with the new found militancy within the Union. The Scottish Area 
successfully put forward a resolution for a substantial· pay increase and with the 
proviso that the NEC be instructed to use industrial action, if need be, to 
achieve the claim. 
In the meantime negotiations between the NU!vJ. and the NCB were severely 
hampered by the new Conservative Government's insistence that any pay al'rard should 
be in line with their incomes policy. Communists on the NUH's executive wer.e 
subsequently active in pressing for an all-out strike. Once the strike was 
undenray one of the key turning points of the struggle - the 'battle of Saltley 
Gates' -was, by-and-laxge, attributable to the organisation of the CPGB1 
"\fuen the Yorkshire miners cont~cted the ]?arty's Birmingham offices for helJ? 
during the 1972 coal st:r:ike, it was forthcoming. The communists were able to 
call out 10,000 engineers to man the picket lines at Saltley coal depot on 10 
February" ( 1) • 
In the wake of all this militancy - and its successful results - the NUM 
Left made further gains. In 1973 all three Yo:r:kshire National Executive Committee 
seats were won by the Left2 ; a fact never before achieved in that Area. In 
Nottingham a further unique situation occurred with the election of Communist 
Joe i~helan to on.e of the Area's · NEC seats. And that same year Communist Hick 
li[cGahey vron the Vice Presidency of the Union. Thus, coming up to a further 
impending dispute situation, the CPGB was able to estimate that on the NUH's NEC, 
"the solid left wing will have at least 11 of the 27 voting executive positions"] 
1. R.Taylor, 197~. 
2. Former-CP militant, Arthur Scargill, won the Presidency. Left-winger Owen 
Briscoe won the post of Area General Sec.retary,and Communist Peter Tait won 
the remaining po:>t on the NEC. 
J. 'The t1orning star', 25th April 1975. 
and of these six were CPGB members - one of whom was shortly to hold the vice-
"d 1 presl ency • 
By the time talks had broken dmm again a new Niners' strike was shortly 
embarked upon following an overtime ban and vrork-to-rule. Tbtf>'o result is well 
known. '!he Conservative Government, facing a direct challenge to its statutory 
Incomes Policy imposed a '3-day working week' on industry. Hhen that failed to 
shift the Hiners a General Election wa:3 called, on the issue of 'who runs the 
country- Unions or Government?', and the Conservative Government was defeated. 
Certainly the Niners, on the one hand, had been under a lot·of pressure from 
declining conditions and a series of pit closures while, on the other hand, gaining 
a sense of industrial power from the changed oil supply situation2• \~hat the CPGB 
did was to provide the pressure for structural changes which helped unify the 
Miners. They were then to the fore in providing the direction and leadership for 
the' new found militancy and, at crucial times, played a vital role in providing 
solidarity action from other sections of workers. 
~y: Beyond the AUE.:W and the NUN the CPGB have managed ·to gain a 
number of district and regional positions in va:dous unions. They have, for 
exa,mple, been particularly successful :in A:.:'T'NS and to ~:;ome extent in UCATT and the 
TG'ilU. There is little doubt that a sizea9le minority of trade union lay and 
full-time officials at this level are CPGB members and, as such, will have a 
significant influence over certain areas of industrial actionJ. 
National Trade Union Organisation: Once again the CPGB can be found to 
have a substantial number of its activists holding national union office. A brief 
1. ·The vice-pre;:nnency Ha3 to prove an important position i'or the CPGB during the 
197L~ National Strike; providing an important platform. ln 1976 i'lcGahey VIas 
effectively the President on many occassions vrhile Joe Gormley was involved 
l·rith the EEC Coal and steel consultative council. 
2. Once the Arab states had realised their poNer to affect oil prices to their 
advantage this made other forms of energy much more important than they had 
been previously. 
J • A bri. ef survey - dravm from 'Ivlornin~ 0ta~' re:portG ( '71-76) and persOrk'"Ll knov1ledge -
f3hOWG at least 46 CPGB members hold1ng lb reg10nal, plus a Tut; & an $TUC post. 
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survey reveals that, at the very least, in the period 1971-75 there was a Communitt 
on the TUC General Council, two others held the STUC posts of General Secretary and 
Vice-President, three others in the post of Union General Secretary and one as 
·General Secretary of a Union Youth Committee, three in the post of Assistant-
General Secretary, five holding Union Presidencies and one Vice-Pre~;idency, one 
with a National Union Chairmanship, one editor of a Union Journal, and one Union 
1 National 'l'reasurer1 • In addition· to these nineteen' offi.ce:vs a further twenty-six 
can be found on Union National Committees. Looking at the figures for individual 
11nions the evidence is of an even greater Communist representation. Taylor (1974) 
for example, claims that "the communists can reckon to elect 15 of the 52 members 
to the (AUEW'11s )delegate conference "2• He also estimated that, at the time, there 
were at least two communists on the UCAT'r Execut~;e Committee, four each .on .that. of 
the NUR and the UPH, and ten on the TGWU Executive). Taylor also confirms that 
there were six communists on the NUN Executive. \1ilson. (1972) indicates that in 
the period of the late 1960s at least a quarter of the WLTU Executive were CPGB 
members. Added to this~list·. is .. the fact·that 0 in the early 1970s, a major.ity·of the 
TASS Executive, six of the ASTNS.National Executive and at least three AUEW 
Engineering Section national officials were CPGB members. This gives credance to 
the claim of Taylor (1974) that, "10 per cent of (national) officials in the trade 
union movement are card carriers". 
Hhile the CPGB have suffered various defeats towards the approach of the 
1970s on balance the period seems to have been something of an advance. The ban 
on CPGB member::.; holding o:D'fice in the TGWU was dropped by the turn of the '70s. 
In the d.raU[;ht;smen section of the Engineering Union a communbt gained the position 
l. 
2. 
J. 
Remarkably the editor of the ASTf1S Journal was concurrently, at one point, the 
editor of the CPGB backed 'Labour Nonthly'. 
Ny own research bears this out. 
Hhile this figure appears exaggerated it seems to be supported by Eric Jacobs 
of the 'Sunday Times' (Business News, 231:d. Nov. 1975.) 
of General Secretary in 1')731 • . In the >;Jeaman'.:; Union (lfUJ) a number of reversal::; 
2 
of Party defeats in the mid-70s culminated in the return of three Party members 
to the NUS Executive and the election of a CP-Left to the vital poGt of General 
Secretary. Alongside Party gains in industrial unions, such a.s the NUI'i, a number 
of gains were made in the growing and powerful 'white-collar' unions. In the 
early 1970s the first ever Communist was elected to the Executive committee of 
NALGO· and she was joined, in 1975, by another Party member from the Yorkshire 
Region of the Union. In APEX a Communist pulled off a remarkable feat in defeating 
a long established incumbent to· beo<:1me the· firsrt Communist .to' reach that Union's ;; . 
, national committee: that was the early. '70s and he. ha~· be~n.re-elected:.ev.ery yea.c 
since· 3. Party gains were also being made in Ad1'NS and in the NUT where, in 1972, 
one of their members was elected to the post of President. Communists were also 
making striking gains at the very top levels of the trade union movement. ln 1974 
Ken Gill was elected to the General Council of the '£ .U .c; a post he has retained 
ever since and has been joined by another.Pa.rty member in 1978. The following 
year, 1975, James Milne became the first ever Communist to hold the post of 
i full-time Secretary of the STUG4. 'I'he 'IvJorning Star' was moved to decribe his 
election as "a reflection of the growing development of left advance in the scottish 
trade union movement ,,5 . Infact, if it had not been for the death of the S'l'UC 's 
1. This crucially strengthened the Left in the AUEW. Ken Uill joined the Left-backed 
Engineers' leader Hugh Scanlon and the CPGB General Secretary of the Construction 
Engineering Section. 
2. In 1971 two Communists had been unseated from the NUi:i Executive. 
3. The· iil.ctlin~nt .was in a very· good· position being employed in the n.egional office 
of the NCB wh:iJ.ch employed thou;;;ands of APF~X organbed clerks. '£he· C9mr,n.mist, on 
the other hand,Nas handicapped in that he was employed as a full-time district 
secretary ;).f hb rarty and >.;a<.; a Union member out of political l'rinciple only, 
i.e. , he was not concerned to press the GPGB leaden.ihip for higher wage'-', etc. 
Nonetheless, Green won the election by a very large margin in a four cornered fight. 
I+. Hilne was elected w1animously. He had previously been Acisistant General .:.>ecretary 
and STUC Chairman. 
5. 15th April 197.5. 
Communist Vice-President - in 1971 - the Party would have made even greater 
advances. 
'l'he results of Union elections is not a simple list of CFGB members 
filling positions it represents a series of activities and events out of which 
election gains were only one element. The exact role of the CPGB is difficult 
to unravel because in almost every union tb'ey operate within the framework of 
a 'broad left' organisation. It is nonetheless clear that in almost every case 
they have been the key sector of the broad left - providing leadership and policies 
to be followed. In virtually all of the major political struggles of the 1970s 
the Communist Party played a key role- the Niners'·strikes; the various Engineering 
Union strikes against the NIRC; the call for a General ~trike in the face of the 
arrest of the Pentonville Five; and the numerous _political strikes organised by 
the LCDTU. 
The CPGB at National Level - the TUC: The strength of CPGB representation 
at TUC Congresses has been sizeable during the late 1960s/ early 1970s and in certain 
cases this strength has achieved some notable results. A survey of one small and 
very weak CPGB district, in 1972, reveals that at least eight Party members were 
elected - from four Unions - to be delegates to that year's TUC Congress. It is 
likely that nationally a sizeable number were so elected. This is confirmed by 
a brief survey of the delegates lists for the 1973 and 1974 TUC Congresses1a 
respectively at least thirty-four Party members (from twelve unions) attended one 
year and thirty-three (from fourteen unions) the next year. By the late 1970s 
the Party's 'I'1orning Star' were claiming that over one-hundred of their members 
2 
rrere at tending the 1978 'l'UC Congrer.;s • 
1. '.rhis survey merely amounts to a recognition of CPGB member~ from the delegates 
list reproduced in the TUC Annual congress Reports. Naturally, the figures 
arrived at will underestimate the number. 
2. September 9th, 1978. 
Numerous examples of CPGB initiated policy could be ~ited as indications 
of hm1 'rUC policy has arisen out of the Party's activities~. ll'or example, at 
the 1972 Congress the delegates voted to set up an annual TUC Youth Conference. 
The successful resolution was moved by a Communist Executive Committee member of 
a particularly unmilitant union and the re~mlt represented a victory for the Party's 
youth organisRtion (YCL) which had been studiously working for the establishment 
I 
of such an organisation for some time. At that same Congress another Communist 
successfully moved a resolution calling for the removal of the existing ban on 
communists from taking part in important aspects of trades council work. 
In the lead up to the 1973 TUC Congress the Communists were active··· 
vlithin their stronghold - the AUEH. At the Engineering Section's National 
2 Committee meeting Party policy was nuccessful on a number of fronts· 1 a resolution 
was carried which instructed the Union's EC to -
"press the TUC not to participate in any discussions with the Government on any 
form of wage freeze and to declare that we will not be bound by any decisions 
arising from talks between the T.U.C., trte C.B.I. and the Government which would 
place restrictions ••• upon the free collective bargaining of wages and conditions"3. 
A further resolution reaffirmed the Union's opposition to the NIRC and called on 
the TUC to press all unions into a policy of non-cooperation with the Industrial 
Relations Act and its NIRC~. And a further resolution aimed at the TUC reaffirmed 
Union opposition to British participation in the Conunon I•ia:;cket5. The National 
Committee also went on to instruct its EC "to give support to the 'Labour \•feekly', 
'Morning star' and 'Tribune' in these publications' efforts to publicise the 
policies of our Union, the ·r. U .c. and Labour MOvement"6• ,In regard to international 
l. For, hopefully, obviou"> :ceasons only a few 'harmlesr:>' examples have been .selected. 
2. 1n eo.ch cac:>e ·.re:~oolutions Here moved and. secondecl by a combination of 1 B:r:Gad-Left 1 
and CPGB memberf~. 
3. 'l'he call to the 'EUC Ha::> defeated by about 3-l at the TUG Congress. 
I+. 'l'his re~5olution I'Ta;> al~:;o defeated at the TUC Congre::~, by the closer margin of 
5,573,000 to 4,024,000. 
_5. ri'hi:; IJC•l'<.cy J?Y~ition helped to get the AUE\'i vote:,; ca:>t aza:i.n::;t a consequently 
6. · ~~lu~~~~~c~~!dt~ ~~~ol~~fu~~ -lWf~~~~i~rn~i~-;l~~~i{~~~~r;Y: 'ue~ort of Proceedings of 
the 'l'hird AlJ~\--1 (EUGinecd::ng·· ;)~~-!~on~· l~atlonal Commlttee, 1973 •. 
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trade union links the NC meeting voted to seek "the utmost co-operation and 
fraternal relations Hith the (communist) H.F.T.U." and to call on the TUC to 
initiate "immediate dh;cu:'3Gions betHeen the I.C.F.T.U. and the VI .F.T.U. with a 
vieH to amalgamation". Interestingly, a slightly watered-down version of this 
latter section Has successfully moved at the TUC Congress by the Boilermakers' 
Union. \ 
Hith the exception of this resolution (on international trade union 
links) and the Common ~~ket policy statement the Communists might be felt to 
have faired badly at the 1973 ·rue. Infact, they were remarkably successful in 
so far as they raised the political discussion about the need to fight against 
Government attempts to interfere in trade union affairs. On the vote regarding 
outright opposition to the Industrial Relations Act, for instance, Left H.P. 
Joan Maynard has stated, 
"The trade union movement continues its leftward I11:1.rch; it is not a headlong rush 
but it is inexorably moving forward in a left direction. 
The first sign: the four million votes cast for the Amalgamated Union 
of Engineering Harkers' resolution for a complete boycott of the National Indust-
rial Relations Court, a very much more fundamental call than the call to de-
register. For the AUEH resolution was saying: Defy a court; defy the law" (1). 
From another position the Party had cleverly maneouvred to leave a joker in the 
pack. Namely, should the AUEH resolutions be unsuccessful the Union was still free 
to raise the fight itself. This, in fact, it did and such a.ction helped to 
develop opposition to the Act and the NIRC within other unions. 
At the 1974 TUC Congress the CP-led Left had miXed fortunes. They lost 
the central battle in moving Congress against the so-called 'Jocial Contract'. 
\·Iha t they did get through included, 
"A policy for grappling trith the multi-national companies; extension of :public 
01·rmn~::;hip and. inrp:coved policy content of exi.sting nationalLation; 
l. 'Labou.r Honthly', Oct. 1973; p)Jl+7. 
II 
• • reaffirmation of opposition to membership of the E .E .C.; strengthened co-
operation of trade unions at international level; an integrated energy policy 
including nationalisation of all natural resources; pre~suce for a 35 hour working 
week; dissociation of Britain from all use:::; of nuclear weapons and the closing of 
nuclear bases" (1). 
Perhaps a more significant gain was seen in the election to the ·rue 
General Council in which Communist Ken Gill gained a seat along with the left 
NUS leader Jim Slater and hro other ''lefts". 'l"'his "leftward trend", as the 'Norning 
Star" refered to it, was continued at the 'l'UC Congress the following year. On the 
2 
one hand, the right-wing Roy Grantham of APE£ lost his seat , while,on the other 
hand., two new left-wingers gained seats. As the ''rimes' 1ms to put it, 
"The political upset overshadowed some other important changes in representation 
on the general council, which reinforced the trend of recent years towards the 
left. Hr.William Keys, the General secretary of the Society of Graphical and Allied 
Trades, won the printing industry seat in competition against ••• Owen O'Brian, 
General Secretary of Natsopa • • • 
The general council has its first Maoist in Hr.1-teginald Birch, of the 
engineering workers, who took the seat vacated by the moderate Nr.John Boyd •• "(3). 
Key's Union had been one of the few to consistently back LCDTU strikes 
and it was Keys that successfully moved the 1975 TUC resolution calling for 
opposition to the introduction of any law curtailing workplace occupations. 
The election of Birch was not looked on with the same favour by the CPGB. 
The 'Norning Star' reports failed to list Birch among the 'lefts' recently elected 
to the TUC General Council; he is simply listed with "other new members" elected. 
!9e National Union Battle-Front: Apart from mixed, but nonetheless 
significant, results at TUC Cor~resses the CPGB seems to have been the leading 
force behind a Nhole number of battles at various union conferences. For example, 
a report by the 13unday Times' Industrial correspondant (Eric Jacobs), in late 1975, 
1. ri. Smith (TAS3 '.Journal' editor), 197Lr. 
2. Grantham was replaced by the left-wing Musicians Union leader, John Horton. 
He went on to blame his defeat on the Communist Party. "I face the Communist 
Party every year. I shall face them again next year. People have been gunni~ 
for a long time and they take advantage of circumstance;:; to achieve their. ends" 
('The Times', Jrd Sept.l975). 
). Ibid. 
{ .· 445 
was headed 'The Right wins a Battle- but not the War'. He was refering to right-
wing gains in the AUE'i~ but commented that the CPGB and its 'left' supporters 
! Here making headway in the EEPTU, the 'IGtiU and UCA'l'T. Jacobs went on to explain 
hoH it was that communist pressure had won the UCA'l'T union away from TUG pay policy; 
l 
a policy \'rhich, in fact, had been initiated at a previous UCA'rT annual conference .• 
By the 1975 UGATT conference the CPGB and its allies were strong enough to dominate 
and push through a number of radical reforms. These included the introduction of 
periodic re-election for all full-time officers and the lifting of a ban on 
communists taking part in branch political discussions2 • 
At the same time important gains were being made inside the NU0. The 
Union, under right-wing leadership, had been expelled from the TUC in 1972 for 
co-operating with the machinery of the Industrial ~elations Act. With the death 
of the General Secretary shortly afterwards the left not only gained the post but 
returned three Communists to the executive committee and mustered a majority at 
the following Union conference. Now the 'Times' was ~uick to comment that, 
"The political shift in the NUS leadership is likely to pose a fresh threat to the 
TUC's social contract, because the union is committed to pursuing a wage claim that 
would add more than 40 per cent to the industry's wage bill. A demand for ~40 for 
a IJO-hour v-reek will be submitted this month" (J). 
This was a prediction that vras soon realised and the TUC General Council and the 
Shipping Ovmers had to work hard in the ensuing period to prevent a national 
strike of Seamen. 
The Impact of the Young Communist League: Another, albeit small, area 
of >-rork in which the CPGB have had significant successes has been among young 
workers. Until fairly recently it is fair to say that the YCL were ~ political 
l. The '3unday Time:.:; ' , 2Jrd Nov. 197.5. 
2. The 'Times', Jrd Nov. 1975. 
J. The ''rimes', 4th ,Jan. 197.5. 
organisational force among young workers. A primary aim of the YCL has been to 
vrin young workers to join the trade union organisations and, once in, to become 
active members. From there they are ripe for winning to the YCL and then the 
Communist Party. This has had a nwnber of significant implications over the years. 
For instance, many young people have not been easily attracted to the trade union 
movement1 and thus of those which do join many will have been encouraged in, 
through some means or other, by the YCIJ or young CP members. This in turn will 
make them susceptible to .activity initiated by the communists2, and it .will draw. 
them into trade union youth organisations dominated b~ communists3. Given that 
so few trade unionists become firmly committed trade union activists this furthe:r:· 
means that a sizeable minority of activists will have .been trained to some extent 
by the communists. This needn't always work to the advantage of the left but it 
does have a bearing on trade union development. For example, current trade union 
leaders trained by the communists include Hugh Scanlon, Clive Jenkins, Arthur 
Scargil and Jimmy Reid. 
Apart from having some success in involving young workers in CPGB led 
industrial (political) activities the YCL has achieved success in pursuing some. 
of its aims through the TUC. The drive for an annual youth TUC, for instance, 
began at YCL Executive level in 19'70. '.£o further thh; aim a front organisation 
was established under the title the 'Trade Union Youth Congress Committee• ('l'UYCC). 
This body held well attended conferences with delegates officially represented from 
a host of unions. Had it not been for internal dissention Hithin the YCL in the 
late 1970s the annual youth TUC might Hell have come under some degree of YCL control. 
l. 'The report of the '19'71 National Congress of the YCL' claimed that 3 million young 
Horker:,c; unrler the age of 2_5 Herr::: not Lmi.on membe.r:s. 
2. l1ainly the YCL campaigned around such ir:;::;ues as demands . for the full rate of pay 
at 18, clay releac;e for all young Norkers, etc. 
J. The YCL campaigned for the e::;tablbhment of youth committees in each union and 
such things as youth sections of tracle:.o councils. 
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On the question of Horker occupations the YCL also had a degree of 
success. In one case YCL executive member, Pete Kavanagh, initiated occupation 
action at a Lovell'n building site. Kavanagh occupied a crane. At another 
building site it l'ras YCLers that initiated an occupation over Hages. Their role 
\'Tas equally important at the UCS 'I"Ibere :it ifas YCLers that got the engineering 
apprentices involved in the 1·rork-in. In all cases YCL Executive Committee 
members Here involved. In the North East of England in 1972 the Tress Engineering 
oc.cups.tipn was. initiated by the YCL District Organiser who,. at the time, had· 
been employed at the factory only a short time. 
As with the CPGB the role of the YCL in industrial affairs,ip. the period 
1971-75, was largely limited by its size1 • A survey of YCL activists reveals 
the depth to 1-rhich they were heavily involved Hithin the trade union movement 
2/ 
holding a wealth of positions at various levels • 
· 1. That is, up to a point. It cannot be denied that the CPGB was, by now, undergoing 
deep political divisions which must surely have limited its imps.ct on trade 
union affairs. 
2. Surveying the 1971 YCL National congress list of nominations the following 
information is revealed: -
Trade Union Membership TASS/AUEVI - 15; AS~CHS - 10; EEP'rU - 6; NUT - 5; UCATT, 
'rGHU & APEX - 4 each; NALGO, UPW & POEU - 3 each; NUR & CPSA - 2 each; and 1 each 
from - NATSOPA, NUI'1, USDAW, NUGl'1lil, BISAKTA, NUFLAT, NUJ, MU, ATTI, AUT, NPU, TSSA, 
NATKE and GLC Staff Federation: total - 75 of 87 nominees. The remaining number 
were school or college students. 
Trade Union Posts. 13 holding union branch posts; 18 with shop steward~hips; 
7 on area, district or divisional committees; 20 on trades councils; and 2 with 
national positions, i.e., STUC Youth Committee and .l national union conference 
delegate. These 60 positions Here held by only 41 YCLers. The remaining number 
- excluding 6 E!EPI'U members barred from holding office - held no position at all. 
-------·---
,:.}urveying the 19'7:3 YCL Hath)11a.l Cong1:es.s delegate::.> lbt the following information 
iG revealed: -
'.L'racle Union Hembershi:Q. TASS/ AUI~Ii - 27; HALGO & M.lTH0 - 1.5 each; E£PTU & NUT - 13 
each i APEZ - 12; . TGdU - 10; UCATT - 9; NUH & U0DAi'J - 6 each; NUJ & CP6A - 4 each; 
POEU, UPH, NUR - 3 each; NUTG\·1; NUGH\·l, BISA..KTA, HUi::lHi·J, ACT;:;, NUPH: & T08A - 2 each; 
and l each from - AT'ri, NAT;::JOPA, NGA, NUF'LA'£, NUAif, ::>OGA'l' 2c GLC Jtaff l<,ed a total 
- 164 of 255 delegates.. Of the remainder 66 Ttfere either members of the NU.::i(students) 
or the NU3S (school students), and 25 were not members of any organisation. 
Summary. 
\ 
The CPGB has,since the late 1960s through to the mid-l970s, played a significant 
role in the direction of industrial relations in Britain. They have been the 
leading force in the left leadership or:left opposition within a number of trade 
unions and within the delegations to the TUC Congresses. Co~~unist Party inspired 
policy and activity, through various front organisations, has helped to shape 
elements of TUC policy, has contributed to the withdrawal of government policy 
, on trade union legislation ('In Place of Strife') and to the downfall of a 
Conservative Government. In a whole number of ways the role of the CPGB has been 
to further politicise the industrial relations scene· in Britain and to such a 
pitch that new forms of radical actions could appear - including worker occupationso 
\ihen those new actions did emerge it was the Communists who, yet again, 
were to the fore; leading political strikes through the LCDTU and initiating 
workplace occupations such as the one at UCS. 
That is not to say that the CPGB alone provided leadership, nor that 
\they provideQ. the correct leadership. Other, aligned. and~non~a.lign._ed; left L 
. . ~ . 
wingers played important roles. Nonetheless, the role of the CPGB far outstrips 
all the others. Indeed, Leninists have long argued that any revolutionary 
upheaval will far outweigh the energies and numbers of the revolutionary party 
but that the presence of such a party would provide the necessary leadership 
to creater the greater situation. ·While it is not claimed that the CPGB created 
anything like a revolutionary situation their numbers should not be taken to 
imply that their impact has been small. On the other hand, the extent to which 
the CPGB were able to provide a political direction to events was severely limited 
in the size of the Party; one of the smallest in Europe. ~ ..... 
\~hat happened in the early 1970s was that a number of events needed 
certain responses. In order for trade unionists to respond in certain directions 
i.e., in order for them to take more explicit political action, a (political) 
lea,dership wat'> required, and at the level of challenge. The CPG.B fitted that bill. 
It members were by noN schooled in political leadership and rrere entrenched in a 
number of r~~k-and-file union positions. Their philosophy was to turn industrial 
situations into political consciousness raising exercises and this they had been 
engaged in over a whole number of instances. Now the seriousness of the economic 
situation provided them w:i,th a ,crucial v;ehicle to explo:i,_t and they took their 
chances. Active trade unionists facing legal curbs found a vehicle of p£otest in 
the LCDTU's political strike calls and workers facing redundancy were offered 
the way forward in the form of workplace occupations. The CPGB had never planned 
the advent of the worker occupation, nor did it advocate the tactic's use as a 
specific way of challenging capitalism. But what it did do was to school its 
members and supporters to exploit each and every situation that would weaken 
capitalism and raise the fight of trade unionists to a new level. And here we can 
see the real contribution of the CPGB. 
+ + + + + + + + + + + 
CHAPTER 11 
THE WORKER CO~OPERATIVES. 
'"on balance, the worker co-operatives have presented a challenge to property rights • 
.. (The) act of workers running and controlling workplaces in which they were formerly · 
1 employees challenges an essential element of capitalist ideology - concerning 
questions of both ownership and control. (But) the extent (and endurance) of this 
challenge is lit1Lted by the economic situation in which they operate and by the 
limited nature of their initial objectives. The need to survive in a capitalist 
:economy pl~ces ?ertain constraints.on the ~unning o~ a_co-operative and c~n 
compel a s~tuat:1..0n ~fhere co-operat~ve management pr~nc~ples can be underDUned ...... 
I . ·'" 
!Introduction. 
[This chapter is concerned with those productive co-ope.atives which arose out of 
r·' workplace occupationSduring the :period 1971-75- Their inclusion here is due 
Ito the attention which they have received and the claim - stated and implicit -
1that they somehow represent .a. further_ radical deve-lopment in industria~ aci;.iqn. r·· . ·.·.. . .. -.-.. .. . ............ ··- .... · - .. ··.· , . .. . - -
The chapter is concerned to take up the argUement about the nature of 
jsuch organisations through an examination of their economic (and ideoiogica.l) 
:viability, their leadership and their primary rationale~~ 
It is argued that the'.establishment of such worker co-operatives indeed. 
IP!esented <;~. radical chal!:nge to capitalist rights of ownership and. control; in I - -
imany ways taking the challenge to a new level. But that the nature of the cha.J.lenge 
1was severely limited by the primary intent of the workforce, by the nature of 
!the workforce leadership, by the swall number of actio~s involved, 1by the econom-
i 
ics of the industries involved and by the need to survive in an hostile economic 
political environment. land 
1The New Harker Co-operatives. 
Jin total only six organisations of this type arose out of the two-hundred occupations 
!or 
I 
the period. The first was at the Navan furniture factory in Wales ln'April 1972. 
I 
: :~· 
I ~ I 
i 11. It is not intended here to provide any comprehensive discussion of the develop-
ment of co~operative ventures generally. This has already been more than 
adequately dealt with elsewhere. Cf. T.McAlpine, 1969; P.De~ick, 1974; 
:R .Hadley, 1973; A.Campbell & B .Foster, 1974; A.Campbell, 1976 · 
That same year two others were established, one at the leatherwear factory of 
Sexton and Sons (Norfolk) in ·June, and the other at a small machine•, .·,engineering 
factory (Leadgate Engineering) in County Durham in December. Two years elapsed 
before three more came into being - all with the aid of government financial 
backing: the Scottish Daily Express workers set up their co-operative in July 
I 
lof 1974 as did the motor-cycle workers of Triumph Meriden,, and these were follow-
ted, in November, by the workers of the I.P.D. factory in Liverpool. At the same.· 
I . . • . . . 
jti~e. t~~ ;o~~-e~ ~orkfofces_._:,in occupation called,.·unsuccessfully,:foj:·:~ov~r~nt ·. 
assistance· .in financing similar ventures; the workforces of the Propytex textile 
~actory in Hartlepool and the typewriter firm of Imperial based in Hull. . 
The year of 1974 was a golden year for the worker co-operative and 
-captured the imagination of many workers beyond thei:r- ranks - reaching ·inside the t:::t~:::·w::k::·::: ::~:: :·::ml~ ::::0:e::-o:::t::y~::ure.· ··· ....... ··.· .. 
j 
Fe o~hers had collavsed or had been taken over,. and Tony Benn was an a'L-tost ~pent_ 
la.nd quie-t. voice within the LabOur Cabinet. 
ke Years of Triumph . and Optimism. . 
~For many activists withi~-the British labour movement the lmrker co-operatives 
lrepr~sented a new advance in the fight against capitalism. Like other workforces 
!racing redundancy those at the worker co-operatives had initially responded by 
~ccupying ·their workplace. Unlike the others, however, · these workers went on 
~ot simply to demand the retention of their jobs within the same ownership 
ltructure nor to campaign for a new owner. On the contrary a new demand was 
~ised; one in which it was envisaged that the workforce themselves should become 
rhe.new owners. This, indeed, was a radical departure from the norrr.aJ...::~r~~ union 
,actwn; it was action Hith a resolve which stood to create an entirely new induitr;ia.J. 
'relations' situation. 
I 
.[ 
i 
: ~ 
I 
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Worker co~operatives had begun from workplace occupations and as acts 
of defiance against 'unjust' or·~misguided' closure decisions made by 'unfair' 
managements. As such they captured the headlines in a time when such actions 
were still newsworthy. The action at Navan and, to some extent, at Lea,dgate 
received largely local attention but the occupations at I.P.D., Meriden, the 
'Scottish Daily Express', Propytex,- Imperial Typewriters and Sextan•,s1···att~acted 
nationwide interest. With the same kind of defiant determinism the idea of 
a workers' co-operative was formulated and campaigned and worked for at each--' 
enterprise; actions which fired the imagination of many throughout the labour 
2 
movement .. :• 
The tiny group of workers at Sexton's attracted support for their 
co-operative ventures from workers at ucs3and at Fisher-Bendix4; from the local 
Norwich trades. council a_nd ASTMS bra~ch;_ from women,':;; liberation organisations; 
from the co-operative movement5; and, primarily, from the Scot,t-Bader co-ownership 
organisation. The Leadgate workers received immediate backing from the local 
AuE\•1 district committee, the trades council and from the town's ~.P., JJavid 
-~atkin~ al~hough, inte~estingly,· not from t~e. rwc6 •. Workers at the dcottish Daily 
Express were supported from a number of quarters including the STUC, several of 
Scotland'~ trade Union organisations,and even the Scottish National Party. 
Similarly, workers at I.P.D. received widespread support which included the local-. 
Labour M,P. and support from the IWC. Triumph workers had the active involvement 
: of t})e region:1s TG\W secretary - Bill Lapworth - and a host of other trade union 
support. No less a person than Hugh Scanlon joined Bill Lapworth on the Board 
1. 
2. 
: J. 
5. 
6. 
Sexton's attracted support despite the fact that only 15 workers were involved. 
Navan is the exception here. All that is known about it is that the 2'8 ·lwrkers 
involved, after an eight-weeks.sit-in1 bought out the owners and began a co-operative 
venture. 
The UCS workforce donated £250. 4. They gave,a "large donation". 
The 1975 annual Co-operative Congress urged all br~ches to assist: the London 
Co-operative Party donated ~:250 and Luton. CWS sent :m £50. 
This was the only vrorker co-operative that they did not support in one way or 
another. see K.Coates,l977, p.lJ. 
I .• ..... ) 
,. :~~'+ l 
,f the workers' co-operative. In their campaign to become co-operatives Imperial 
'ypewriter workers received the support of their lhP. and a :feasability report 
~as drafted by the district of the TGWU along with supporters in Hull University. 
'ropYtex also had TGHU support and the backing of almost the entire community of 
[artlepool, including a local soliciter, lecturers from the Polytechnic and even 
;he Industrial Society organisationm Support was also nationwide, with donations 
\ 
!Oming from trade union branches and trades councils. 
·'In the· midst,.,o~~:>this. :wide~pr~ad· enthusiasm1 the Labour GOVernme,nt, J?rodd.fid, 
>Y Industri Minister Tony Benn, provided ten million pounds to help get th;res·,·o:r· . 
.. · . ~. : 
lhe worker co-operatives established. Ken Coates (197&) has since described the 
~vancement represented by the move to establish worker co•operatives and the 
lubsequent government aid: 
Thepr~-f~~d atta~hme~t .of the British people to -~emocratic ideais be~~~~s, today, 
a powerful econonrl.c resou.:Cce in its own right. If the present political leaders 
prove unwilling to recognise this truth in time, they will fall in some ignom;i:ny. 
But the idea of industrial democracy is in the air, and it will find spokesmen 
equal to its promise: Meriden, KME and, yes, the Scottish Daily News have all 
converged, . in the words o:e Tony .B?nn~ ·to l~t. the democratic _genie out , of the : ·. 
bottle. Neither the Queen's horses, nor the Queen's men,. will ever get it back 
in again" (2). 
~ertainly 'industrial democracy was in the air' and the worker co-operatives had 
I .. 
Jlade a con~:r:ibution t~w~~s this but. Coates had. rea~ too much into the situation and 
\ad not sufficiently seen the various weaknesses in each case. 
~a~er~hi p and Intent. 
~o begin with·, it should be made clear that the. move towards worker co-operatives 
involved only a handful of those who had occupied their workplaces; it was not 
movement and certainly not a ~ movement. \lhat evolved, over a tHo yea:r period., 
1as a handful of very weak and insecure enterprises. A widespread movement might 
l. That is not to say that this 'enthusiasm' wa~ general throughout the labour: 
movement. Criticism of worker co-operatives have come, for example, from the 
former IS group; the IMG; and the workforce of Briant Colour Printing. A much 
less explicit critique has come from the CPGB. Cf. K.Coates, 1977-, pp.l7-~8. 
r 
;Introductory chapter. 
~ 
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' 
loth have contributed to a raising of worker consciousness in the direction of 
;orne form of "worker control" and contributed in some economic sense as worker 
:a-operatives estaolished some form of interchange.~ As it happens even the small 
tumber that were established had very little contact with each other and, in fact, 
;wo of the largest - KME anci Triumph - were openly hostile to each other. 
The facts of the matter are that rlo\:.one single worker co-operative began 
\ . i 
!rom the conscious decision of the workers involved to set up an exper1ment in 
l'orker control. In each case some form of co-operative .ncidental~:bonus. ownership was an ~ded,'but .... :'; .. • 'r' • 
Sexton •.s: ~~~ workars. :at·~ ~exton and Sons took action after the company . 
nnounced that the factory was to close. They occupied. _However, this course of 
~[~tion had been embarked upon under the influence . 9t the publicity surround.ing the, 
rhen on-going, ucs wor~-in and the .. initial intent W'as only barely.formulated, . 
lamely, 
To preserve. (their) own skills in leatherwork until. some ideas of sa'{ing the 
1
factory ·had been explored" (1). , 
lv.~n t~en more--than two-thlrds ·of.•.the. origi~i workfo~e· had ~~t ·s~pported the . 
lccup:tion; only fifte~~,. ~e~~ned to figh~ on. . 
In the coUrse of maintaining the occupation the workforce hit on the 
dea of producing small items. of leatherwear which could be sold from a stall at 
le local market2 • This in fact·contributed to the·eventual idea o~ a worker 
a-operative but at this early stage the wor:tceorcewere seeking ways to get a. new 
wner.for the factory- in-the same way as the UCS workers were doing. Certainly 
hey "had a little idea of common...;ownership - but no concrete knowledge") • 
• 
..... _ 
Questionnaire from occupation leader, Nancy NcGrath .. 
They produced belts, skirts, jackets and handbags which were sold from a stall 
at both Fakenham and Norwich markets. 
Questionnaire return from Nancy NcGrath. 
.... 
. . j 
Shortly after this point the workforce were approached by -the ··~cot.t Bader 
:ammon-ownership organisation1with .an offer of help to form a worker co-operative. 
raving ·failed to~find a:: new ~wner·,. and ·by now fairly entrenched in small-scale 
?reduction, the workforce decided to set up a worker co-operative with outside 
1elp and advice. It seems more than evident that the idea of the worker 
~a-operative - called Fakenham Enterprises - originated from the intervention of 
the Scott Bader organisation •. Certainly_this organisation provided the· majority 
of the working capitafand initially held a controlling interest on the BbaDi-of 
-~ :···~. 
Directors. Further, the ICOM - Industrial Common Ownership .Hovement'-:- organisation 
W"as involved and Fakenham Enterprises, 
"provided ICOM with its first experience of working from a redundancy situation 
with only a truncated work-force, lacking any managerial, costing, selling or 
accountancy know-how" (J). 
~~ part-time,:. financial adviser to the new venture was also drawn from ICOH - in 
llh~ form of David Spreckly,the chairman of a:,co;,.,ownarship business called Landsman . 4 Caravans • . . 
·Although providing the initiative for the co-operative venture the 
-··'.·... • & • 
'outsiders', in line with their principles of common ownership, did not ~a~ 
...... 
rny controlling interest in Fakenham Ente:t'J?rises. . _The co-o:pera.tive was establi_sh~d . .--· 
on the basis that all remaining workers had a single one pound share in the new 
rompa.ny while, "the outsiders whO have given us f:i.riancia.l backing don •t ba.ve ani . 
:11. This organisation was founded from '1iberal' principles. It created a common-
ownership situation -with the initiative coming -downwards, i.e., the factory 
Has shared out to the workers by the former owner. See 'This is ICOH. A 
description of the Industrial Common OWnership Movement', ICOH Pamphlet, Jrd Edition, 
Sept. '7.5: 
They provided an initial loan of £2,500 and then further loans totalling ~10,000 
over the following three years. K.Coates, 191'1, p.l2. '::, .. 
'This is ICOr-1 ••• ", op cit, p.15. 
As with Scott Bader, Spreckly - a member 
company with his workforce; a latter-day 
·-
of the Liberal party - had shared his 
Robert Owen. 
. l 
:shares" • The new venture, living up to its name, was to be run on the basis of 
lone share one vote, 
I.,In its organisation, we ldll all be involved in the discussions and decisions -
I 
from the littlest to the biggest. 
We are having only a few directors because we are required to by 
company law. But as far as we are concerned there are no directors: we are 
I just the same bunch of people" (2). 
It was this kind of internal demobracy that led Ken Coates, of the IWC, 
to describe Fakenha.m Enterprises as a brave "experiment' .. which .. ~ .. - · 
"helped. to draw attention to a. time-honoured presc:dption for industri~ :democ:r:acy" (3). 
Such was the measure of the contribution to 'socialist • ideas made by this tiny· 
group of workers. However, it needs to be recognised that the workers• action 
W$~ primarily to save jobs. They succeeded for a while and with outside initiative 
and. finance and as such it was a very.limited. 'on~laught' on capital •.. 
The Lead.gate: In a similar vein the workers at Leadgate Engineering 
occupied their factory in response to a closure thr~at. · Once again only a thi~ 
., 
• 
of the workforce became involved in. the initial occu:pa.tion; two-hund.red:'out o£ 
. . .·.. . . . . . . . . . .·::-
three-hundrE!d left -the works withou~ a fight.. The.la.tter !fere no~ untypica.l of 
:the town, on the contrary, the occupation was an outstanding event. Consett, in 
• North 'fest Durham, had been dominated for many years by a· combination of right-. 
wing catholic elements working through the conservative BISAKTA union. 
Inside the occupation the leadership was not untypical of th~ locale. · 
The convenor, Fred Carlyon, had no history of militanc.y and if anything. stood to . 
'the right of centre within the Labour Party. Ask~d by· the local press if he was .. 
l. 'The f1orning Star,. 18th July 1972. 
2. Ibid. 
J. l971,pp.l2-lJ. 
-··- ........ . 
·· ... . 
.. 
. .... 
a militant Carlyon replied, somewhat vaguely: 
"If by militant you mean a person who stands up for his rights, then I'm a militant"(l). 
In fact, sometime prior to the occupation Carlyon had played a dubious role within 
the union. In his own words; 
"! 've made enemies when as a union man among my own people •. I got a communist's 
(union credentials) took off him. I got his job took off him. He' was causing 
unneccessary trouble in the works," (2). 
It was the leadership of men like Ca~lyon that led Leadgate workers into 
an occupation action. A.s 'at Sexton's, it began without any clear idea of'·direction .. 
~ far as Carlyon was concerned there were{'t any jobs in the area.,tc\Tii&y occupied 
~o fight for "human dignity" and "the right to work"J. · The idea of a co-operative 
renture only came later, but it is debatoa.bl6 as to how far the final or,;a.nisation 
l
coeuld justly claim such a title as 'worker co-operative'. 
Once the occupation began the workers, to keep the action going, let it 
. . . . 
known that they would be willing "to consider any off~~ to. take on contract work"4. 
The idea of some kind of a 'work-in' was conceived as a \i8.Y of buying tim.e until 
... 
the company began negotiations on the remaining workforce's future. 'rhey were 
not sounding out opinion on the feasability of a'workers' co-operative. 
jEventually the company did agree to talk when the. occupation workforce announ~ed 
that they had concluded a deal elsewhere to do sub-contract work using com:pa.ny 
machinery5. 
;1. (Newcastle) 'Evening ~nronicle', 18th December, 1972. 
:2. Study tour interview, October, 1976. 
(Newcastle) 'Evening Chronicle', 18th December, 1972. 
'Norning Star', lOth July 1972. 
That is, without the company's permission. 
I 
I 
The subsequent negotiations with the company resulted in an agreement 
that the Leadgate workers should establish a sub-contract unit to receive · 
. kl ~ompa..11y vror .. The company were to provide a loan of £2,500 towards the payment 
::>f the first month's wages and gila.rantee.at least six months sub-contract work 
to help get the unit off the ground. 'lhe local director, William Reed, was to 
act in the capacity of consultant but woul~still be under the parent company's 
em:ploy2 • Thus, in January of 197.3, the new tentu:i::'e came into being; rena.m~d 
'Nightbridge Engineering'. Of the original occupation workforce only thirty_, 
'remained, and of these nineteen were directly employed at Night bridge while the 
1
remained were paid by the parent company until the new venture could abso:t:b them. 
! 
The running of the new venture was stated to be along 'co-operative' 
i 
:lines but there were many in the labour movement that had their doubts, including 
I ._/ 
,the normally supportive I\W. Leading IHC spokesman Ken Coates spelled out these 
,ioubts sometime later, 
;"This situation raised one of the most common arguements about the difficulties 
:of the co-operative strategy: it differed little from the old trade·union 
device of the 'collective contract', which, for various rea.sons, aroused sus-
picion among some modern trade unionists" (J). . · . . . . . · 
Within Nightbridge itself operations were under some form of 'workers• 
'control' • The venture was- run by a Board of Directors made up of six former 
'shop floor workers and Jack Rostron the local AUEii district secretary. · This \. . 
1
Board handled many of the important decisions regarding the runni~ of the factory 
I • .•• 
but various crucial issues were put to full meetings of the whole workforce. The 
! 
1
ract that the venture was run in this way is. an indication of the shift in think-
1 
; 
:ing of certain trade unionists and of the Leadgate leadership in particular. 
11. It was Fred Carlyon's opinion that the company signed the agreement~ ·-·~:thinking 
that we woulC4~'t last the length of time it took to write out a document as~a. 
sub-contract unit", (study tour interview, Oct. '76). 
I 
2~ The company was Stibbe of Leicester. 
! 
1 
I !3. 19'77, p.l). 
I 
J. 
. . -·- -";-·-· --· -·· -····-
DebatablY~P· however, the 'co-operative' spirit only appears to have been half-
hearted and as such this seems due to a weakness in the leadership situation. 
Commenting on the level of 'worker democracy' l'Ti thin the factory one worker put 
it that, 
"Sometimes we just get cat 's tail of the argum..ent with bits rubbed off. But 
mainly they tell you as much as you want to know" (1). 
Apart from a Board of worker directors no attempt was made to alter 
the pay structure within the factory. Old ideas Here taken over with small 
.. 
modification. According to Carlyon, 
i"If you pay the lowest-paid men a reasonable wage the rest will find their own 
level. If you start at the top you find that the man at the bottom is starving"(2). 
Eventually, a year later, faced with the loss of Stibbe work and the 
1chance of a, sub-contract for different work for Churchill Tools Carlyon put ·it 
I 
to the w·orkforce that the choice before them lay between "wrapping it up" or 
"sacking twenty :people ••• and bringing in skills necessary"). The majority 
:chose to leave the venture and share out existing finance while Carlyon and one 
:or two others went on to found. a new - private enterprise - establishment. 
Th~ new establishment was run, under the direct~rship of Carlyon, along 
strictly capitalist lines. The Board "runs the company and has total say within 
it". Carlyon "as the managing director, :passes the instructions down to the works' 
1
su:perintendent, he to the foreman and the foreman to the men; like any other 
, L~ 
factory" • And, as is standard with most firms, the new private Nightbridge 
I 
I 
Q.uotecl in (Newcastle) 'Eveining Chronicle', 27th December 1973. Hhile it is 
true that 'worker democracy' hardly works :perfectly and that such attitudes can 
be found to be expressed even in the 'best' worker co-operative it did not 
seem untypical of the situation Hithin Nightbridge Ltd. Carlyon himself 
pointed out that the venture had "unfortunately ••• lost ·some of~:Jts_ ideals 
as a worker co-operative" (study tour interview, Oct. '76). ··-. :> ., . 
(Newcastle) 'Evening Chronicle', 27th December 1973. 
study tour interview, Oct.'76. 
Ditto. The new Board consisted of a chairman who was brought in from 'outside' 
on the basis of nis investment in the firm to the extent of becoming a one-third 
owner. 
--
firm engaged in sackings and lay-offs. In the first years of operation, up to 
October 1976, the firm sacked "eight or ten" workers and usually "in the first 
month of employment". Carlyon's major lament in this connection was that, 
11 the Employment Act in this country is stacked-up against management"1• And 
these were not the words of a man who had been converted from a left-socialist 
position to one of the right of centre in the Labour Party. They were consistent. 
Encouraged by the militant situation of the time and the pressing circumstances 
at Leadgate a right-wing socialist had led a small group of workers into radical 
action. A combination of both ideological and - more telling - economic weaknesses 
had brought about the end of the advances made and, faced vrith a new situation, 
Carlyon reverted to his old style of thinking and leadership. 
Despite the criticism of the IHC the situation at Leadgate did represent 
__ / 
an advance. ·A small group of workers did manage to wrest some vital control over 
at least a part and an important part of their working lives. The situation they 
were faced with, however, and the weakness of the leadership meant that the 
radicalism was both short lived and failed to have more than a limit~d.''{mpact 
on other workers. 
The 'Scottish Daily Express': Events at the 'Scottish Daily Express' 
must, to some extent, be treated as unique.· The development: of 'worker co- ·-
operativ~si~." holds the potential· of· widely publicising· trade linion · anq.~· .. -''-·' . 
§;oc:ialirst ideas .. , The •scottish :Daily Express' workers had the added ,potezit~al ~ 
-'\· 
- in the ownership of a newspaper - of promoting those ideas. in a regular and· 
powerf~ll fashion. In this t-he role of leadership was_ crucial. In fact, the ' .. 
~tyle of the even~ual 1worker; owned' n~wqpaper .. revealed: S®X""io~ -leadersh:i.p weaknesses. 
1. study tour interview, oct. '76. 
\fhen the Beaverbrook organisation announced the loss of two-thousand 
. 1 . . 
jobs from its Glasgow newspapers in ~hrch 1974 the local print chapels set up 
an 'Action Committee' to fight the decision. Clearly the unions were strong 
and united2 but what a~tion should they take? A key problem lay in the fact 
that they were i11..fluenced by the company's arguement that the transfer of the 
tlasgow papers to Hanchester would help maintain the jobs of print workers 
]elsewhere within the organisation. Thus, f~ the 'Action Conunittee' the 
!alternatives to unemployment appeared few. It was at this point that the'· idea-
,of a workers' co-operative was floated. As Alistaire Hackie, the Action Committee 
!leader, was to put it, 
:"At first when the idea was placed on the Action Committee's agenda ••• no 
' one lWUld give it serious consideration. It Has just too ambitious - yet there 
was no al terna ti ve" (3). 
That the idea of a workers' co-operative/arose out of weakly formulated 
•notions of saving jobs and not out of any major desire to establish· some form 
:of' workers' control is seen in a number of other statements made by Hackie. 
"The entire history of the 'Scottish Daily NeHs' is fou.""l.ded on the determination 
of a group of trade union activists to fight against unemployment. Any other 
consideration was incidental" (4 ). . · . . 
:According to Hackie a majority of the Action Committee, 
:!"simply believed that by effort and organisation they could create employment for 
themsleves through the setting up of a newspaper under a co-operative structure" (5) .-
The papers involved were the 'Bcottish Daily News', the 'Sunday ExpresS..' a:iid 
the 'Glasgow Evening Citizen'. 
A.Nackie, 19771 p.l09. 
Ibid, p.lll. 
Ibid, p.l09 •. (Hy emphasis, AJN). 
Ibid, pp.ll2-113. 
. . ...._· 
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Even the "political" approach of the minority reveals a number of serious 
weaknesses. As I1ackie points out, the minority - "being the more politically 
conscious" - saw the co-operative idea as a "vehicle of :protest". Its 
"successful outcome (being) • 
impossibility but not quite. 
made" (1). 
• • so remote that it appeared almost an 
The effort and the protest would have to be 
Thus, 'l'Thile a majority of the. leadership were primarily interested 
in saving jobs the minority could see no further than the establishment of 
a co-operative as a form of large-scale protest--·~ It was a divided lead:ership 
in which even the "politically conscious" were not fully convinced of the 
viability of a co-operative venture; a lack of conviction that may well be 
counted in their subsequent inability to overcome problems within the co-
operative. 
Further evidence of leadership weaknesses lfas to be revealed in a. 
number of ways in the running of the co-operative itself. True the workforce 
were united in a powerful Federated House Chapel whose st;rength "was difficult 
to match in any national newspaper in :Britain"·2. but it was a unity built 
around specific ends and in opposition to a specific structure - the Beaver-
brook Organisation. Faced with a new task, of stating what it stood for and 
of where it was going, it failed quite badly and again the leadership 
- . 
question was crucial. The establishment of a worker co-operative is relat-
ively unproblematic in manufacturing concerns such as domestic heating 
production or motor cycle production. There will be relatively little 
dispute about the nature of the product to be manufactured. This is not 
------------------------~-------------------------------------------~------~ 
1. A.Mackie, 197,, p.ll2. 
... ....... 
2. Ibid, p.109. 
the case with the production of a newspaper. A domestic heater only reflects 
on the worth of a co-operative in so far as it is a well made item. A news-
paper, on the other hand, can potentially reflect the very values and ideology ,-· 
of those running such a venture. It was a challenge that was to a large 
extent to break and divide the co-operative leadership. 
The unity that a workforce might build around production of the 
same products but under workers' control just could not be sustained when 
it concerned the philosophy of the product; the philosophy of the newspaper 
that was to be co-operatively produced- 'The Scottish Daily News'. This 
was to be expected in a situation where the Action Committee consisted of 
a combination of "Labour sympathisers with perhaps two or three SNP 
sympathisers" and a communist or two1 • Coupled with this the entreprenurial 
Labour M.P. Robert Maxwell was involved in the. -venture in a managing role 
and the chairman of the Scottish Nationalist Party, William 1'/olfe, was 
involved as a financial advisor. Reflecting this diversity of interests 
and the leadership's inability to come down firmly in one way or another 
Alistair Mackie announced, immediately prior to the new paper's launch, 
that it would be, 
"Scottish, independent and radical - politically liberal with a small case 
'1' It (2). 
In fact, over the paper's sho~t life its identity altered from 
. day to day and from page to page. Part of the problem appears to lie in 
the fact that, to begin with, editorial direction was left to the journalists 
on the paper instead of being open for discussion generally among the workforce. 
1. A.Mackie, 1977, pp.ll2-llJ. .. ...... 
2. The 'Morning Star', 2nd April 1974. 
·I 
('·. ,-· .. :·· 
\·A~~::, ..•.. ~ 
Yet even here Hackie, the most able of the Action Committee, appears unable 
to draw the lessons. The problem lies not with the fact that editorial 
direction was left to the journalists but rather, according to l'J.ackie, that 
::r ..... • 
those journalists were not compet~nt enough to handle the situation. 
"They were • ~ • given a chance no other group of journalists had ever pre-
viously been offered - the right to determine the editorial content of their 
own newspaper. (But) sadly the editorial content did not rise to meet the 
aspirations either of the workforce or of the Works Council. 
(They) seemed unable to produce a page with a distinct identity. 
The effect was that the paper's philosophy varied from pag~ to page and 
story to story. (They) were not expe~ienced in their roles, and were 
selected more by their contribution to the struggle to create the paper, 
than by their individual talents" (1). 
t1ackie could only see a way out in the appointment of an ·editor 
"who had not been part of the struggle and whotherefore could be objective" 
in his choice of editorial staff2• It indicates that ~~ckie, and others 
around him, had adopted the old methods of overall control in regards to 
editorial content of a newspaper. 
Ultimately the character of the leadership and the nature of the 
workforce's commitihentt- to co-operative principles was to be revealed in 
the support given to Robert Maxwell in his efforts to gain effective control 
over the direction of the paper. With the setting up of the co-operative 
paper the Action Committee had been transformed into a "Works Council" 
charged with oversee1ng the running of the venture. ·Initially this body 
was led by Mackie and a majority sympathetic to his slightly left of centre) 
I 
position. Slowly but surely Robert Max,well appealed to the workforce for 
the removal of those who opposed his own direction and he succeeded. Early 
1. Mackie, 1971, pp. 131-1)4. 
2. Ibid. 
). Durtng an interview with foriAer· 'Horning Star' Scottish indus_t.:r:ial journalist 
- Arthur Nilligan - Mackie was described to me as "a middle-of-t~he-road 
Labour man who has recently found militancy". (Interview, July 197 5). 
--· 
on "politically conscious" elements James lilcNamara. and Charles Armstrong 
were removed. Later Maxwell turned his guns on Hackie and James Russell 
(a financial journalist). In-t;aresti"Iigly, he was able to appeal to the 
l~orkforce to remove them on the grounds that they ~ committed to some 
form of co-operative principles. A 'Sunday Times' report on the affair 
is particularly revealing: 
"Maxwell's method was to denigrate the works council as incompetent fools 
more interested in political experiments than producing a successful news-
paper, and to appeal to the workforce over the head of the colincil,--ho].ding 
·himself up as the only man who could save their jobs b"ecause only he could 
raise advertising revenue. By playing on the workers' worry that they 
could not only lose their jobs but their investment • • • I1axvrell broke 
their spirit to such an extent some of them began to wonder if their· 
. critics had been right: that running a business should be left to m.an.a.ge-
ment. "We've got to face it", one of the workers said after a particularly 
stormy meeting, "we need to feel the master's whip". "(1). · 
The emphasis on saving jobs and through the reliance on old 
style management, as described in the 'Sunday Times' report, resulted in 
a vote of three-hundred to twelve in favour of l1ackie and Russell's removal 
from the works council. 
Very shortly thE! political mess within the paper was to be 
caught up with the economics of running a business of this ·type and the 
newspaper's life came to a..YJ. abrupt end. 
In the end the idea of a co-operative newspaper had been an 
inspiration to many throughout the Scottish labour movement and beyond. 
The fact that a good part· of the finance had come from the Labour Government 
and representing a victory of the Tony Benn 'left' inside the Cab:Lnet 
added greatly to the sense of importance attaching to the opening of the 
co-operative 'Scottish Daily News'. In short, the event had tremendous 
ideological value for the forces of socialism within the labour mciveme~t. 
1. Report by Ian Jack, Phillip Knightly and James Fox, 'How Naxwell Sabotaged 
the Harkers' Dream', 21st Sept. 1975. 
r 4JJ€f) :~ 
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For a short, but only a short, while events within the venture were to 
represent an advance in control for those workers involved. However, overall 
the internal situation within the 'Scottish Daily News' far from matched up 
1 to the ideals projected by its launch: the reality did not match the dream,. 
· TriUiiroh Neriden: l1leriden - along with the .K.H.E. co-operative -
has served as a beacon light of co-operative principles. If any ideological 
"" . 
strength can be said to have been drawn from the advent of worker co-operatives 
then :Heriden can claim· much of the credit.. It is the example· that has Illallged 
' --
to divert attention from many of the shortcomings of the others •. 
As with sit-ins at'other factories facing closure the workers at 
the Neriden works began their action very much as a protest action aimed at 
buying time. The action did not begin with the aim of wresting control and 
establishing a workers' co-operative. i'Jhen, (•without any prior notice or 
I ). 
consultation"··{, the company announced that the works were to be closed 
within months the workforce imposed an immediate emb~go on the movement 
of finished products (motor-cycles) and plant from the works. The managing·· 
director, Dennis Poore, responded to this actionby announcing that the·· 
works would now be closed down immediately. At this point the workers 
escalated their action and staged a sit-in. Their previous action had been 
a kind of 'work-in', with the workforce continuing production but exercising_ 
control over: .its dist:;r:ibution~ Now the workforce sat-in and extended::control 
over plant and the production itself: they offered to release from the 
factory one new bike for every new order placed but th~s met with management 
1. The situation inside the Scottish Daily News has since been severely 
cri.ticised. l~y Bill Freeman - convener at Briants Colour Print_~pg.: 
........ 
'.'Print u;nions have given good support to them; · not so much the of{:i:cial 
"leadership but from the membership. But they are working machinery ··-
with staffing conditions that are a threat to the rest of the industry. 
Employers say to us openly that they are overmanned and that if they 
could have the sort of staffing that the 'Scottif:>h Daily News' have 
then they could survive better. And, that they wouldn't have_needed to 
close the 'Express' with such a staffing. we (at Briants) wouldn't have 
been prepared to get into that field where to save o~ jobs we would have 
to do something that was harmfull to the movement"~ Interview ,Sent .12?5.. ____ _ 
"6 . i 4. 7~ 
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. t . l 1n rans1gence • 
As with the other co-operative workforces the Meriden situation 
began with a vital weakness in internal support. Over one-thousand of the 
,~eriden.,,workforce~'. did not become involved in the sit-in and left the 
factory once management declared in closed: leaving seven-hundred to 
battle on alone. Unlike other co-operative developments the decision 
to opt for a workers' co-operative seems to have been substantially discussed 
by the remaining workforce prior to any campaign or completion of any 
contracts. The idea itself- i.e., of campaigning for a workers' co-operative 
- appears to have originated from the local TGWU Divisional Organiser (Bill 
. 2 
Lapworth) and local Labour N.P. Leslie Huckfield.. The strength of the 
workforce!J5· enthusiasm for the idea can be seen in the fact that they began 
campaigning to become a workers' co-operative just two weeks after the 
management's closure announcement and only three days into the sit-in,.'; 
·. '/' 
Lapworth and Huckfield were asked to negotiate with the company to this end. 
An added strength in the workforce's enthusiasm vrhich differed 
from those in other occupation situations was a belief in the worth of their 
product·. Possibly in some cases this commitment, as suggested by one 
supp9rter, was stronger than any ''commitment to co-operative principles: 
" (The) 'I'Torkers' enthusiasm for motor cycles and thei:c confidence in their 
l. 
2. 
J. 
· ovm ability to construct them attractively and effectively, were strong-
er than any arid dogma either of the right or the left ••• "(3). 
Cf. E.Johnson, 1975· 
'The Morning Star', 2nd November 1975. Also K.Fleet, 197~, p.92. 
K.Fleet, 1977~ ·_A similar point is to be found in other sourcesa-
The Co-operative Party 'Notes' (Aug.'75) states that, . 
.. The Meriden co-operative was start-ed because the men had. great faith in 
their product and were outraged at the proposal that the "Bonneville,._ 
should cease to be produced at Neriden". 
'The Times', 17th January 1977, similarly reported that, 
"At Kirby the 'I'TOrkers were seeking nothing more than the right to work 
and to escape.the do],e queue. At M~riden therE;) was an emot~ve attach-
ment to the k1nd of JOb. that \faS be1ng done ana, more espec1ally, to 
the product itself". 
; ~ . 
If Meriden workers were in any way committed to the idea of a wo~kers' co-
operative many within the labour movement were not.· 'fhey we~e given a "hard 
time from some trade unions'' and some trade unionists even "hoped to see 
Meriden fail"1 • The idea also met with hostility from various leftist 
political 2 grou:ps ·• A major exception was the I\'IC. This is of interest 
because it is sometimes believed that the establishment of such worker 
co-operatives signalled an advance among the British labour movement, when 
clearly certain sections were not at all happy with the situation?. ? 
It was to be some time after the campaign was begun before the 
Meriden co~operative became a reality. It was, in fact, to be another eighteen 
months before the co-operative began operations, but this provided ample time 
for the workforce to discuss and wo:rk out tha details and principles of the 
co-operative venture. 
The character of the Neriden co-operative was two-sided. On the one 
hand, the production details resembled that at Nightbridge, i.e., a form of 
'collective contract' z the workforce owned the production end but relied 
heavily on the former owners to purchase and market the finished ,product. 
·Ori the other hand, the management and operating principles of the venture were 
along the lines of egalitarianism and strong elements of direct democracy. 
Management structure: The venture began with a Board of eight directors 
responsible for day-to-day decisions. These directors are elected from each 
1. 'Interview with Felix Keane (External Helation.S Nana,6er) -·october, 1)176. 
2. The International ~~rxist 
both condemned the idea. 
No.J, Hinter/Spring 1975; 
Group (lNG) and the International i:;>ocialism Group . 
'Journal of the International Narxist Group' Vol.2 
';:>ocialist \forker', 20th July 1974. "'" .. 
:~: . 
:,.. 
J. Even Neridan's architect and staunchest supporter, Bill Lapworth, did not 
see the establishment of a workers' co-operative as the signal for any 
further developments in the labour movement. As far as he was concerned 
worker co-operatives were "not some sort of panacea for the ills of British 
industry, but a ·course of action in this particular case". 'Norning ;:>tar', 
. 9th october 1975· 
I 
! 
I 
.! 
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of the unions involved. Nanagers are appointed by the Board but neither 
do they bear the title of 'manager' nor do they have the ultimate right of 
di.smissal. All persons performing a supervisory or managerial role are 
refered to as "organisers", and they have the initial right to dismiss 
. . . 
workers. Dissatisfied workers, however, .. can ultimately appeal against the 
decision of an organiser to an 'Appeals Committee' made up of five workers 
1 
elected directly from the shop floor • 
Ownership: Unlike other worker co-operatives the Heriden workforce . 
decided that shareholding should be kept to the bare: minimum required under 
company law, i.e., three persons. The three shareholders each have a one 
pound share but do not have a greater say in the running of the co-operative 
than non-shareholders. They are in effect trustees for the co-operative and 
are bound by trust deed to vote as directed by a majority of workers at a . 
1 t . 2 genera mee 1ng • 
Decision making: Without a doubt the Meriden co-operative is the 
most democratically run of the worker co-operatives, i.e., in regard to 
direct democracy. Directors are all subject to re-election; with a third being 
. ' 
requir~d to put themselves up for re-election each year) •. Najor decisions 
are put to a mass meeting of the workforce and majority votes are binding. 
Regular monthly meetings are held where the workforce receive reports from the 
directors and can raise questions and problems with them. In addition a 
1. Beforeany appeal goes that far it goes first to the Personnel Nanager 
and then - if the person is still dissatisfied - to the Nanaging Director. 
2. Tne co-operative is registered as a private limited company with the name 
"Synova Hotors". Interestingly, the workforce continue to refer to the 
venture as Neriden. "'" ',, 
·::: 
3. The directors were all, at the start of the venture, the former senior. · ·· 
shop stewards. 
--· . .-· 
number of special meetings can be held during working hours to discuss matters 
of importance that require urgent consideration. At such meetings directors 
could be forced to resign on a vote of 'no confidence' 1 • 
The workforce also exercise some influence over the appointment of 
organisers. AlthoUgh appointed by the Board an organiser first has to be 
approved by the section of workers invqlved. If ever a section of workers 
2 . 
express serious disapproval an organiser can be removed or demoted p 
On the whole the organiser has tended to function as ~ co-brdinator 
of production rather than an authority figure controlling the workforce. 
Each worker acts as their own inspector and, with a few exceptions, everyone 
3 is able to change work tasks<. \•fork tasks themselves were initially enlarged 
to allow the workforce to gain a wider appreciation of the process and gain 
better job satisfaction. 
The hiring of new labour is done by the Personnel department but 
even here the workforce have an important say. All successful candidates for 
employment have ultimately to be vetted by the workforce section in which they 
are likely to be employed4 • ~:•W;tlr,:: s· · 
In the area of design enthusiasts from the workforce meet on a 
1. The voting distribution is the only major anomaly in this otherwise egal~· 
itarian institution. Each person who has been with the co-operative for 
twelve months or more is allowed a vote. A person can, however, acquire 
extra votes by having a longer employment record. Thus, the person with 
two years employment with the co-operative is entitles to two votes; three 
years employment gets you three votes, and so on up to a maximum of five 
votes. 
2. This has actually happened during the life of the co-operative. 
J. The only exceptions are those jobs in which a special skill is required and 
where ths job is dangerous to the untrained person, i.e. , welding' .. : 
4. The Perso!l..'1el department keeps a list of former employees of Neriden who 
have expressed an interest in working for the co-operative, plus a number 
of other interested persons \fho have writen in for work. Candidates are 
drawn from this list - of over one-thousand names - when a vacancy occurs. 
regular basis and discuss ideas for improvements and modifications to the 
motor cycles. 
Hages and conditions: For much of the developing 'years of the 
co-operative the principles of egalitarianism were reflected in the very 
wage structu.......e itself. Up until 1977 everyone at the fileride·n factory received 
the same wage , , regardless of skill,\sex, age, years of service, and work \ . . . ' 
done. Everyone was, initially, paid fifty pounds a week and this was increased 
to fifty-six in late 19761• 
Norale: In· a number of ways Meriden was a shining example to the 
British labour movement. '£hey had occupied their factory and even:tuallJ: · 
became its new owners. .They boldly declared that they would have no truck 
with narrow demarcation lines or pay differentials, nor would they retain 
·"· . 
traditional structures of authority and control. Ownership was to mean an 
active and on-going process. Hhat i.s .more,. despite a number of severe diff-
iculties, these changes seemed to be paying off in terms of improved production. 
Direct decision making surely made some contribution to the "high 
morale" of the workforce well into 19762• Absenteeism had been reduced to a 
two percent rate compared with a seven percent average for other firms in the 
Coventry areaJ. As a result of changes which included job enlargement and 
i 
voluntary job rotation the workforce were quickly able to overcome.any bottle 
-neck that occurred: demarcation disputes ·were a thing of the past. The wages 
structure, it was claimed, led to an improvement in the quality of production. 
1. 
2. 
During a study tour in October 1976 it was pointed out that the tea lady 
received the same wage as the Director who was showing us arOl.lJld the factory. 
The strength of egalitarian feeling at the co-operative is sh9?!n.~n the fact 
that for many of the skilled workforce staying with the co-operative meant a 
drop in wages in the order of £20-JO week. Cf .Fleet, 1977, :p.10.5. ::- .. 
Hhen asked. Hhether they liked working at the co-operative Heriden workers 
largely seemed to answer to the effect that, ''of.'course 1 like working here, 
I own the fa,ctory'. Several workers were questioned informally during the 
October 1976 study tour. 
--· 
J. Within the factory in 1976 notices indica~ed that for the 47 weeks up to the 
middle of october the absenteeism rate was 1.8%, i.e., lower than that officiall 
st.atea.. · 
.·. '~~··~ l. / ·. I ."1:,.1',.. ; 
This was largely due to the ending of productivity arrangements. In addition 
the very fact of a flat-rate pay system allowed the co-operative to do away 
with the need for a huge wages department as had previously existed under 
the former company. 
If ever a workers' co-operative can be pointed to as having made 
a positive contribution both in providing i challenge to capitalist ideology 
and raising sections of workers' aspirations then it must be Meriden. They 
had a leadership commited to some form of co-operative principles and a 
workforce.similarly inclined due to months of discussions about the nature· 
of the new venture. The only serious flaw in the whole si. t.~~l9.Ii~wa~ .. the .... , , 
curious fact that the Meriden leadership would have nothing to do with the 
co-operative at Kirkby. Infact, there was mutual/hostility between the two 
co-operatives: both claiming to be the only true co-operative in a situation 
reminiscent of the dispute between China and the Soviet Union. This was 
doubly sad given that in time an even bigger enemy - the capitalist economy 
- was to undermine various of the egalitarian trehds within Meriden. 
K.M.E. - Thorn or Flower? The sit-in by workers at I.P.D. in 
Kirkby began as a reaction against planned redundancies and closure. And, 
as with many other such actions, the primary motivation of the I.P.D. wo:dters 
was to save jobs. In fact, in the early stages of the crisis at IPD the 
shop stewards supported the firm in its e~forts to get an Industry Act loan. 
on several occasions stewarus lobbied the Labour Government for aid to keep 
open the firm and certainly at this stage the idea of a workers• co-operative 
was not in their minds. . ....... 
The idea of a workers' co-operative very much arose out of the 
negotiations that senior stewards had with the Minister at the Department 
of' 1'-.td.de and Industry (DTI) - Tony Benn. A statement by :Benn reveals the role, 
I 
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j 
that he played in pushing the ideaa 
"There was suspicion among the shop stewards when they came to the Department 
of Industry: suspicion about what we were trying to say to them. 
First of all they said "We want you to save the firm. That's what 
we want. \fill you give money to save the firm?". And to get them to believe 
that we were really not interested in saving the firm but we were interested 
in saving the jobs and saving the production - it took a very long time to 
persuade them that it was not a con-trick by a Minister who was finding some 
excuse for not helping them in the ordinary way that Ministers help firms -
by giving money to the firm" (1). \ ·: 
Elsewhere it has been pointed out that, 
.. 
"The co-operative idea ••• emerged from the talks between '.i.'ony Berm and the 
Conveners, Spriggs and Jenkins" (2). 
Eventually convinced of the.idea the conveners began to put 
together the outline of a plan for a co-operative to be submitted to the DTI 
for financial assistance. In the meantime the Official Receiver was in the 
process of attempting to find a new buyer for the firm. Not until they were 
relatively sure of government aid did the conveners then take the plan to the 
occupation workforce. As convener Jack Spriggs was to put it, 
"We first ensured that the co-operative idea had a good chance of acceptance. 
and then we could go to the workers and say 'look, we've got the chance of 
government backing for a workers' co-operative if you'llagree to it" (J). 
Faced with such a compelling proposition the workers did accept the idea but, 
"as a pragmatic, expedient prospect for running the business; it did. not come 
from any deep groundswell of unified political commitment. It was primarily 
reactive" (4 ). ! 
l. T .Benn, 19717, pp. 71-87. 
2. T .Eccles, 1977, p.155 
J, Study Tour interview, Oct. 1976. 
4. T.Eccles, op cit, p.155. 
'···. 
Once again the new co-operative began with only a minority of the original 
workforce; in this case less than seven hundred became involved in the sit-
in with a further eight hundred staying out of the action. Despite the 
various weaknesses in the situation the workforce leadership did manage to 
forge ·some COTh~tment to co-operative principles among the workforce as a 
whole. 
\ ' 
Hanagement structure: At the Kirkby co-operative -renamed. Kirkby Nanufactucing 
and Engineering (KNE) - democratic principles were made a central e-le.men1. ,of 
management but more in the form of a representative democracy rather than the 
direct form prevalent at Meriden. It was decided to have two Directors Ofl_ly •. 
These were given responsibility for the day-to-day decision making. Below these 
a number of departmental heads were created or maintained along with the roles 
of General Manager, Personnel Manager and \~arks Nanager. 'l'he ultimate 
decision making body, however, is the governing body consisting of the former 
shop steHards' committee\ the majority decision of this body is binding. 
The right of hiring lies in the hands of the Personnel ~mnager but 
. 2 
only from a list of candidates vetted by the ~overning body • Similarly, 
the General Manager has the sole responsibility for sackings but his actions 
are bound by a "code of operations" and sacked workers have the ultimate right 
of appeal to the governing bodyJ. 'l"'his right had, in fact, been tested in the 
I 
early life of the co-operative. A strike occurred after the lieneral r1anager 
sacked tHo workers for failing to move to other tasks within the factory. The 
1. At first a "Harks Council" Has established - separate from the shop .:;tewards' 
committee - to take on this function. Very quickly it became defunct ana. 
the shop stewards' committee effectively took over the function. 'l'his body 
of course i:6 ultimately re;;;ponsible to the entire workforce in:-ma~: _meeting. 
-2. Priority employment is given to unemployed trade unionists. Anyone with 
a record of having previously accepted voluntary redundancy is not eligible. 
'3. sacking, according to the "code" is to be restricted ·':,o "industrial 
misconduct.". Redundancy was not to. be alloweu; work;;;haring wa:;; to be the 
rule where the situation warra~ted 1t. 
... l 
--· 
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strike lasted for twenty-four hours and was resolved by the intervention of 
the two Directors1• 
One potential problem area with the process of democratic management 
at KME lies in the fact that both the Directors retained their union positions 
of convenor and deputy convenor and as such continued to sit on the shop 
stewards' committee. This put management on those committees which considered 
policy and the appeals of disgruntled workers. The safety valve, however, lies 
in the fact that as union representatives they would be liable to re:eleciion 
on a periodic basis. 
Ownership: Unlike Meriden the ~liD co-operative decided that all 
employees should be a one pound shareholder. All shareholders have an equal 
vote in the say of the co-operative both at shareholder meetings and works' 
mass meetings. No plans were made to introduce the Neriden electoral system 
of one vote for every year of employment at the co-operative; the only uneven 
situations were in regard to new comers who were to be allowed a vote only 
2 
after twelve months employment with the venture • 
Decision maki~a Directors are responsible for many of the day-to-
day decision making but they. are subject to re~election every year on a 
majority vote of the shareholding workforce. In the meantime the shop stewards 
committee are empowered to over-rule Director~decisions and in turn this 
committee have to answer to mass meetings of the entire shareholding workforce. 
The majority decision of mass meetings is binding and such meetings can be 
1. 
2. 
Director Jack Sprigg!3 has since stated that the General Nanager a.cted 
"hastily" in giving the order to the two workers to change tasks and acted 
"hastily" once more in sacking them. 
·····. 
One danger in universal share holding, that the Neriden workers hoped.to 
avoid, is the fact that if people leave the co-operative's employ they are 
legally entitled to take their share with them. Further they are also 
entitled to sell their share •if ther remain'·'with ·the. co~op'erative ,' :. . ~. ·" 
or not. This creates the danger of' outside" shareholders. Aware of this · 
the co-operative "encouraged those leaving to give up their <Ll share". 
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called at any time by the Directors or the shop stewards' committee. The 
workforce are entitled to raise any item at these meetings. Such mass meet-
ings were being held about every six weeks during 1976. In addition there 
is a constitutional annual general meeting of all shareholder members to 
decide on policy. 
Wagest At KNE economic "realities" rather than political P:t::inciples 
determined the wages structure. The wages·structure was rationalised into 
~. ' 
three categories of payment; a skilled, semi-skilled and an unskilled rate. 
All KME workers were paid on one of ~hese grades •. This excluded the Directors. 
They received a wage according to their previous level of skill - both were 
semi-skilled. This entitled them to the going rate of forty-nine pounds a 
week. However, the egalitarianism ended there because in addition they 
received a further sum of three thousand pounds a year as a Directorls fee1 • 
Morale: After eighteen months of operation morale at the works 
seemed high. According to the Directors morale was a lot higher than it had 
been under the previous employer and certainly this was the impression coming 
from the shop floor~. It is difficult to ga~e just how definate an effect 
this had on absenteeism as the Directors would say no more than that there 
was "some improvement" over the old employer situation- • Labour flexibilty, 
however, had improved considerably. Skilled workers were willing to take on 
lesser skilled work when required to and this was assisted in the fact that 
it did not require them to experience any drop in wages~ • 
1. 
2. 
J. 
such a situation is not necessarily out of keeping with the principles of 
co-operative working. EXtra responsibility and extra hours can be a good 
case for unequal payment. It is curious, however, that Jack Sprigg~ chose 
to stress - during the study '!'our interview - that his wage was at the oemi-
skilled rate and that he did not receive any overtime payments "despite 
working irregular hours". 
The workforce appeared, indeed stated that they were, happy. The workpace 
appeared leisurely and in some cases two people carried out tasks where one 
might have been used elsewhere. . . . . 
The choice of flexible working relat~ons l1es Wlth the workforce and is 
tempered only by situational requirements and skill requirements. 
The fact that the co-operative was run along democratic lines will have 
undoubtedly contributed to the morale within the KME factory but there is 
some evidence that many of the workforce were still not fully committed to 
co-operative principle&. For many the co-operative still represented, 
"nothing more than the right to work and to escape the dole queue" (1). 
Nonetheless, despite various problems the ~~ co-operative contained ~y: 
advances in democratic management; serving, again, as an inspiration to 
many within the labour movement and acting as a new challenge to ~apital~~t 
ideology. But once again economic factors were to help undermine these 
advances; factors which played on leadership weaknesses2• 
The Hostile Economic and Political Environment. 
As a political challenge the worker co-operat~_ves - especially Meriden, l{lvlE, 
and (to some extent) Scottish Daily News - represented a new stage in the 
ongoing open political-industrial battles of the 1970s. The challenge, howevert 
lay more in the nature of a·contribution to socialist ideology rather than 
representing any genuine inroads into the power of capital. The threat lay 
in the fact that other workers in thriving industries might begin to attempt 
to emulate their co-operative brothers and sisters. A major weakness in the 
worker co-operative situation lay in the fact that they all arose out of 
I 
situations of industrial crisis for the previous company3• This represented· 
a weakness both in terms of the survival of the co~operatives themselves and 
the continued strength of the co-operative principles in force, A workers 
1. 'The Times', 17th January 1977. 
2. One weakness was the:1·'fact: that KME ·Dire·c~ors had=a-hostile~a.tt±tud~c.· :_ i>/~:1 
to the Meriden co-operative; accusing them of being sectarian and too _ 
utopian in the running of their affairs. They also held the attitude that 
Meriden was doomed to failure and that ~v~ should have nothing to do with 
them. In fairness, they had made attempts to contact 1v1eriden with a view 
to some form of co-operation but were rebuffed. 
J. To a limited extent the Leadgate situation is different given that the 
closure was more due to the company's manipulation of regio~b·srants. 
co-operative at Ford's would have had far more practical, as well as'ideol-
ogical, implications for British capitalism. 
F~~enham Enterprises Ltd~ Whatever the financial situation of 
. . . i -:o.~~\f·_-.;, •. ·. ·, ... 
funds would be available to them • 
The co-operative started life with the old machinery from the 
previous company, purchased with a loan from the ~cott Bader organisation. 
The product consisted of various oddments of leather wear at first but after 
a while the workforce- concentrated on the production of uppers for shoes but, 
/ 
necessarily, on a sub-contracti~ basis. '£his: however, put the co-operative 
at the mercy of "the.seli';..sal!ie market situation that had killed off their 
previous employer. Indeed, with aheavy recession in the shoe industry the 
firm sub-contracting out the work faced serious financial difficulties and 
the co-operative lost their main source of employment. They continued for 
a short while after this and began to work on wool and tweed designS but by 
the end of 1976 the IWC were referring to the end of a "brave experiment"~-:~:--::;;. 
It had indeed been a brave· experiment. At best the co-operatfve only ever 
employed thirty and paid a maximum wage of around twenty-three potUlds a week. 
For a period of some weeks wage3 had been as low as ten pounds a week and the 
venture had to survive;several shortages of caoh before finally collapsing3. 
l. 'The I1orning star', 27th July 1972 •. 
2. The IWC, =enarkably, did pronounce death a little too soon as the co-operative 
was still to be found in operation as late ao July 1977. 
). They had to survive the loss, in early 1975, of their part-time financial 
adviser, David Spreckly. Spreckly resigned after the co-operative failed 
to take his advice to liquidate the firm that year. 
r 
! 
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Night bridge En&ineering Ltd: A major factor that undermineci the 
Nightbridge venture was the economic arrangements that it concluded in 
order to begin operations. The sub-contract work that. it concluded with the 
former comr::a:ny - Stibbe ·- was both the making and the breaking of the venture. 
It is difficult, however, to know if they could have done better by taking 
a different direction. 
The product at the Leadgate factory vias textile machinery and this 
. . . . -· . . 
provided a compelling reason for attempting to come to a deal with the stibbe 
company. Unfortunately, the venture did not diversify its outlets and 
produc~and .faced a serious crisis when Stibbe ran into financial difficulties 
in the midst of a recession in the textile industry •. For the Stibbe company 
the first to go was the sub-contracting uork. The count.cy Has expe..ciencing 
a steel shortage about the same time and this affected supplies to the ailing 
Nightbridge. The crowning problem was the introduction by the then conservat-
ive Government of the infamous "Three-day working week". 
Faced with such a vast crisis it was decided to close down the 
venture and re-open as a new company operating along much more traditional 
·managerial lines. The idea of a new company vias made possible by an agree-
ment made by Director rred Carlyon with the Churchill company to wuck 9n the 
assembly of machine tools. i~hy the co-operative venture could not continue 
is explained by Carlyon: 
"The factory was in des:pe.cate trouble and couldn'~ ignore the Churchill offer, 
and yet twenty of the thirty employee::;; l'fere '::;;pecifically trained. to the 
0tibbe product and couldn't cope Hith the change in the :product" ~1). 
For Carlyon there was no 6Cope, either in time or finance, to allow for re-
training. 
l. Interview, Study Tour, October 1976. 
His advice to the workforce was to close down, distribute any funds left, 
and re-open with new labour and with funds attracted, in part, from private 
sources. The workforce agreed, but a number of questions remain. Wasn't it 
possible, for example, to attempt to diversify the work at an earlier stage 
and allow for some element·of retraining? ·And·just how·true is it to say 
that two-thirds of the workforce could\not have coped with the change of 
product? The factory was new and was staffed by a workforce which in~luded 
many who· had gohe through government retraining centres1 • Couldn't·. oth.er 
work have been found that the workforce could have coped with? There may qe 
no easy answer to any of these questions and, if·nothing else, they reveal 
the economic difficulties that confront a co~operative leadership and which 
can defeat even the ideologically strongest workplace leadership. 
In this case the leadership, in the form of Carlyon and Rostron, 
was ideologically weak on the question of worker co-operatives and the econ-
omic difficulties served to strengthen their views of reality. 0adly, the 
man who had fought "for human dignity" in the summer of 1972 was declaring 
2 by December that "a state of goodwill exist;;; between u;;; and the company'' and 
by October of 1976 was stating that, 
"I still have socialist ideas but we've got to manage a company. It's got 
to be viable. You've got to convince other people because you live in a 
commercial world • • • He were forced to conform to the established commer-
cial ways of doing things. Now confidence is building up" (3). 
In late 1976 the new company headed by Carlyon was somewhat different 
from the former venture. Carlyon continues a.s director but at a salary at 
1. Carlyon himself had been retrained. Interestingly, in the course of the 
new company vrork was diversified and reliance on Churchill weakenad. 
2. (Newcas~le) 'Evening Chronicle', 15th December 1972. 
J. Study To:lr intervie'H. The"confidence"refered to by l!arlyon refers to that 
of the ba..'l..~s. 
least double that of a shopfloor worker in his employ. 'fhe company chairman 
is now an "outsider" with no connections with the former workforce struggle 
or indeed wi t.'l ths workforce. The new chairman - I>lr. Johnson - bought his way 
into the new firm and owns no less than one-third of the company. Norale 
has also cha.."lged. Hhen asked hoH employees like working for the new Night-
bridge company1 Carlyon replied that it was, 
\ 
"not really different from working for other companies. i~e started off with 
broad democracy - consulting mass meetings. But then we got the articles of 
association changed and now.operate as a limited company" (2.). 
Shopfloor workers at the factory expressed the view that Nightbridge was like 
~ other employer in the area and that it was no more satisfying to work there 
than anywhere else3. One worker admitted that he was in the process of look-
ing for another job. 
Carlyon did express the view, in 1976, that he hoped that one day 
Nightbridge would once again operate as a workers•co-operative. However, 
there is little evidence to suggest that steps were being laid in that 
direction, on the contrary a number of factors were developing which would 
serve to prevent such an occurrance, i.e., th~ involvement of Johnson. 
Hhat was a temporary advance in workers' control was rapidly converted i!lto 
an exercise in~etty capitalism. The weight of capitalist ideology in a 
situation of economic difficulty was too much for the ideologically unprepared 
Leadgate workers. For the time being the leaded gates of commercialism 
would appear to have closed around what had been something less than a 
radical experiment. 
1. The company name appears to have been :cetaineo .• 
2. Stucly Touc i.nte.cvtew, Octobe.c 1976. 
J. study Tour factory interview;;;, oct.1976. 
···· .. 
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The Scottish Daily News: The economic viability of the 'sDN' W<fs. under-· .·;·, 
·mined, ·by· '· a mu11ber of serious weaknesses. Fi.cstly, the former· owners had 
felt compelled to close down two of its nevrspapers due to economic difficult-
ies. Certainly the newspaper industry vras experiencing a serious ~risis1 • 
This meant that the co-operative venture would need to overcome se.cious 
marketing and advertising problems in order to survive in sucm a cut throat 
industry. An early analysis estimated that the nevr paper could break even 
if it could gain a circulation of tvro-hundred thousand per day, with~·an __ ; 
advertising content of forty. "Percent and with a total workforce of around 
six-hundred2• 
The great problem for such a nevrspaper would be that it would have 
to appear vrith a relatively clear identity, which, as exampled earlier, it 
failed to achieve. Thus, secondly, in a situation of crisis the paper failed 
to produce a product vrith a distinct identity. 
_,·,-"; .. :. 
Thirdly, the newspaper needed a skillful and relatively unified 
management. Again they were sadly lacking. Fowcthly, the newspaper needed 
·• 
considerable financial backing if it vras to have a chance to survive. ~~ny 
new ventures take the view that they may need to run at a loss for anything up 
to a year before they begin to become established and hold an important 
element of the market. The financial backing for the 'bcottish Daily News' 
was piecemeal, inconsist.ent and badly thought out. :Indeed it ca:ru:.be argued. that. 
the nature of the financial arrangements is the key to much of the newspapers 
failure._.. The question of management is strongly linked. 
To begin vrith, the Government decided to help the co-operative get 
off the ground with a loan of one· and~ three-q ua.rter millL:m pounds:·~ ,li,:i~hout 
this loan it i.::; more than certain that the co-operative would not have been" 
1. The Unions involved accepted to a certain extent that to argue fo.c the 
retention of the 2,000 Scottish jobs could involve a challenge to the 
:.::-ecurity of -t-he jobs of their Hanchester and London collegues. 
2. This was the estimate of Hilliam ~·iolfe the co-operative's financial advisor. 
.. :' / 
~· ! 
embarked upon. Regrettably the loan was given with a number of strings 
attached and surrounded by a number of uncertainties. The Ninister responsible. 
Tony Benn, agreed the loan against the advice of his mm advisers.· In 
addition Berm could only agree the loan if it had a number of conditions 
attached. The co-operative, for instance. had to raise almost half-a-million .. 
pounds already promised plus a furth~r half million in equity or unsecured 
loans with a further three-quarte;s of "a ·milli~n in secured loan1 ." As if 
that task wasn't large enough·· potentia.l investers would have to be made ~ware 
of the unfavourable report prepared by th~ DTI and the City of Glasgow 
consultants. 
The financial arrangements Here SUCh that they almost .inevita.bly· J?Ut 
an important element of the co-operative into private control. Things might 
have been better in another direction but in this case the financial require-
ments of the loan allowed in the capital investment of Robert Na,x:well. 
Robert Maxwell agreed to invest fifty pence for every pound invested by the 
workforce, and he made no bones about his involvement. He apparently stated 
that 'his return would be in political capital; the· publicity of his involve-
ment would be his reward, it could prove to be an aid to his future political 
l .f ,2 l e • 
The Action Committee, aware of Naxwell's former bad financial 
record with the Pergamon Press company, nonetheless de9ided to go along 
w.i.th his offer "but to be careful"). But I>'laxwell 's involvement was to cost 
them dearly. Haxwell had ambi tioris of his own which interfered with the 
running of the co-operative venture and on the eve of publication he put 
forward an ultimatum conditional on his continued financial involvement: 
....... 
1. A.Nackie, 1977, p.l22. 
2. Ibid, p,ll6 
3. Ibid, p.ll6. In 197~ a lJ.'l'.I. investigation into the business affairs of 
Haxwell concluded that, "he is not • • • C~, person who can be relied on to 
exercise proper stewardship ?fa publically quoted company". 
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"The co-operative -vrould have to agree to producing an evening edition; would 
have to accept Haxwell as Publisher; would have to put the needs of the pax;er 
before the demands of the unions; directors would have to commit themselves 
to resign in advance should they find themselves.in a position of disagree-
ment with the other directors" (1). 
Faced with these conditions or the collapse of the co-operative the Action 
Committee, according to Nackie, had. no alternative but to go along with them. 
This was not to be the last time that Maxwell would use economic 
\ 
threat to impose conditions on the workforce. At the start of the venture 
he occupied the position of non-executive co-chairman but, aided by the~-
Paper's economic difficulties, he was soon to asslli~e day-to-day responsibility 
for the running of the paper. The venture had begun with a ci:tculation of 
around three-hundred thousand daily but by the second week this was down to 
two-hundred thousand. Nonetheless, the General Hanager could state at the 
end of Nay that the Paper was selling enough 6-opies to make the venture 
viable. By August, however, several difficulties had set in and at this point 
Maxwell stepped in. He offered additional financial support but with himself 
in a leading position. Tragically this brought a double problem for the 
venture, not only did it signal a shift away from democratic management but 
at a cost of incompete~nt management. Without reference to anyone Naxwell 
announced a four point plan to save the paper: the price of the :product was 
to be reduced, there was to be~ pay-back scheme for advertisers in which 
rebates would be paid if circulation had failed to meet a two-hundred and 
forty thousand daily print, a new tabloid style was to be introduced, and 
the :paper Has to be run on a twenty-four hour basis with morning and late 
afternoon editions. Maxwell's plan not ·only failed but may have further 
damaged the paper IS eCQrlOmiC Viability • 'l'OWacdS the end Of ;:)epte~~er daily 
. :::. 
::: 
1. A.t1ackie, 1977, p.l2?. 
circulation was running at one-hundred and eighty thousand and the paper was 
. 1 
losing twenty thousand pounds a week • 
In addition to changes in the newpaper's style Maxwell had introd-
uced a managerial style that was to severely hinder unity within the venture. 
The 'Sunday Times' was to comment that by now NaXwell had turned the paper 
into "an instrument of his own ambitio~s" imposing "an astonishing personal 
regime", 
"Freq_uently, production of the.paper (was) interruptedas Hobert Nax.well _(came)· 
onto the public address system, booming out exhortations to the workers and 
execrations of .,saboteurs" and "malcontents" who (were) opposing his plan5 
and - by extension - threatening the workforce with unemployment" (2). · 
Maxwell, in turn, appeared to place the failings of the venture not on his 
ovrn errors of judgement but on what he called a campaign of hostility on the 
part of the 'Sunday Times .3. In the midst of-an even greater financial crisis 
· Maxwell resigned from the paper's executive position claiming that he was 
doing so in the interests of the paper; reaso~ing that in doing so the 
'Sunday Times' would cease its "malicious campaign". That was october 1st. 
Six days later the Government turned down pleas for more financial assistance 
4 
and.the Prime Hinister refused to meet a deputation from the paper; •. On the 
21st October a provisional liquidator was appointed and five days later the 
'Sunday Times' announced.that the, 
"Scottish Daily News has ••• temporarily ceased to be a co-operative. The' .. ,:?:':'·'>~;. 
workers no longer control the organisation now that the provisional liquid-
a tor • • • has taken over". 
1. 'The Times', 2Jrd ~eptember 1975. 
2. I. Jack, p .K..11ightly and J .Fox, 'How Nax.well Sabotaged the Workers' Dream', 
21st September 1975. 
J. 
4. 
.. ·~. . 
Ibid. 3efore Naxwell resigned he had managed to force several oppohen~s 
off of the Action Committee ;y.· contribute to the resignation of the financial 
advisor jichard Brinston. Brinston resigned after his firm had been dis-
missed as auditors at an Executive !'leeting that he was specifically asked 
not to attend. His firm was replaced by anothr who had acted as auditors 
for Naxwell's Pergamon Press. 
The paper, it can be argued, Has :.;~crificed. to politicalr.expedienc;y.ti:Jith the tran~=>fer of Tony Benn rrent any fuc t-he1.· corrun1 tment to wo.c.t~..e.r co-ope.ca ~ves. 
A key element in the collapse of the 'Scottish Daily News' was undoubtedly 
the way in which the venture was financed. That a Labour Government supported 
the funding of a worker co-operative is remarkable but the strings attached to 
the finance reveals that the action was born of a political compromise. 
Tony Benn had. won the day in winning support for the venture but only after 
severe restrictions were placed on the support. Those restrictions helped 
\ 
bring Robert Naxwell1 into the picture. ,Additionally, far from p\ltting 
political· support into the venture the Labour Government withheld-:. ·any-- fur-ther 
financial support and this factor finally helped to ensure the venture's 
death. This was a factor that was to weigh heavily against the survival 
p.cospects of the other ventures of K.M.E. and Triumph Heriden. 
Synova Ltd: If the worker co-operative at the former Triumph Meriden works 
can be held up as a prime example of co-operat'ive principles then it was also 
to be a prime example of how such principles can be undermined by economic 
circumstances. 
The new co-operative vent.ure of Synova was to be hindered by its 
industrial context, namely a failing British ~otor-cycle industry. To have . 
overcome this inheritance would have required a massive re-investment progr-
amme and some product diversification. This did not happen and again the 
nature of the venture's initial funding is a vital key to the problem. 
l. Maxwell had been accused from an early stage of having an interest in the 
production of an avenin~ newspaper and of using the co-operative to this end. 
In ~3eptember 1975 ~21st The 'Sunday Times' stated that, 
"Haxwell • • • makes no secret of the fact that he proposes to relaunch 
the 'Scottish Daily News' as an evening paper under his own control". 
Haxvrell described the charge as "totally untrue", and continued 
"I have ambitions to control and own a Daily or Evening paper but none that 
concerns the 'Scottish Daily News' "(BBC 'Nationwide' intervl~ni/ lOth Nov. 
1975). 
Once the provisional liquidator was called in the fir.:;t person, 
in fact, to shoH any interest in buying the-plant and building was Robert 
Maxwell. This Has not accepted, and interestingly HaxHell had declined 
to iake over the paper a.s a going concern, (1"ne ''1'imes', 21st Oct. '75)._ 
--· 
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The crisis in the British motor-cycle industry& In the 1950s there had 
been in existance over twenty British motor-cycle manufacturers enjoying 
the vast majority of the market sales. At that time motor-cycles were 
enjoying boom years- reaching a peak in 1959. In a.sittiation parallel-
ing that in the British shipbuilding industry1 motor-cycle manufacturers 
concentrated on short-term profitability, failed to substantially 
re-invest within the industry and failed to diversify their products. 
With a growing slump in the market throughout the 1960s and the growing 
competitive challenge of the Japanese several British manufacturers went 
out of business. By the onset of the 1970s and a revival.of the market 
the Japanese were well placed to capture a sizeable part of the British 
2 
market .• 
In the early 1970s sales of new machines rose by a steady twenty 
to twenty-four percent with the biggest growth area being that of mopedsJ. 
Only a handful of British firms remained at this time and these produced 
mainly_large bikes of 4.50 cubic capacity and bigger, four-fifths of which 
were being sold abroad. The British firms included the Triumph factory 
at Meriden which concentrated on producyion of the large bikes; the 
Wolverhapton factory of Norton Villiers in which over sixty-percent of 
its machine tools were more than twenty years old; and the BSA factory 
at Small Heath with inefficient buildings and lay-outs dating back to 
the First World-War and earlier4. The major Japanese companies entered 
the market with a range of motor-cycle capacities and with a capital 
investment almost four times greater than the major British firms5. 
1. See Chapter 5. 
2. Cf. 'An Industry Outclassed'• The Times (editorial), 1st Aug. 1975; 
s~-.Fryer, 'Norton's final backfire? ' , The Sunday Times, Jrd' Aug. '7 5; 
'Motor cycle sales set for boom', The Times, 21st Aug. 1975; J.Fryer, 
'Is Brit~in's bike business now into its final skid?', The Sunday 
Times, 26th October 1975. 
J. The Times, 21st Aug. 1975. 4. K.Fleet, 1971r, p.89. 
5· J.Fryer, op cit, Jrd Aug. 1975. 
As a consequence sales of British bikes in the USA over the period 1969-
74 remained constant at thirty thousand units while Japanese sales rose 
from twenty-seven thousand to two hundred and eighteen thousand units1• 
In Britain the Japanese had, by 1974, captured eighty-three percent of 
2 the market while British manufacturers could only manage three percent • 
GoverP~ent aid - a political footballt Clearly, if the 
British motor-cycle industry was to survive then fairly drastic measures 
had to occur and chiefly in the field of investment and diversification 
of :product. Measures taken by the Conservative Government in 1973 
brought about an amalgamation of existing manufacturers3 and formed, 
what was to become, a disast~-ous--: link between the Meriden factory and 
those of Wolvenhampton and Small .Heath. 
From the begining of the merger management-policy proved 
di-visive. The managing director's first :major move was to attempt to 
close down one of the three factories and concentrate production at the 
other two. The factory chosen for closure was Meriden and this led to 
an occupation which increased the new company's problems4 • The occ~pation 
1. J .Fryer, 'Norton's final backfire? ' , The Sunday Times, Jrd Aug .197 5 
2. P.Wayma.rk, 'Notor cycle sales set to boom', The Times, 21st Aug.l975 
3. The· new company was called Norton Triumph Villiers (NVT). 
4. Poore, the managing director, had been advised to close the Small Heath 
factory which was a lot older and less efficient. He chose Heriden 
however. Felix Keane, a Neriden Director, claims that Poore at that 
t:i.lnewas probably' motivated by the fact that he would have been able to 
get a better price for the Neriden site. (study Tour Interview, Oct.1976) •. 
K.Fleet (1977, p.90) adds that, "Poore wished to 'rationalise~_:product­
ion, concentrating on Small Heath simply because wage rates were·.:.l()Wer 
there and the workforce more docile". Fleet also assesses that Poore-'"-- ... 
probably· hzd . ~ intention of selling the Neriden sit.·e "as a spares 
depot to one of the motor manufacturers • • • and thus make a nice, 
fat capital profit for his company". 
.-· 
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prevented the company from removing completed bikes, both weakening 
NVT's financial position and creating a situation in which it missed 
the vital spring sales drive in the USA1• 
By the spring of 1975 the company was in serious difficulties. 
The Meriden factory was in its eighteenth month of occupation - and 
non-production, and Dennis Poore was ptessing the government for forty 
. . ·.· 
million pounds aid for a massive re-investment programme. Meanwhile 
Meriden workers were pressing the government for funds to establish a 
co-operative venture2• The government came up with the worst of both 
worlds. It financed the establishment of a workers• co-operative but 
. .. . . . 
in such a way that it would prove difficult for it to survive economicall~ 
' ' ' 
and it failed to provide any more financial a~sistance to NVT which forced 
./'" -
it to close down shortly afterwards. In the :process it tied the 
co-operative's fate very much to that of NVT by the arrangements it had 
established in providing public funds.~ 
1. J .Fryer;· 'Norton.'.s final backfire', The Sunday Times, )rd. Aug.l975· 
2. Dennis Poore and the workforce at the BSA works were very much opposed 
to this. In fact, the BSA workers carried on a long d±visive struggle 
against the Meriden co-operative. 
J. It provided the Meriden venture with £1.5 million in the form of a 
grant to purchase the company from NVT, plus a loan of £4.2 million 
at a concessionary 10% interest rate to be repaid over a 15 period 
and with the first payments begining after 5 years of operation. These 
terms were "less favourable ••• than (that given) to NVT". They 
received, at the begining of the amalgamation, £4.8 million in Government 
preferential shares with all dividends waived for J years before the 
option to buy out-the shares or pay interest. (The Horning Star, Jlst 
July 1974 ). As it turned out the co-operative was to receive no more 
financial assistance; NVT, on the other hand, received a further sum 
of £19 million. 
A further problem was that the ownership of Heriden's marketing 
arrangements and outlets was to remain with the NVT company. ·--- ... ,. 
··--. 
I 
The short of it was that a Conservative•Goverlli~ent had made a 
financial comm~tment to saving the British motor-cycle industry but 
maintaining the ownership and control structure which had presumably 
presided over the developing crisis. At the same time it turned its 
back on the :possibility of assisting 'a workers'_ co-operative ventureo 
The change of government in 1974 caused added problems for the industr-y 
in that it represented for a short while a struggle of opposing left and 
right forces with the left marginally gaining the ascendancy on the quest-
ion of workers' co-operatives. That ascendancy was quickly ended but left 
the new workers' co-operative in existance bu~ faced with an unsympathetic 
Industry Minister. Unwilling to nationalise the remaining motor-cycle 
industry but equally unwilling to put any more public funds into a 
privately owned one the Labour Government allowed the industry to die..: 
leaving, ironically, a weak and unaided co-operative to battle on. 
Indeed, by 1979 the Meriden co-operative remained the sole 
British manufacturer of motor-cycles but now it faced the repayment of 
nearly one and a quarter million pounds in interest due on government loans 
and a new Conservative Government. In early July the co-operative, in 
financial difficulties, appealed to the new government either to waive 
the interest payments or to defer them until the end of December. The 
answer once again depended on the political character of the government 
and with the Industry Ministry in the hands of one of the Conservative 
Party's most.ardent right-wingers1Meriden's closure was forshadowed. 
The political football had bounced in yet another direction. 
1. Sir Keith Joseph. Sir Keith announced in the House of Commons on 
the 17th July 1979 that,"Having considered carefully all the material 
put forward by Meriden in supp9rt of this request, the Government has 
decided that it should not be granted". (Financial Times, 18th July 1979) 
Synova in the world of capitalz The Synova co-operative was 
born against a background of an industry in crisis. Various e·conomic 
problems beset the venture even before it got off the ground. The fact 
of the occupation itself meant that the famous Triumph motor-cycles 
were not marketed for ·avmost two years. This along with a public 
uncertainty about the future of the British motor-cycle industry and 
fierce Japanese competition helped to ensure the loss of a vital 
element of the market. 
Badly needing funds to get off the ground the Meriden workers 
instead faced procrastination as hostile elements in the government and 
civil service worked to hinder and constrain the positive assistance 
offered by Industry Minister Tony Benn~. The NVT company at the same 
. 
time kept pushing up their asking price for the Meriden machinery as 
the conclusion of the government agreement drew nearer. This added 
three-quarters of a million pounds to the buying price2• 
The fact that NVT retained control over sales outlets was very 
quickly to cause the new co-operative problems. In July of 1975, with 
the co-operative ir~ Its infancy, the NVT company was in serious trouble. 
1. 
2. 
i 
I 
The co-operative began on the basis that they would :Lea~e.:the 'plant>·. 
from NVT - who would supply components and purchase finished machines. 
This situation would continue for a month - until April of 1975 -
when the co-operative would have to make an offer to purchase the 
factory outright and complete the deal by August of that year. 
The fac~ that the whole process took over a year to complete -
from the time Tony Benn took office in February 1974 until March 1975 -
was due to opposition from the Industry Developments Advisory Board 
(IDAB), from certain members within the Cabinet, and from the 
Treasury which "dragged its heels over the final agreement". Of. 
K.Fleet, 1977. 
.... ....... 
Fortunately the government agreed to provide the extra Money in the 
form of a grant. (Felix Keane, Study Tour Interview, Oct. 1976). 
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The difficulty seemed to lie in the acquisiti9n of the provision of six 
million pounds in export finance from the government. The loan had been 
offered by the government to· NVT but the company were refusing to go 
ahead with it on the ground that it contained ntwenty pages of impract-
ical condi tions"1• In the meantime NVT were unable to purchase the 
machines that the co-operative had produced for the North American 
market. Synova was caught in the middle of a row between NVT and the 
government and in the meanwhile vast stockpiles of bikes were building · 
up and the. venture was facing a serious cash flow problem. 
This situation continued for nearly three months at the end of 
which the co-operative was faced with a stockpile of over one thousand 
bikes2• · To.,~dd to this further blow to the Triumph's marketability 
both Dennis Poore and Hugh Palin, another NVT director, launched verbal 
attacks on the co-operative. Poore blamed much of NVT's problems of 
the co-operative's existance, 
"Without Meriden there would have been no problems .. (J). 
Palin, in a more damning criticism claimed that the first two prototype 
models produced by the co-operative had a number of design faults which 
made them unsatisfactory.from a marketing point of view4. In:fact, they 
1. The Times, 9th Oct. 1975. 
2. At the end of October 1975 the Export Credit Guarantees Department 
were reported to be willing to underwrite £2 million worth of exports. 
This boosted the cash-flow of both NVT and Synova. 
J. The Times, Jrd July, 1975. 
4. The Times, 2Jrd June, 1975. Palin claimed that the bikes were .. -too .. 
noisy, made excessive vibrations, and did not meet recognised safety· --~--­
standards. 
had been tested at the Motor Industry Research As?ociation premises in 
. 1 
the Nidlands and had passed with "flying colours" • 
Marketability of the co-operative product was to prove a con-
tinued difficulty throughout the rest of Synova's existance. Unable 
initially to compete over the range of motor-cycles and even to compete 
on price to some extent the co-operative emphasised the quality (and 
\ . . 
nostalgi.9history) of their product. To some extent this paid off in a 
specialised market but buyers were continually concerned about parts' 
and this concern was continually exageraged. by news of the impending 
closure of Synova, and by a continued difficulty with marketing ca~ed 
by p~oblems at NVT and a forced stockpiling at Synova. Thus as late as 
October of 1976 Synova was still experiencing problems with NVT in the 
marketing. of the co-operative,',s machines and that month a report of the 
Public Accounts Committee dealt a serious blow in the.claim that Synova 
- along with KME - was not "a viable project". The report went on to 
2 
suggest that the Synova and KME ventures were on the verge of collapse • 
Being competitive was, ofcourse, always a key problem for the 
co-operative venture-~ To some extent it needed to diversify and to a 
great extent it needed re-investment. Any possibility of re-investment 
was problematic. Government funds were no longer available and ironically 
the egalitarian wages system put a serious block on the achievement of 
greater economy through econo~ies of scale. At its peak the co-operative's 
seven hundred workers produced three hundred and fifty bikes per week at 
1. Derek Johnson, Synova company chairman, quoted in The Times, Busin.,ess Nel:Js, 
4th August 197 5. -- ' 
2. PAC report quoted in The Times, 22nd October 1976. 
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which point a maximum profit rate was being a~hieved1 • In order to 
increase profitability at that rate an almost immediate doubling of 
production would have had to occUr but that was not achieveable. The 
problem lay, in part, in the fact that all workers including non-product-
ion workers received the same wage and small increases in production 
would result in the employment of a number of non-production workers 
along with production workers and lead to a drop in the value of each 
new machine per capita. 
The situation was increasingly difficult for Synova as they 
badly needed new machinery to replace existing machinery. Slowly b~t 
surely the co-operative began to enter into associations with private 
capital and to alter some of their principles. In early 1978,Ken li'leet 
of the IWC wrote a note of warning that was so rapidly to be overtaken 
by events, 
"The Meriden co-operative looks remarkably well set for a good future but 
we cannot ignore potential threats to its success. It could be that 
private industrialists, when they are shown that the workers can indeed 
run industry better than themselves will try to destroy it. A future 
Government may be hostile and would be in a position to make life diff-
icult for the enterprise. More subtly, if the concern needs the help 
of outside finance to expand, it may be forced or tempted to modify its 
democratic arrangements ••• "(2). 
In November of 1975 the co-operative had already concluded a 
deal with "outside finance" to. help them diversify. The deal involved 
the assembly of bikes for the Italian moped manufacturer Moto Guzzi. 
1. Felix Keane, Study Tour Interview, Oct. 1976. 
2o p.l06. 
--
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In fairness it would be difficult to claim that this association led to 
any erosion of Synova's co-operative operating principles1• A more 
dubious association was to occur in 1977. As that year began the co-
operative was in a critical position and by July its marketing agreement 
with NVT was to expire and it would have to survive with its own market-
ing arrangements. In January Synova appealed to the government for a 
one million pound loan to enable them to purchase the sales agency from 
NVT and to have some working capital to develop new products and achieve 
. 2 greater diversification. The government turned this down • Curiously, 
two days later the Minister of State for Industry, ALan Williams, met 
with representatives of the co-operative while informally Jack Jones, 
the TGWU General Secretary, met with government financial adviser Harold 
.Lever on the co-operative's behalf. A week later co-operative represent-
atives and government officials held talks with the chairman of the 
General Electric Company, Arnold Weinstock, whose company was reported 
to be considering the allocation of sub-contracting work to Synova. 
In the meanwhile the government reversed its decision and 
agreed to loan the co-operative some money, but only enough to buy the 
sales agency. The loan of further funds was going to depend on the GEC 
I 
company. While Synova waited for the outcome of talks with GEC its 
financial position grew critical and it was forced to close down for 
three weeks and then follow this up with a four day week for assembly 
'" 
workers. Its fate very much depended on GEC. Iir .. fact, GEC provided a 
1. Ideologically it may have been a disappointment to some within_ the 
.. ·~-labour movement. 
2. Audrey Wise, Labour M.P. and IWC supporter, described this decision 
as .. tantamount to sabotage". (The Morning Star, 8th Jan. 1977) 
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loan of one.million pounds. Announcing this in t~e House of Commons 
Industry Secretary, Eric Varley, stated that GEC would take over motor- · 
cyclesfrom Synova until they were sold1 and they would also provide 
some technical assistance, management and marketing advice. In addit-
i'on Lord Stokes, the former chairman of British Leyland, was to act as 
consultative to S~nova.::on international sales. 
Outside finance had moved in and in a big way and in the event 
the co-operative experienced an erosion of its managerial perogatives 
and hence its democratic management. Furthermore; it had done so to 
a company that had experienced more occupations than any other, and with 
the involvement of the former director of a company which had experienced 
the second largest nulllber under his directorship. The .situation.was 
summed up by a Conservative front bench spokesman, John Biffen, who 
stated tha.t, 
"there would be much fascination that Sir Arnold Weinstock, an unabashed 
apostle of capitalism, would be providing support for the Meriden 
co-operative" (2). · 
The situation certainly caused consternation within sections of the labour 
movementJ and has since seen a situation within the co-operative where 
leading figures resigned or were replaced in management positions, the 
wages structure was altered to reintroduce differentials and productivity 
incentives. · The last part of the Ken Fleet prophecy unfolded with the 
1. GEC took control of Synova motor-cycles at cost and once sold returned 
the profit to Synova. 
2. Quoted in The Morning Star, 8th February 1977. 
3. Dennis Skinner, Labour M.P. for Bolsover, for instance, pointed out that 
"intriguing" developments occured during the negotiation of the -'!Meriden 
-\'leinstock Venture". These included a £163 million rights issue which_ 
benefited GEC and also a delay in the building of the Dra.x B Power · 
station and other related power policy matters which also benefited 
the GEC company. In the words of Skinner, "Could it be said that 
the Weinstock involvement in the Meriden affair was a. sprat to catch 
a mackerel?n (The Morning star, 8th Feb. 1977). 
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election of a Conservative Government in the spring of 1979. This 
indeed proved to be an hostile government and Synova was forced to 
begin the process of winding up its affairs, being unable to gain the 
funds necessary for economic survival. 
Without a doubt the Synova co-operative had a strong leader-
ship: ideologically left and committeu to co-operative principles. 
What killed off the co-operative1 in the end was a series of almost 
•. 
insurmountable economic and political problems beyond the control of 
Synova. However, its death will not signal a total failure. Its 
existance and relatively long commitment to co-operative principles has 
made a significant impact on the thinking of British trade unionists. 
As the 1980s approach groups of workerS facing redundancy and closure 
/ . 
still consider the possibility of establishing their own worker co-
operative and to that extent the Meriden workers must take a large part 
of the credit2• 
Kirkby Manufacturing and Engineering Ltd: -The story of KME shares a 
common theme with that of the Scottish Daily News and Synova., namely 
that the occupation workforce received government funds to establish a 
co-operative and then found themselves faced with a change of Industry 
Minister and a consequent lack of continued support. 
1. At the time of writing the co-operative has not yet been liquidated 
but it would appear to be. just a matter of time. 
2. Amoung those workgroups recently considering the prospect of a workers I 
co-operative are the following: - print workers of the 'Daily Jang' 
(London, August 1976); textile·workers at Courtaulds (Skelmersdale, 
January 1977); textile workers at Courtaulds (Grantham, May 1977}.; 
shoe workers at Tweedsdale 's footwear (Preston, April 1978) and ···. ~-~ .. 
bakery workers at Spillers (East Anglia, April 1978). 
The basic problem that the new co-operative faced was that it 
inherited a failing business and one which could not be revived without 
massive investment funds and some radical restructuring. The government 
had already, in June 1974, refused the former IPC owners an Industry Act 
loan on the grounds that the company 11did not appear to have a viable 
future"1• 
A feasability study on the prospect of a workers' co-operative, 
commissioned by the DTI assessed that, at best, employment could only 
be found for six hundred of the nine hundred employees and only provided 
that there was enough finance to run the business and substantial 
subsidies to cover losses for the initial period of trading. The uri's 
Industrial Development Unit concluded that the proposal for a co-operative 
employing nine hundred and thirteen people would result in overmanniug, 
would be overburdened by overheads, woitld lack sufficient capital and 
would fall short of its sales targets2• 
Against the advice of the DTI Tony Benn went ahead and agreed 
a grant of three million and nine hundred thousand pounds but with the 
removal of Benn shortly after the DTI could now achieve its own prophecy 
by ensuring that KME did lack sufficient capital. 
The K}m co-operative began operations with a government grant 
out of which they had to give one million and eight hundred thousand 
pounds to the Receiver for the purchase of assets. The assets included 
an overly large factor~ which was designed to employ three thousand , 
1. T.Eccles, 1977, p.150 ......... 
2. Ibid, p.l)8. 
J. The factory mairi building is 1020 feet by JOO feet. 
:people. This created a :problem .. of ove:rheads which only have been cover-
. . 1' 
ed at high levels of turnover spread over a large volume of goods • 
Production at the factory, in fact, included a soft-drinks line which had 
only briefly in the past ~v~r.been profitable2 ; a panel radiators line 
in a market of fierce competition; an electric storage heating line in 
a market slump situation; and a line of metal presswork for a car ind~st­
ry that was in recession3. As the Industrial Development Advisory 
Board summed it up in advising against a grant for a co-operative venture, 
.. there wasn't enough profitable activities to offer a :prospect of gener-
. ating a stable :positive cash flow; some of the markets were de1Pressed 
and there wasn't a stable product base; the sheer scale of the factory 
was an obstacle to making economies by curtailing unprofitable activit-
ies such as the soft drinks"' (4). 
To add to the co-operative's proble~s stocks of raw material 
and finished products were out of balance with sales needs and it was· 
almost impossible for it to obtain new supplies except on a strict 
immediate cash payment basis. Adverse press publicity had not helped in 
this direction5 and the co-operative were forced to seek suppliers in 
Holland (for glass) and in Germany (for steel)6. 
l. Previous attempts to cut back on production of some of the less 
2. 
J. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
· profitable lines had led to a cut in the overall costs and an increased 
average profit margin of the remaining goods, but it had left the high 
fixed overheads to.be spread over the smaller volume of goods. "'Ihe 
net result was a negligible change in the overall un:profitability". 
T .Eccles, 197/., p.l45. 
Half of the volume of the soft drinks sales were lost during the inter-
uption of supplies during the closure and occupation. 
Contrary to the workforce leaders' expectations this did not improve and 
motor manufacturers diverted press work back into their own underused 
factories. 
Quoted in T.Eccles, 1977, p.l59 ........ 
-. 
This kind of publicity was to continue over the years and K}m were to 
suffer the same criticism as Synova in the Public Accounts Committee 
Report in 1976. 
Jack Spriggs, KHE director, study tour interview, Oct.1976. 
I 
i 
.. ·.. I 
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Des~ite various handica~s, however, th& new workers' co-
o~erative began to become successful where ~evious owners had failed. 
The soft drinks line had already become marginally ~rofitable within the 
first six months of ~roduction1 and ~reduction of domestic radiators had 
to be ste~ped u~ from seven to ten thousand units per week2 ~ The 
Business News section of 'The Times', ·in fact, was moved to comment 
· that, "Kirkby Co-operative Confounds its Critics .. and claimed that the 
factory was already "heading for profi ta.biii ty by the end of the year" • 
Part of the early success story lay in the con.clusion of a deal 
with a Midlands company for the exciusive manufacture of its ventilation 
systems. 
The Co-o~erative Barty were equally_optimistic and cou~le of 
/ 
months later, 
"(KME) may well show that a co-operative conglomerate can succeed in a 
plant where a succession of ca~italists failed over fourteen years•• (J). 
Unfortunately the co-operative had a long way to go before it 
could climb above the serious cash flow handicap that it started operat-
ions with. It beg~with a grant which had tied to it terms which 
·prohibited the seeking of any private cash loans, and yet fairly shortly 
was effectively starved of any further government support. A:j.though 
l. 
2. 
J. 
This was remarkable given that they started production under the handi-
cap that the Receiver had been selling off product lines cheaply to 
get rid of them. . Thus, the new production appeared to retail·· at a 
greatly increased price. 
This offset a failing in regard to electric storage heaters which, 
contrary to co-operative leaders' expectations, did not experience an 
upswing in the market situation. 
.. ....... 
18th AUWJst 1975. -...... 
achieving some success in sales and marketing the· Co-operative began 
operations with a loss of around thirty thousand pounds a week. By 
the end of the following year production again seemed promising and the 
directors were confident that several lines would become profitable1 but 
nonetheless they expected to experience a loss of one million and four 
hundred thousand pounds for the year's'-.trading • 
. ·• 
Bravely the co-operative venture struggled on but continually 
h~pered by a cash flow problem and a lack of government support. By 
late 1978 it was rumoured that far from providing cash support to the 
venture infact the government were to support an attempted takeover by 
. a subsidiary of Metal Box2 • While this never finally materialised the 
venture was forced to close in the early summ~r of the following,year? • 
. ·' 
Although with more organisational problems than Synova the 
KME co-operative strongly raised the banner of worker co-operatives 
amo·n~~-: sections of the British trade union movement and its eventual 
failure was due largely to economic and political problems beyond its 
control. One commentat0rhas summed it up neatly, 
. --
"Has it been possible for KME to succeed? The answer, given KME's 
intractable commercial problems, the state of the economy and the 
underl'unding, is "barely". · Has KME • s performance been good, bad or 
indifferent when g-auged against what was possible?The answer is ngood.", 
with occasional lapses into "indifferent". · ' · · · 
Should KME succeed, it will be a potent example of the value 
of commitment and gritty determination against all odds. Should it 
fail, the Verdict on the merits or demerits of CO':"'Operatives Would 
have to be "not proven" " (4 ). 
1. Jack Spriggs stated in October 1976 that only the fruit juice line 
was making a profit. Developments were, however, occuring in other 
directions. On storage heaters KHE were producing directly for the 
electricity board which was· in the midst of a successful sales-drive, 
and comretition had been reduced to a handful. On domestic radiators· , ._ 
K~~ wer~ supplying six companies and interest was growing.(Study Tour Interview) 
2. The Morning Star, 19th Sept. & 15th Nov. 1978. 
J. The empty factory was filled with slogans which read, "Seven years ha ha" 
and "We are all doomed" - Financial Times, 6th June 1979. 
4. T.Eccles, 197·7. 
Summar;y:. 
l ,. ·, ' ·:5sm: ... :·. -~· ... :··. ;. ·-' : 
Over the period 1972-75 six "worker co-operatives" came into being. By 
the middle of 1979 only one remained and even that looked set to close. 
In all cases ~~e workforce inherited a.failing or weak industrial base 
and against a background of general economic depression. This was 
certainly a key contributory factor weighing against any chances of 
survival. In the cases of ID·m, Synova and the 'Scottish Daily News' 
.government aid, with its problematic conditions and subsequent lack of 
assistance, was an added political factor in their demise. It is diff-
icult to say, however, whether continued government aid would have ensured 
these ventures existance much longer and particularly within the context 
of an absence :of change in goverrunent economic policy generally. 
Ueaknesses in leadership was an important contributory factory 
in the demise of the 'Scottish Daily News' and,to a lessor extent, the 
Nightbridge Engineering venture. 
In terms of ideological strenouths the majority of the workforces 
involved acted primarily to save their jobs; co-operative principles 
were either secongary or non-existant. In several instances the leader-
ships varied little from this stance. The Synova leaders and. ]o a slightly 
··'~ :·;-.·{)~ .; ... ~ . . . .. .. · . . 
lesser extent those at Kl•m Here exceptions to this rule. Yet despite 
these Weaknesses the 'worker CO-OperatiVeS I did represent a Cha,l).enge to 
capital. They did raise the idea - both in the minds of some workers 
.and s·ome capitalis:ts _ - that it was quite a reasonable thing for workers 
to attempt to own and control their own workplace; to do rrithout capitalists. 
The vreaknesses went largely unnoticed for many trade unionists along:.w~th 
' 
., 
the negative· factors of leadership displayed at Nightbridge and the o.'::icot.tish 
Daily News'. The strength of leadership at KNE, Synova and Fa..l{enham.,;·· ·. 
-· 
' the very histories and fact of the various takeovers themselves, and the 
reasonably long existance of some of the ventures contributed to a raising 
of the banner of 'worker co-operatives• specifically and socialism generally. 
To this day groups of workers in redundancy struggle continue to consider 
not only sit-down action but the establishment of a workers' co-operative. 
The idea lives on where once, prior to 1971, it was confined to the 
thinking of a few leftwing activists. 
+ + + + + + + + + + 
-. 
CHAPTER' 12 
CONCLUSION: WHICH WAY WORKER OCCUPATIONS? 
"The occupation tactic has thus far failed to fulfil its more radical 
challenge; bei~~ limited to narrow objectives. At this latter level, 
however, it has proven superior to the strike in both its ability to 
achieve limited objectives and in raising ge~erally working class 
consciousness ... 
Introduction .. 
There can be little doubt that the "work-in" at the UCS, in July 197.1,: 
shattered age-old traditions of industrial relations in Britain. It was 
the first1 of over two-huridred workplace o~cupations. 
This thesis has set out to examine how it was that such actions 
occurred and developed throughout the British labour movemento Several 
factors seem to have emerged, albeit in varying importance. These can be 
summed up as the existance of a socio-economic crisis with consequent 
,/ 
effects at the micro level; the 'mishandling' of that crisis at both the 
~~cro (government) and the micro (company) level; the existance of a 
strong and "mature" trade union movement containing a growing militant 
infrastructure in the form of shop stewardships; and the existance of a 
political (CPGB) and industrial (AUEW) leadership ready and able to expioit 
the situation through that infrastructure~ 
· Within the context of the development of occupations the advent 
of the "workers' co-o:perative" merits a..ttention. To some extent this 
represented the realisation of th.e challenge inherent in the work:place 
occupation. These grew out of a situation of wides:pread militancy which 
included the regular occurrance of workplace occupations and the winning of 
office of a Labour Party ready to accede to some of the demands of that 
militancy. 
1. Although not actually the first :post-war British occupation ·it was the 
first of what became a sequence of workplace occupations. 
I 
Beyond summarising those factors which contributed to the advent 
. . 
of workplace occupations this chapter sets out to assess the significance 
of the work for an understanding of "industrial relations" generally. 
It is suggested that while "industrial relations" is maintained 
by the existance of a dominant ideology it is not the only one operating 
within the situation and its vitality rests to a crucial extent on the,exist-
ance of an healthy economic base1• This is also the case with social policy 
which arises out of the dominant ideology; which helps.·to explain the· 
inadequacy of the iRedundancy PaYments Act, 1965•. · More forcibly, it is 
claimed that the CPGB plays a significant and regular role in certain 
.. 
aspects of•'industrial relations". Leadership is considered a. crucial issue 
and it is claimed to be the ultimate deterffiining factor in the success or 
failure of the various actions'and situations described throughout this work2• 
It is claimed that this work confirms that of :Professor V .L.Allen that there 
is a strong link between militancy and shopfloor leadership.- Another vital 
link inthis chain appears to be the existance of large-scale ca.pitalist 
organisations. - t:l '; 
Finally this chapter goes on to examine events since 1975. 
Significantly there have been some reversals concerning the key factors 
under consideration: many former occupation workforces continue to face 
' 
closure, redundancies and curtailment of real wages; the Labour Government 
which came to office on the wave of militancy was defeated after four and 
a half years in office; the right-wing regained the leadership of the AUEW, 
and the CPGB suffered the worst split in its his.tory. 
-- •.. 
·~ 
l. That is not to suggest that it is impossible for capitalist ideology to .. 
be challenged under conditions of economic strength, but it would appear 
more likely to be the case in periods of economic crisis, (see Chapter 2). 
2. That is not to ignore the fact that leadership is a relationship that is 
shaped by a particular set of circumstances. 
It is argued that the Labour Party was unprepared and unwilling 
to build on the militancy of the period and make inroads into capitalismp 
and as a result it failed, when in office, to adequately tackle the crisis 
situation. The CPGB at this time was undergoing an ideological shift 
with consequent divisions within its ranks. Thus, it was unable to provide 
some of the political leadership necessary to ginger up the left oppos~tion 
within the Labour Party and the militant sections·of the trade uni~n move-
ment. '!he :problems within the CPGB were also vital factors in explairiing 
the demise of the Broad Left in the AUEW and the consequent rise to power 
of the right wing. 
Despite these reversals the occupation tactic proved to be 
a more effective weapon· than: thEi'.tradition~::)..' "l;;tri:K~~a..ctiQI!-!' ·.A~~~; , . .\::;. 
such the period since 1975 has witnessed the continued use of the tactic 
and its spread to even more sections of the labour movement. Large 
companies still predominate among ~cupied workplaces.aruiAUEW members 
still figure substantially among occupation workforces. 
Socio-economic crisis. 
Periods of socio-economic crisis appear to have an impact on the working 
class in several ways: objectively their living standards are curtailed 
and, at the subjective level, their attitude towards capitalism may change 
,as a result. At such times sections of'the organised working class seem 
more willing to take part in radical action. This appears to be the 
lesson of the historical overview of occupations in chapter two. 
The handlin~ of crisis. 
Whether sections of the working class take part in radical action and to what 
-·.- ." :~~-
extent depends on a number of crucial factors. One such factor is the extent 
\ 
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to which governmental handling of the situation can be percieved as "fair". 
There will be some in the labour movement already convinced that capitalism 
is unable to solve the needs of the working class.but there-will be some 
.; .. 
who remain to be so convinced. 
Government statements in the Britain of_the late 1960s did not 
contribute to the maintenance of confidence in capitalism (see chapters J 
and 4). More so, government actions in the form of wage restraint· and 
trade union curtailment laws drew attention even more to the problem,s of 
capitalism and in such~a'way as to encourage the view that these were being 
tackled in an unfair way. What had been economic crisis now turned into 
political crisis as a sizeable number of trade unionists engaged in political 
strikes against governmept. policies..,::·~: . 
In the context of widespread unemployment the handling of red-
undancy situations at workplace level also needed to be perceived as "fair" 
and, more crucially, "necessary". In'many cases neither f'actor appeared to 
be evident (see chapters 5 and 6). Many workforces were given short notice 
of impending redundancies and in a number of these cases the companies 
were large and wealthy institutions. In short, militant action was 
heightene~ in a situation where workers were concerned about the general 
economic situation, by tb.e baQ...chand·li~ of ~ffairs by employers. 
The trade union movement. 
With the onset of economic crisis and its exasperation by government and 
employe~ actions the reaction of working people depends on a number of 
f'actors; primarily the nature and strength of the trade union movement~ 
When the crisis began to bite in the late 1960s the TUC affiliated 
trade unions had almost nine million members; the leaderships of so1r1e 
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important unions had shifted leftwards, and th~re was in existance a power-
ful shop stewards movement. As a consequence the left and cceftain shopfloor 
elements within the movement were able to set the TUC on a collision course 
with government and to involve sections of the trade unions in radical 
action, (see chapters .),:,,4~:. !()and 8). 
The shop stewards movement grew as a result of a 'full employment' 
situation and in the face of the growth of large scale companies and large 
scale union organisations. In the competition for labour among employers 
shop stewards were able to use the situation to gain extra concessions, this 
encouraged further the development of stewardships. At another level shop 
stewardetrlpS,wo..:Hkely to be -enooUr:agal b,y·-a/growth in the number of problems 
needing urgent attention but being ignored ip.' th~· machi:p.ery _of.:d~he::.;.large­
scale organisation and/or delayed in the processes of the large scale trade 
union organisation. 
These twin factors may also help to understand the growing 
disenchantment of sections of working people with capitalism. On the one 
hand, 'full employment. helped to encourage ~t'ilans;of cC'ontinua;lly ris:i.:ng:,,,~ 
living standards1• While on the other hand, the growing remoteness of 
industrial organisations will have, ironically, prevented the maintenance of 
any significant commitment'- to the system providing those expectations, i.e., 
ideological conviction .of the value of capitalism. 
When the crisis came sections of workers were further angered in 
the realisation that their expectations could not be met but they were 
well organised to resist inroads into their living standards. 
It was shopfloor organisation that gave ct.lead in the struggles_ 
l. Cf. s.~llet, 1963; R.K.Brown, 1978. pp.44J-4. 
· ....... 
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against anti-trade union laws and predominant among them were the workforces 
of the large companies, i.e., Ford, BLMC, Plessey, etc. (see chapters J and 
4 ). 
The existance of organisational forms which allowed immediate' 
response to industrial problems was thus an important element in both 
encouraging and enabling large sections\of workers to respond quickly to 
political events. 
The AUEW. 
Organisationally shopfloor organisations may not have responded so readiiy 
had not large groups been in a position to do so without incurring the 
wrath of union officialdom. It was no accident that engineering shop 
stewards were to the fore in the many politica~ strikes and workplace 
occupations of the period. The organisational structure of the AUEW 
places much emphasis on shopfloor organisation and is in many respects 
responsive to, and reflective of, opinion at this level. This operated 
in two ways in the period under discussion. Militant shopfloor opinion 
began to dominate the policies and then the leadership of the union. The 
. --
leadership by early 1971 were swung to support the actions already initiated 
by many shopfloor organisations of that union. On the other hand, the 
I 
relative autonomy of shop and district organisation allowed them to take 
action in advance of their nationa~(~eadership, (see chapter 7). 
With their hands relatively free during this period many AUEW 
-
shopfloor organisations could give a lead to other such bodies from unions 
which allowed lesst:t·freed0mcco:6;,mov~ment .. ,. ,., 
Political leadership. 
--..._ 
Finally, in order for sections of workers to be drawn into action there ·- ..... 
needs to be a lead given as to whether action phould be taken and in what 
direction. Here the CPGB played a significant role. Clearly their role 
would have been difficult if it had not been for the exi~~~?~. of a ~ge 
number of shop:t"loor organisations. Thus, the question of organisational 
structure· was a. crucial one. It was through such organisations that the 
Party initiated actions against anti-trade union laws. They did this ~y 
the establis~~ent of the LCDTU which primarily brought together various 
shopfloor and rank-and-file organisations, (see chapters 4 and 8). · 
The Party, through active membership within many shopfloor 
organisations, ~as at the same time able to exert influence on the policies 
and leaderships of various unionso 
The workplace occupations. 
Once the CPGB 's front organisation had managed to involve large numbers · 
of workers in political strikes this had an important impact·on the 
attitude of many towards industrial affairs at workplace level. But first 
came the UCS work-in. Here CPGB militants provided the suggestion.-.,(Sa.mmy 
· :Barr)-;for the action and provided the key driv~ (Jimmy Reid) and organisational 
. . .. ... .. . ' 
co-ordination.(Jim Airlia). 
Now we can see the full.picture of groups of workers facing 
redundancy and/or· falling living standards. These workers have bmrlt.up .. a.· 
shopfloor organisatioh.and have become militant in the process. Their 
militancy, however, has been directed at gaining concessions within the 
existing system. In the late 1960s, in something of a ~mma as to how to 
react. to political eve;tl~s, they responded to a call by tha tcr.ro for.., .. pol.,-
itical strikes. Engagement in such strikes and the results they wer~·---­
achieving altered the thinking of many~ By the early 1970s they faced a 
..·;:--:'" 
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serious problems at their own workplace. Which way should they go? Once 
again CPGB members, this time operating at workplace level, had provided 
an answer. These workers,schooled in militant and then radical (political) 
action, were ready and able to apply radical action to their own workp~ce. 
The workplace occupation was set into motion. 
The workers' co-operatives. \ 
In the midst of this situation it was almost inevitable that some sections 
of workers would consider going 'further'. In some cases small groups of 
thef'.non-conununist left argued for the mass seizure of workplaces as a 
prelude to a more radical challenge to capitalism. In other cases the 
situation appeared to be ripe for attempting to gain legal and formal 
control over the workplace and continue to run ~t as a co-operative 
venture. Of those workforces discussing this six finally went ahead. 
'!he action of those establishing co--operative ventures arose 
out of the context of the widespread development of-workplace occupations, 
the militant unrest and the gaining of office of a Labour :Party containing 
Ministers sympathetic to the co-operative idea, (see chapter 9). This 
- .. . 
latter fact was a major factor in understanding the development of the 
workers• co-operatives. It is likely that the idea would not have merited 
! 
much attention at this_time had not Tony Benn encouraged it among certain 
occuPation workforces. 
Workplace occupations and ''industrial relations ... 
The development and spread of worker occupations provides us with an 
indication of the processes involved in "industrial relations". l?rima:cily 
it indicates that the framework of "industrial relations" is too narrow to 
............ 
allow an adequate analysis of important industrial occurrances 1• 
1. This is particularly true of the hitherto dominant "pluralist" view 
within industrial relations schools of thought. 
' ...... 
I 
·'· 
. t 3)/fQ .L. 
wnile it can be argued that the seeds of, unrest can be revealed 
in poli.cies and procedures pursued within a pa.rticula.:r/company. this thesis, 
hopefully, f!.as revealed that the analysis cannot end there; that other key 
factors lie outside of the immediate situation and in the realm of what·' 
might be ca 11 ~d "political economy". · 
That the thinking and action of workers is influenced by factors 
outside of their immediate working situation needn't rest with any abstract 
or logical arguement: · _ one need,onlypoint to the previous involvement 
of occupation workforces in political strikes whose aims lay well outside of 
the concern of the particular companies involved. 
There is little need here to go over the now well discussed . 
critique of pluralist thought in industrial relations1 • As R.Hyman (1978) 
has so ably put it, 
"Pluralist complacency was bound to wilt in a cold climate; in an epoch of 
crisis, the doctrine has received a practical refutation ..... (2). 
This doctrine accepted the existance of the status quo as given and 
portrayed the parties to "industrial relations" as more or less equal in 
terms of power. It failed to recognise the actual imbalance which the · 
ownership of the means of production gives to one side to the detriment to 
the 6-rorking class) other side, nor did it recognise the powerful and:,:·~< .. : .:~: 
partisan intervention of the State as ~ further source of imbalance. The 
. crisis conditions of the recent period have revealed that many workers~:hav~ 
seen the.existance of serious contradictions between labour and capital and 
:reacted. acc;:o:(dingly; .even though they may well have not gone so far as to 
-"' • ~;·' ••.. 4: • 
gain a fully nrevolutionary consciousness ... 
1. Cf. R.K.Brown, 1978, pp.442-448. 
2. p.46L 
.... ·.· 
As R.K.Brown (1978) has succinctly pointed out, pluralist 
philosophy failed to adequat.ely understand that, 
"Given widespread subscription to egalitarian values, inequalities in 
employment-related rewards and deprivations must always, therefore, be 
a potential source of instability in British society, though one which 
can be diminished if the existing pattern can be successfully 
legitimated" ( 1). 
Arguably such legitimation is more likely to be successful in situations 
where "industrial relations" procedures are able to meet workers' "rising 
aspirations and the expectations of increased rewards from work" 2• i:)uch 
opportunities have proven increasingly difficult since 19683. 
A study of the role of the CFGB in the sphere of industrial 
affairs indicates that from time to time, particularly during critical 
economic periods, another ideological voice is listened to. This has only 
ever _been partial but there are indications that a sizeable minority of 
trade unionists have been drawn to the CPGB's interpretation of events 
f th d . t . t 1. t . 4 and away rom e om1nan cap1 a 1s vers1on • 
Up until now the role of the CJ:GB has either been treated super-
ficially, ignored, and/or regarded as insignificant. This thesis has 
1. p.44J. 
2. Ibid. 
J. Cf. Brown (1978), p.44J; and Hyman (1978), p.461. 
4. For example, the CPGB managed to convince some trade unionists that 
the Conservative and Labour Governments' legislation on trade union 
activities ('Industrial Relations Act, 1971'/ 'In Place of i:)trife (1969)') 
were anti-worker actions introduced by elements'of the capitalist state 
machine. 
That is not to suggest that sizeable numbers of workers becanur: 
communist but that they were, at least for a time, won away from acceptance 
of a "consensus" or "post-capitalist" vieH of industrial life, and-- towards 
a "conflict" or Marxian view. In such cases workers involved would be more-
likely to see their struggle not simply against a bad employer but as 
against the 'employers' or "owning class" and their state representatives. 
\ 
attempted to show that the Party's influence has been far more significant 
than its numbers might suggesta while claiming little more than twenty-five 
thousand members it was able to play a crucial role in initiating political 
strikes which involved anywhere from a quarter of a million up to three 
million workers. In short, the CPGB needs to be counted as one of the 
crucial parties to "industrial relations" ip Brita:ln and, without overplaying 
\ . 
this fact, it does provide a peculiarly different insight into developments 
and events within this sphere. 
Anatomy of the strike: 'l'he unique nature of the occupation tactic 
allows us to observe i:iome of the prbcesses~invoived.in the-development of an 
industrial dispute in a way that would prove difficult in the case of a 
traditional strike. If, for example, a ·group of wor!ters \1ho ,;went.;;;OI:l,.:.strike 
/ 
could be found to .have; been associate\d.,with ano·tn~r group of. workers that-,-
had previously ·been·,on st:J;:ike it woulg. not be clear whether the association 
had been influential on the latter action. It may have been that the 
second strike was largely the result of factors internal to the workplace 
situation. If, on the other hand, we are dealing .with workplace occupations 
then there is a clearer indication that an association between groupo of 
workers was an influential factor. After all it is hardly usual that 
various groups of workers would have independently embarked upon a new, 
radica~ course of action. Somehow the choice of action was probably influenced 
by association with other groups of n{nitant workers1 • 
1. I am not claiming here that this 'argu.tllent~.is Unproblematic. Au important 
difficulty lies in the fact that already-militant worker~ are the more 
like):Y t'9 joiin;~n;i:lit.ant asso9.iat;1i~~· That, however, help~ us to under-
stand the process by which militancy irs sustained and developed and. by .. _ 
observing the spread of worker occupations we can see more clearly how 
this occurs. 
In fact, as has been sho~n in previous chapters, occupation work-
forces were linked by a myriad of industrial and political organisations. 
The occupation tactic was spread through the affiliates of the LCDTU; 
through combine co~~ittee organisation; through official and unofficial 
industry-wide stewa._rds' organisation; and/or through local trades council 
organisation. Workers used to thinking about a certain course of action 
when faced with redundancy were encouraged to move in a radically different 
direction; firstly, to resist redundancies and, secondly, to do so in 
dramatic fashion by the staging of an occupa~ion. The fact that it was 
the occupation tactic which these workers employed helps to reveal more 
clearly the significance of these political and industrial organisations 
in the spread of militancy. 
This argwnent expanQ.s- .on the work of Professor Allen1 in regard 
to the role of the shop steward in the development of militancy. Clearly, 
not all shopfloor organisation is militant nor able to respond militantly 
to events (see chapter 7). In' a number of cases the militant action of a 
group of workers is facilitated, possibly even inspired, by their links 
with other shopfloor and branch organisations. There were cases where 
previously non-militant workers occupied th~ir workplace due to ~filiation 
with (~.,g.q Netal :Sox~ ~I:a.uchester; 1972)- aM 'enco\).l'ag¢mt]nt from (e.g., 
Faken.flam, 1972) fellow trade unionists. Thus, the factor of inter-related 
shopfloor links might well be more crucial than hitherto believed. 
Again the role of the CPGB has to be taken into account as an 
important factor in the spread of militancyc Allen (1966) ~derstated the 
role of politically motivated activists in this~- regard..-- The question- 9f- _ .. _ 
1. V.L.Allen, 1966. 
leadership has been an important consideration within this thesis. It has 
been argued that those who took part in the early workplace occupations 
had previously been drawn into political strikes. The initiative for 
such radical action in both cases stemmed from CPGB members and like-
minded others. 
For those who want to deny the rdle of the CPGB and to play up 
the role of worker spontaneity they can point to a large number of 
workplace occupations where the workers involved apparently responded 
without a certain kind of leadership and certainly without any direct 
CFGB involvement. What they cannot qo is to pick out such examples among 
the "pioneering occupations". Nor can they date such "spontaneous" 
occupation actions to the period prior to the advent of the political 
-----·. 
strike in 1969. Of course many actions will arise "spontaneously" with 
the absence of a certain kind of leadership but probably only after 
certain conditions have been created. Here the role of the CPGB was 
important in providing the leadership which created those conditions. 
Events since 1975. 
There have been many reversals since 1975; many of which throw doubt upon 
some of the conclusions of this thesis. Indeed some commentators have 
already anticipated the problems involved in this approach. For instance, 
R.K.Brown (1978)1 points out that, 
"The growth in militancy between 1968 and 1':174 now appears much less per-
manent in the light of the decline of strike activity since that period 
• • • ; there has been widespread acceptance by unions and their membe:rB 
of further pay restraint since 1975, however much this may be for 
'negative and pessimistic reasons'; and some of the supposed 'explosions 
of consciousness' associated with strikes or occupations have proved 
short-lived" (2).: 
.. ·~. 
1. This recent summary of current trends in industrial relation~ provides 
a useful starting ~oint from which to counter possible criticisms of 
some of the thesis arguments. 
2. p.45J. 
Brown goes on to comment further on the question of the workplace occupation: 
"Indeed the challenge presented by an occupation is in most cases less than 
it seems; the demand is for work under another, conventional, employer, not 
except in cases like the Neriden motor-cycle factory, for workers' control 
or workers' ownership" (1). 
The base of the criticism appears to centre upon the question of "class 
consciousness" and the acceptance or non-acceptance of .the legitimacy of 
the existing social order. Indeed this has continued to be a critical 
question for l1arxists. 'D:te'"J?roblem for· thi,s thesis can· be stated· thus: 
if CFCB leadership was crucial in the decade described and workplace 
occupations signalled a development in class consciousness how b it that 
strike action declined, apparent wide-spread support was given to pay 
restraint 7 the right-wing gained power in the AUEW and a new Conservative 
Government came to office with a large majority? lt"'urther, how was it that 
these things occurred in a period of continued socio-economic crisis? 
The answer is by no means unproblematic but Brown touches upon it, 
albeit without allowing it too much credence: 
"Faced with this sort of evidence the Marxbt argument has focused esp-
ecially on the question of leadership, arguing that full class conscious-
ness is unlikely to develop spontaneously ••• "(2). 
I would a:rgue that leadership is the crucial issue here. That the CPGB were 
unable to bring large numbers of workers into social conflict around 
revolutionary demands in no way denies their ability to provide leadership 
around a number of issues which involve a partial recognition of the weak-
ness of capitalism. Ind~~d r·would claim that the economic situation was 
volatile enough to allow the CPGB to provide leadership to large numbers of 
trade unionists, but that this could only be taken so far due to the 
-···· , .... ··-----------------------------
1. p.45J. 
2. p.454. 
numerical and ideological weakness®s within the Party's ranks1 • The crisis 
threw up leadership needs but the CPGB was at one of the weakest points in 
its history. Its membership was dwindling2 and it was undergoing a crisis 
of identit~. In addition its industrial influence far outweighed its 
political influence. Consequently the CPGB's strategy was to channel 
industrial unrest towards political victory\for the Labour Party and as 
pressure for leftward change within that party. 
That the Labour Government remained basically unchanged is 
substantially a question of the weakness and relative absence of revol-
utionary leadership. If it is true .that leadership 'is an· essential element 
in raising working class consciousness,thenit is surely true that thi~. 
needs to be strong and able enough to maintain and develop that consciousness 
and that is what the tiny CPGB lacked. 
This raises the whole question of class consciousness which, although 
axiomatic, Marxists have not yet fully come to terms with. It is often sup-
posed . that class consciousneii>s arises . out of~ class conflict.t i:o so~how main-
tained and Q.eveloped:;a.nd is then transla:~, through leadership into revolut-
. . ' / . . . 
ionary action. It. is rarely conceived: that at the time of the "revolution'~ 
the class consciousness of the great majority might only be partial and 
potentially temporary. And it is rarely conceived that class consciousness 
among the many may possibly only be maintained in the event of a successful 
revolution and not otherwise. What is ~o surprising about the fact that so 
many workers achieve a high point of class consciousness only to lose it 
l. 
2. 
It should be added that the CPGB's strategy for revolution did not include 
turning such industrial unrest directly into the seizure of capitalist. :pl::'ope:r:ior. 
I am not unaware that this in itself is in need of explanation but that is 
an argument that rests elsewhere and involves discussion of developments 
in the world communist movement. 
The CPGB at this time were rapidly moving towards the development of a 
"Eurocommunist" line involvi:oo a re-think on many treasured issues •. 'fhe dP.bate diverted much energy 1nward and proved too much for many act1v1~ts 
who left and formed a "New Communist Party". 
;· ... · 
within a short period in the context of a situation where the means of ideological 
production remains firmly in the hands of the capitalist class! 
Marx dosen't really help in the resolve of this problem. Through-
out his writings he indicates that, ideally, revolutions are mad.e by a 
class conscious working class. Yet ~~x is also concerned with the question 
of leadership and in the Communist Manifesto he talks of the need for a 
revolutionary party which is defined as one which contains the best and 
most class conscious elements of the working class. In other words, it is 
possible to be more and to be less class conscious. Whatever, the historical 
evidence seems to support the view that revolutions can and have been made 
by populations in which a substantial majority have only partial class 
consciousness. 
I would argue that "explosions of consciousness associated with 
strikes or occupations" ca.nnot simply be said to have been "short lived". 
It is too early to tell. While it may be argued th&~ such consciousness 
has regressed it could be that given a resurgance of revolutionary leadership 
this might only prove to be aregression to the back of the mind1• 
On the question of the challenge of worker occupations themselves 
Brown misses an important consideratio~. It is true that such actions were 
less radical than they might have seemed if one expected that they were part 
of a movement for immediate "workers' control". However, at one level - as 
Brmm admits earlier - occupations represented a "challenge to property rights 
(and) can be considered • • • more challenging than a strlke"2• 
l. One could say, to the back of the consciousness! 
·· ..... 
2. Brown, 1978, p.4_5J. 
As such they helped to raise the consciousness of many involved. On the 
. other hand, collectively they formed part of the onslaue;ht on capitalist 
policies which, if only tempora.r,l.ly halted, may well have prevented a 
rapid move towards more authoritarian rule. This gives the occupation 
a much greater social significance; with the argument that the actions 
should be seen as a collective contribution to working class attitudes 
. \. 
in the struggles of the period, and should not be looked at individuall~ 
Finally, I would comment that it is disap:pointing but unde:rStanda.ble 
that :fu:own should concentrate on the work of Hyman with its emphasis on the 
trade union official/shop steward leadership dichotomy. ·:':qle -~t~e .of 
such leadershipr in turn, will depend on the existance and nature of a 
revolutionary party. That is, that the question of leadership cannot be 
. . . . /. 
~, 
ultimately left within the context of the trade- unions themselv~s. Th~, 
fo:r instance·; T would argue< that; .the~ reaQon f<ir the demise of the AU~W ~ .t 
·• . . • I d 
Broad.J Left is; t0 _be foUnd in.!! the. divisions withil\ th.a._ QPGB .... With tq~;.c ,, __ ,_-
·' . .~. 
were able to.win·corrtr.ol Q~ :t¥1,e Union •... ·:~,~: ... ,_:. ·,_-.,.;.. ,:·,i', ,, . 
. . ,. ···-··.··· ... ·_ ..... . 
the/Ia~(;l,n: · a.dmihlstra.tioa:is~ eip~..:ed b~t· several factors. A key point 
~- . . . . . . 
lies in the fact that it is easier to gain a united front againbt something 
' 
than in favour of something. ~ large numbor in the labour movement 
were already committed· to social denooratic policies., This divided them from. 
those who weren't but who nonetheless had accepted the need to fight for 
a Labour victory. This latter group were inevitably forced to fight the 
issue out within the organisations of the labour movement as oppos~~ tR 
.... - ..... 
strike actions against employers or government. This struggle might have 
--; ·.·, 
. .. 
been somewhat more significant if the CPGB had been stronger. 
Such factors go some way towards explaining the decline in strikes 
over the period. However, it is disappointing to find :Brown talking about 
a decline. in strike activity as if we were now facing a period of relative 
industrial ~any. To begin with, by his own figures the years since 1974 
show high numbers of "working days lost'~ which fall little below the militant 
yeans of 1968-70~ Secondly, the industrial situation in 1979 indicates 
a level of widespread unrest unequalled since 1970-71. 
Economic crisis continues as Britain approaches the 1980s and once 
again there is evidence. of a growing militanc~ among trade unionists - once 
again faced with a Conservative Government. Ho1-1 the situation will 
develop will depend on those factors which have been the subject of 
discussion in this thesis. 
Workplace occu-eations since 1975. 
Ny estimate in 1974 that the workplace occupation has become a standa.:rd 
weapon .in the armoury of British trade unionists has proven correct. D<~iX'ing · 
the years 1976 and 1977 there have been at least forty-three occupations 
(eight and thirty-five respectively)~ Members of the AUEW continue to 
predominate; being involved in at .least fifteen cases, with the 'IGWU and 
EEPTU following with eight cases each •. In at least twenty-seven cases 
' large companies were involved including Rolls Royce, Plessey, G.K.N., ICI, 
Hassey-Ferguson and Chrysler. Of the remainder ten involved national or 
local govern.rnent institutions including steel works, hospitals and power 
stations. 
Ta.lcen at the level of a localised dispute the occupa.tion .. tactic 
~-.- .:: :,'":·:-.: .. 
has proven superior to the strike in a number of ways. Pickets can stand ·,. ·· 
..... · 
. i 
I 
... -. ---·-··-·· .... ·--- .. ··-··- -·-"··· -·· ··-·----------
duty out of the rain if not actually in the warm. ,Solidarity can be 
built in a number of rrays not possible on an:::-6utside strike picket line, 
e.g., through the introduction of films and discussions inside the works. 
··- ..- ......... . 
·And, most importantly, blackleg labour is rendered vi±tually impossible. 
It also ma_~es it extremely difficult for the employer to gain access to 
supplies and s·tock without the permissi~n of the strikers •. Until tlJ.e 
passing of the laws on tress:pa.ss1 the occupation tactic also helped · 
strikers to avoid difficult legal problems raised by the police in 
regard to picketing. This is still proving to be the case but there is 
no telling whether or for how long the new Conservative Government is 
going to avoid using the terms of the tresspass laws against workers 
involved in an occupation. The future of the occu~tion tactic, ~t would 
seem, is inexorably bound up with a number of fac·cors which in essence will 
determine the future of the British labour movement and "ind:ustrial rela.t-.. 
.ions" over the next decade or so. 
1. In December 1977 the 'Criminal Trespass Law' (Part 2 of the Criminal Law 
Act, 1977) came into force. Cf. C.A.C.T.L. ·pamphlet, 'Workplace Occ-
upations and the Law', March 1978. 
-··· ......... 
· .. -.; 
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